Barriers to Secure ICT in a Maritime Environment by Wood, John
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Barriers to Secure ICT in a Maritime Environment
Thesis
How to cite:
Wood, John (2014). Barriers to Secure ICT in a Maritime Environment. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2014 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
BARRIERS TO ICT SECURITY 
IN A MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
c >•Q)
q . in  
O QJ
cu .cS 
JO  c 
h - 3
John Wood 
Department of Engineering and Innovation 
Faculty of Mathematics, Computing and Technology 
The Open University
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
September 2014
bR-ns op suBmisaon; 30 zotS
ProQuest Number: 13835911
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 13835911
Published by ProQuest LLC(2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Abstract
The purpose of the research reported in this thesis was to investigate the barriers to 
ICT security in a maritime environment so that the findings of the research can be 
used to develop a secure ICT maritime profile that will be capable of being updated 
on an on-going basis. This is an important area of research because the maritime 
sector is increasingly reliant upon ICT yet there is evidence that ICT security and the 
potential threats and consequences if ICT is not available when needed have not 
been given the attention they deserve. Indeed, the literature review carried out as part 
of this research pointed to a big gap in the maritime literature regarding ICT security.
Literature from non-maritime specific fields was used to establish a basic 
understanding of the barriers most likely to be relevant and provide key terminology 
for use in this research. Empirical data were collected from semi-structured interviews 
with Royal Naval personnel and informal discussions with Merchant Navy officers. A 
robust yet flexible approach was used to interpret the results and thus identify the 
barriers, many of which are caused by complex interactions between social and 
technical factors, particularly on-board ships.
Nine barriers to ICT security were revealed. They are: tensions experienced between 
security experts and ICT users; operational imperatives override security 
requirements; security requirements impeding business process; a limited ability to 
recover from disruption; unable or unwilling to share security incident information; 
Inadequate security training; disruption to situational awareness; unpredictable 
behaviour of people in difficult situations; and a lack of ICT security awareness. A 
new understanding of barriers arose from further interpretation of the findings, the
results of which led to recommendations for the design for an updateable maritime 
ICT security profile that could be used to guide relevant staff (including Ship’s 
Security Officers) and as a tool to raise security awareness for non-experts.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 The need for this research
The research described in this thesis stemmed from personal experience that life at 
sea can be fraught with difficulties. Clearly, the most obvious dangers are those 
associated with being in a vessel a long way from immediate assistance in an 
environment that is frequently hostile. These have always existed since seafaring 
began, but in recent years additional dangers have arisen due to a growing reliance 
on electronic Information and Communication Technology (ICT); specifically, the 
implications if ICT is not available when needed. It was my growing awareness of the 
very real threats posed by these dangers that led me to question what research has 
been done to prevent incidents involving ICT security at sea, the consequences if 
such an incident occurs and how to mitigate their effects. A review of the literature 
revealed very limited coverage of these topics which suggested an opportunity 
existed to undertake research to investigate barriers to ICT security in a maritime 
environment.
British Maritime Doctrine (Ministry of Defence UK, 2004) presents a discourse on an 
area referred to as ‘the littoral’(p. 27) which is defined as ‘a 300 mile wide multi­
dimensional coastal zone in which most human activity takes place’ (p. 28). This 
activity can have nefarious undertones as described later in Chapter 2, although more 
often than not, human activity at sea can be seen in a more positive light such as 
research, wealth generation, the opportunity to progress a career or simply 
recreation. In his detailed work on marine economics, Stopford (2009) points out that
the world’s maritime sector can be regarded as interacting transport systems that rely 
increasingly on ICT. There is, however, little evidence in the maritime literature to 
suggest that ICT has been given adequate consideration. For example Arnaud Disaut 
of the National Maritime College of Ireland is credited with saying 'Marine ICT is 
barely studied1 (Cited in Bradbury, 2013, p. 53). When maritime ICT security is 
considered the focus tends to be on procedural aspects. (See, for example, ‘the 
secrecy of correspondence’ (Post Office, 1975, p.2) and ‘forbidding of the interception 
of radio communication correspondence’ (Lees and Williamson, 2009, p. 153).) In its 
report (ENISA, 2011) of an investigation into cyber security in the European maritime 
sector, the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) describe 
how the world’s economy depends upon the shipping sector, and that the shipping 
sector in turn relies on ICT for management, operations and safety. The ENISA report 
emphasises the lack of research and suggests that maritime ICT security has 
‘essential problematic areas’ (ENISA, 2011, p. 1) that are putting the availability and 
integrity of maritime ICT systems, and the confidentiality of the information carried on 
these systems, at risk. The audience for the Agency’s research included 
‘organisations, national authorities, government bodies and private companies that 
are involved in the maritime sector and especially in its cyber security aspects’ (p. 6). 
The Agency used literature regarding private/public partnerships, regulations, policies 
and descriptions of ICT systems together with qualitative data from interviews 
national authorities, government bodies and private companies and quantitate data 
from questionnaires ‘to identify gaps and overlaps in regulations and policies, 
possible security issues linked to ICT systems and interesting initiatives’ (p. 6). The 
research was validated in a workshop attended by the organisations identified in the 
literature. The results of their data analysis are presented in six key findings, the first
of which is ‘low awareness and focus on maritime cyber security’ (ENISA, 2011, p. 8). 
They suggest that this low level of awareness may be due to the lack of reported ICT 
incidents. The effect is such that there is ‘a low sense-of-urgency combined with an 
inadequate preparedness regarding cyber risks’ (p. 8). The second of their key 
findings is the ‘complexity of the maritime ICT environment’ (p. 9). They note that the 
ICT which supports commercial operations can be a complex mix of sophisticated 
technologies. (This finding complements the view of complex military ICT reported 
elsewhere in Chapter 1.) The Agency report cites the increasing use of Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) infrastructure as a specific example of the 
complex ICT which is increasingly used in port operations. They also note that ‘there 
is inadequate standardisation or development of good practices to ensure that 
security is appropriately considered in this particular ICT environment’ (ENISA, 2011, 
p. 9). The third of their key findings is the ‘fragmented maritime governance context’ 
(p. 11) which is leading to a lack of co-ordinated effort across the maritime sector. 
One contributing factor is the diverse laws and regulations which govern inland 
waterways, sea roads and international boundaries which makes it difficult to enforce 
ICT security. Another contributing factor is privatisation of national assets because 
‘security baselines and standards put in place may not necessarily depend on the 
port’s country of origin, but rather on the current owner’ (p. 13). The fourth of their key 
findings is ‘the inadequate consideration of cyber security in maritime regulation’ 
(ENISA, 2011, p. 14). Considerable effort has been applied to physical security but 
‘there is very little consideration given to cyber security’ (p. 14). For example, the 
International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code makes no provision for the 
threats and vulnerabilities of cyber-attacks. The fifth of their key findings is ‘no holistic 
approach to maritime cyber risks’ (ENISA, 2011, p. 15). As a result, only a limited
range of security issues are being addressed and this is being done in an ad hoc 
manner. The Agency report recommends consideration of ‘a holistic approach, based 
on sound risk management principles and good practices, in order to address the 
subject of maritime cyber security’ (p. 15). They also suggest that the holistic security 
approach would require the identification of critical assets used in ports and harbours 
including:
• Automatic cargo handling systems
• Remote control of power and other critical services
• Ship movement management and navigation systems
• Telecommunications systems
ENISA, 2011, p. 3
The sixth of their key findings is an ‘overall lack of direct economic incentives to 
implement good cyber security in maritime sector’ (p. 16). Unlike other sectors, the 
maritime sector has no obvious motivation to improve their ICT security policies and 
practices. The Agency report suggests that it may be possible to make use of 
financial insurance to mitigate losses from cyber incidents including loss of data 
damage to networks and extortion. As a starting point, improved dialogue between 
insurers and the stakeholders in the maritime sector would be required. Such 
dialogue would potentially ‘stimulate the undertaking of better cyber security 
measures by eliminating the barrier of the lack of awareness on cyber-risks involved’ 
(p. 17).
The military navies of the world are responsible for keeping the sea lanes open for the 
‘freedom of navigation’ (MODUK, 2004, p. 41). To support this, and other tasks, they 
rely upon complex ICT to enable the command and control of a wide range of assets 
ranging from ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers to survey vessels, 
tankers and off-shore patrol vessels. (See, for descriptions of maritime military
communications including voice, data, and electronic warfare, NATO (2010).) These 
assets are required to work in all conceivable conditions and circumstances. For 
example, the UK Public Accounts Committee (2013) report into Defence and cyber 
security notes that:
Our Armed Forces use some of the most sophisticated equipment in 
the world, designed and delivered to operate in the harshest 
conditions that our Service Personnel find themselves in
Public Accounts Committee, 2013, p. 3
Should the ICT become unavailable this reliance potentially poses a serious threat to
operations and safety:
The evidence we received leaves us concerned that with the Armed 
Forces now so dependent on information and communications 
technology, should such systems suffer a sustained cyber-attack, 
their ability to operate could be fatally compromised
Public Accounts Committee, 2013, p. 3
The need for research is acknowledged by those in senior roles and will play a key
role in the efforts to make the Ministry of Defence cyber strategy work:
The rapidly changing nature of the cyber threat demands that a 
premium be placed on research and development to enable the 
MODUK to keep pace with, understand and anticipate that threat
Public Accounts Committee, 2013, p. 9
Prior to their 2013 report, the Public Accounts Committee (2008) censured the
Ministry of Defence for having ‘an undesirable record on data security when it should
be amongst the best in government’ (p. 7). They based their criticism on incidents
such as the virus which caused severe disruption to the Royal Navy’s ‘NavyStar’
network and the loss of personnel data from unencrypted laptops. The Department
estimates that, between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2008, 747 of its laptops and 121
memory sticks have gone missing or been stolen. Since the start of this financial year,
a further seven breaches have occurred, which together amount to the loss of the
personal details of at least 1.7 million people’ (Public Accounts Committee, 2008, p. 
21). Even elementary mistakes can lead to serious consequences. For example, a 
French soldier, using an unauthorised electronic memory device, accidentally loaded 
malicious software onto a military system which rapidly spread throughout their 
military network. This in turn led to the headline ‘French Navy surrenders to Conficker’ 
(The National Business Review, 2009).
1.2 Maritime ICT: Key innovations 1860 to 2013
Essentially, maritime ICT is made up of the three components in Figure 1.1. Mariners 
can be thought of as early adopters of ICT with over one hundred years of operating 
experience. Although not exclusively so, this operating experience draws on 
innovations in fields ranging from submarine cable technology and wireless 
telegraphy through to broadband Internet services and the automation of on-board 
systems. This section will look at these innovations in turn. This historical perspective 
is included so that the context of this research can be better appreciated by those not 
familiar with the maritime environment.
International and
Radio Communications 
and 
GMDSSnational authorities
Shipping organisations
Harbours, ports etc. Ship board ICT
Shore ICT 
infrastructure
Figure 1.1: Three basic components of maritime ICT which enable the information flow needed to conduct 
world-wide maritime activity
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From submarine cables to VPNs
Submarine cable networks effectively ‘transformed the shipping business’ (Stopford, 
2009, p.27) when they were introduced in the 1860s. Ship arrivals and departures 
could be tracked in near real time which in turn allowed ship owners to bid for new 
cargoes with a certain confidence that had not previously existed. By the 1980s, the 
introduction of desk top computers and office automation tools led to the rise of 
private networks that use secure leased telephone lines to connect distributed offices 
with a degree of security. (For a description of a Private Branch Exchange see 
Stallings (2007).) More recently, and as noted by Roumboutsos et al. (2005), shipping 
companies have tended to migrate their private networks to shared virtual private 
networks (VPNs), over which they pass sensitive information to remote locations.
One example of the advanced technology that is used in this way is Defence 
Information Infrastructure (Dll) (Public Accounts Committee, 2008). The Dll project 
has replaced a number of single service systems with common to all terminal 
equipment, secure on-site wiring all inter-connected via a VPN. Dll is also extending 
to front line forces such that headquarters, RN ships, army and RAF units can 
exchange information and command and control orders for joint operations. However, 
as Hill (2000) notes, VPN architectures tend to be based on the Internet Protocol with 
all the inherent threats and vulnerabilities they bring. For example, the timely and cost 
effective management of cargoes remains a core principle of an efficient merchant 
fleet. From a security perspective, if the associated management information could be 
intercepted, changed or interrupted, then a competitor could gain an advantage, such 
as ‘the divulgation of cargo information’ (ENISA, 2011, p. 15) or take advantage of the 
situation to smuggle contraband items (Bateman, 2013).
7
Operations: from wireless telegraphy to Internet protocol
Schiller (2003) notes that ‘shipping was a major early client for wireless telegraphy’(p. 
9) in the early 1900s and ‘wireless was standard for shipping by the time the Titanic 
issued its radio distress calls in 1912’ (p. 9). Wireless telegraphy opened up new 
shipping routes by allowing vessels to move off the well-worn trade routes and so 
exploit new regions for commerce. The introduction of wireless telephony in the 
1930s and radio telex in the 1940s established the core radio capabilities available to 
mariners at sea today. (For examples of these core capabilities see Lees and 
Williamson (2009).) The combined voice and data capability of wireless radio is now 
referred to as radio-communication and includes ‘any transmission, emission or 
reception of signs, signals, writings, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature 
by radio, optical or other electromagnetic system’ (International Telecommunications 
Union Radio Regulations, 2008, Volume 1, p. 7). For quite some time after the 
introduction of wireless telegraphy, the technologies available to establish permanent 
links between ship and shore did not exist and so from a maritime ICT security 
perspective, a ship at sea had been considered to be, in effect, isolated from the 
threats and vulnerabilities that were acknowledge in relation to terrestrial ICT. This 
situation has obviously changed with the introduction of broadband real time links 
provided over satellite channels. One example of the advanced technology that is 
now used is Skynet 5. This is a military communications system provided by the 
commercial consortium Astrium on behalf of MODUK through a Public Private 
Finance Initiative (Close, 2013). For an annual fee, Astrium guarantees bandwidth 
availability to MODUK, whilst the contract also permits Astrium to sell spare 
bandwidth to NATO, allied nations and other organisations. This provision was used
8
to provide support to the policing effort during the 2012 London Olympics (Records 
from BBC News Archive, 2012). The satellites have on-board computers to support 
overload planning in the form of automatic routing and messaging precedence, and 
an advanced ‘anti-jam’ capability. Skynet 5 became operational in 2008 and uses 
Internet Protocol and the broadband technology Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM).
Distress: from Morse Code to GMDSS
Although the first wireless telegraphy equipment was not originally adopted to 
improve safety, the ability to call for help from sea was soon recognised as a major 
benefit. RMS Republic demonstrated the effective use of wireless radio when she 
foundered off the east coast of America on the 6th January 1909 after a collision with 
a smaller vessel, SS Florida (Watson, 1995). Even though the distress signal from the 
Republic was weak, it was received ashore and relayed quickly to vessels in the 
vicinity of the incident. The consequent rapid and co-ordinated incident response 
played a major part in the saving of 1,600 lives. Wireless communications also helped 
to save lives when RMS Titanic sank on the 15th April 1912 but in this instance the 
disaster also served to highlight significant communications weaknesses in the 
arrangements and mechanisms that were in place at the time (Mersey, 1912). Chief 
amongst these were shortfalls in internationally agreed distress frequencies, poor 
radio discipline, the lack of agreed message handling priorities and non-standard 
wireless watch keeping hours. As a consequence, the Radio Regulations were 
overhauled to include international distress, urgency, and safety protocols, radio 
silence periods and standard international manual radio watch keeping hours. 
Wireless distress, urgency and safety communications continued to rely upon a 
manual radio watch keeping system ashore and afloat and specially trained Morse
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Code operators until 1988 when the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
(GMDSS) was introduced (Lees and Williamson, 2009). GMDSS automated the 
international safety radio watch keeping system and changed the way that radio 
operators and maintenance staff are trained and employed at sea (International 
Maritime Organisation, 2009). Dunston (2010) argues that GMDSS is predominately 
used by relatively wealthy nations and is too expensive for use by the nations of the 
developing world. He goes on to state that ‘GMDSS implementation by many Flag 
States is less than satisfactory - some ships, particularly those registered under 
‘Flags of Convenience’, are operating under exemptions, in direct breach of the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention1. (The SOLAS Convention was ratified by 
member nations as a result of the Titanic incident (Mersey, 1912).) However, Lees 
and Williamson (2009) suggest that GMDSS was a much needed improvement in 
wireless communications capability because it uses ‘both terrestrial and satellite 
communications’ (p. 1) such that if one fails there should, in principle, be alternative 
means of calling for help. Using satellite communications, which notionally gives 
global radiocommunications coverage, provides another benefit. A vessel’s radio 
communications outfit is now determined by the Sea Area of Operation rather than 
the displacement of the vessel. However, as already stated, not all vessels are 
GMDSS compliant. The owners and crew of those that are not are required to comply 
with the pre GMDSS radio regulations. (See Lees and Williamson (2009) for a 
description of pre GMDSS requirements.)
Military vessels are exempt from Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations and the 
International Naval Safety Association (2011) argues that the principle reason for 
these exemptions is due to the differences in safety ethos between naval and
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merchant vessels. For example, the Master of a ship is legally bound to render help 
during an incident but in so doing they must not stand their ship into danger (IMO, 
2009). The Commanding Officers of warships will also render assistance if the military 
circumstances allow and will, if necessary, put their ship in harms’ way to save lives 
(International Naval Safety Association, 2011). Also, compared to a merchant vessel, 
a warship will almost certainly have more crew members, who are trained in disaster 
support and systems failure recovery methods. However, the International Naval 
Safety Association publication ANEP77 (NATO, 2011) does set out the safety 
standards required for a naval vessel to conform to merchant navy standards. It is 
interesting to note that as of 2013, ANEP 77 does not have an ICT security chapter 
but it does have a chapter on Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
equivalence (Lloyd's Register, 2013).
Ship’s automated systems and ICT
The automation of on-board systems enables larger displacement vessels to be built 
and manned with relatively fewer crew when compared to their sail powered 
predecessors (Stopford, 2009). The forerunners of today’s ICT-enabled systems 
included electric telegraphs, remote steering and damage control systems. Modern 
merchant vessels still rely on these systems but now use common local area 
networks and an array of other ICT ranging from the remote control of engines and 
cargo monitoring to office automation. As well as for dedicated ICT, ships also make 
use of private ICT such as mobile telephones, laptops and other devices. This ICT 
poses substantial security issues caused by authorised and non-authorised 
equipment. For example, such equipment can interfere with ship’s operations, give 
away a ship’s position by direction finding or location tracking or allow eavesdropping
to take place. (See Section 2.2 for detailed consideration of these topics.) Examples 
of ship-board ICT are supplied at Figure 1.2. (For more examples of current maritime 
ICT capability see Digital Ship website available at www.thediaitalshio.com.)
Marine radio provides links which require security
Distress radio 
(GMDSS)
Broadband links Ship to shore radio
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Deck and boat 
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systems
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and switch gear
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Figure 1.2: Examples of ship-board ICT drawn from multiple sources
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Situating the dangers
The literature, so far, suggests that maritime systems and the way they interact is 
complex. It is difficult however to assess the dangers posed to these systems by an 
incident involving secure ICT in a maritime environment because of the apparent lack 
of specific literature on the subject. The Royal Navy’s ‘capability based approach’ 
(Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 172) describes the means and ability needed to 
achieve maritime operational objectives, whilst the associated ‘Fighting Instructions’ 
(Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 214) sets the precedence for recovery from incidents, 
making use of the axiom float move fight. For this thesis: float describes the means of 
restoring critical ICT services; move, describes the ability to restore day to day ICT 
services throughout the ship; and fight is used to encapsulate all the reasons for 
using ICT at sea, such as trade, exploiting natural resources, war-fighting etc. Should 
the crew of a ship be unable to maintain the imperatives of float move fight, then the 
ability to call for help will be needed. Examples of threats to VPN security are 
provided as Table 1.1, and examples of threats to ICT security are listed in Table 1.2.
Table 1.1: Virtual Private Network architectures: examples of threats to security
Source Examples of threats to security
Anderson and Moore 
(2009)
Virtualisation has increased the number and types of ICT that must be protected.
Too easy to create virtual machines.
Unknown network connections & account privileges persist.
Unknown applications -  whether malicious or loaded inadvertently by employees, for the latter 
patches are never applied.
Oversights in configuration settings.
Laptops are offline when vulnerability scans occur/its agent software is not activated.
People not advised that vulnerability scans are to occur.
Data governance is poor. People copy and move information without permissions.
Harris and Hunt (1999) Password sniffing.
Denial of Service (DoS).
Session hijacking.
IP spoofing.
Common protocol vulnerabilities.
Kropp (2006) Business needs brought on by deregulation. 
Movement towards common operating systems.
Witten and Frank (2005) Unauthorised data mining.
Zwicky et al.{2000) Re-routing.
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). 
Re-tunnelling.
Common gateway interface scripts.
Rapid changes to technology with unknown impact on IP security functions.
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T a b le  1.2: E xam ples  of th reats  to IC T  security
Source Examples of threats to ICT security
International Organization 
for Standardisation (2008)
Computer assisted fraud. 
Espionage.
Sabotage.
Vandalism.
Fire.
Flood.
Pillai and Andley (2010) Governments cannot control the internet in their country. 
Cyber-crime.
Theft of ICT assets.
Electronic eavesdropping.
Lack of trained investigators.
Internet Engineering Task 
Force (2007)
Human error.
Deliberate trespass.
Software attacks.
Technical failures in hardware and software. 
Technical obsolescence.
1.3 Research aim and thesis structure
The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to advance understanding of 
security issues associated with the use of ICT systems in a maritime environment. 
Specifically, it seeks to reveal barriers to secure ICT and use them to inform the 
development of a secure ICT maritime profile that will be capable of being updated on 
an on-going basis.
Chapter 1 established the need for this research and mapped key innovations from 
1860 to 2013 in order to better appreciate the context of this research. Chapter 2 
reports the results of a literature review of wireless ICT, cyber security and barriers to 
ICT security drawn largely from non-maritime specific fields that is used to inform this 
research. Chapter 3 sets out the methodology and analysis used to conduct the 
research. Chapter 4 presents a summary and analysis of data collected from Royal 
Navy personnel before presenting a discussion regarding barriers and how they 
manifest themselves. Chapter 5 presents a summary of data collected from Merchant 
Navy personnel and presents information from secondary literature that allows the
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consequences of a secure ICT incident to be better appreciated. Chapter 6 starts with 
a discussion of how the barriers that have emerged from the research can act as a 
stimulus to develop a secure ICT profile before using them to develop a profile that 
will be capable of being updated on an on-going basis. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises 
the research and sets out conclusions, the contribution made to knowledge and 
recommendations for further research. The research roadmap is shown in Figure 1.3.
Aim:To advance understanding 
of security issues associated with 
the use of ICT systems in a 
maritime environment >  Maritime ICT: Management and day to day operations
□  The need for this maritime sector research
□  New dangers posed by 
reliance on ICT
□  Complex systems and policies 
which are not co-ordinated
□  Lack of ICT security 
awareness □  The need for holistic risk 
based security
□  ISPS Code lacks ICT 
security section
□  Maritime military 
issues □  Merchant issues
□  What the literature says about wireless security, ICT security and barriers (Mostly non-maritime specific)
□  What is a barrier? □  Maritime barriers
S  Barriers to ICT security: Key terms to help identify barriers from the empirical data
❖  Scoping exercise
□  Develop research 
methodology
Merchant Navy data 
and analysis
❖ RN interviews 
and analysis
❖ Drawtogether all sources
■S Barriers e.g. tensions between ICT users and 
security experts
>  Maritime incidents and disasters for an 
understanding of what could happen
Key:
□  literature 
❖  Research data 
>  Secondary literature 
S  Findings and conclusions
Maritime ICT security profile
J  Conclusions and 
recommendations
Figure 1.3: Research roadmap
Chapter 2 
Literature review
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this literature review is to investigate further the background to this 
research into barriers to ICT security in a maritime environment. This chapter will first 
review wireless ICT security and the small amount of sector specific literature that has 
been published. It will then look at the literature on barriers with particular emphasis 
on issues that appear to have greater relevance to the maritime sector. At the end of 
the chapter, the findings from Chapters 1 and 2 will be combined to identify the key 
concepts that are most likely to be associated with barriers to ICT security in the 
maritime domain and thus potentially will help to frame the empirical research.
2.2 Wireless radio: security issues
Use of wireless systems ashore has only become widespread in recent years. 
Wireless devices, applications and services now enable remote access to the Internet 
allowing users to vote, bank, shop and interact with social networks from any location 
that has suitable radio coverage (Davis, 2010). This mobility has given wireless users 
greater flexibility in the running of their business and day to day lives and has 
introduced the concept of ‘Mobile Web 2.0’ (Davis, 2010, p. 2). When it comes to 
security, the mobility and flexibility of wireless systems comes with negative 
consequences and many authors have looked at the problems associated with 
wireless. For example, Dunlop and Smith (1994) note that the fundamental physical 
limitations of using radio frequencies are ‘the spectrum available for mobile 
communications is limited’ (p. 513) and that ‘the radio environment is subject to
propagation difficulties and interference’ (p. 514 ). Goldsmith (2005) suggests that the 
difficulties with propagation can lead to quality of service issues because ‘the need to 
use the higher end of the frequency spectrum tends to induce path losses 
[attenuation] which limit service ranges’ and that ‘interference can make the channel 
or medium unpredictable’(pp. 6-8). The behaviour of wireless users has to be 
accounted for in the design of a network. For example, network topology changes as 
users join and leave the network which in turn can impact on the time it takes to 
access the required services (Rackley, 2007). Not only is the available spectrum 
limited but, as Goldsmith (2005) points out ‘there is also heavy competition for a 
scarce resource [spectrum] which has to be allocated to disparate applications and 
systems’ (pp. 11-12). The radio part of the electromagnetic spectrum is divided into 
frequency bands and use of each band is determined by the propagation 
characteristics of that band. For example, the high frequency band of 3 to 30 MHz is 
allocated to a variety of purposes ranging from worldwide communications to 
commercial radio. (For radio spectrum allocation see Clark (1997, p. 161).) The 
allocation and permission to use the electromagnetic spectrum for wireless 
applications1 is strictly regulated and policed at both national and international levels. 
This allocation process can be very expensive (see, for example, the UK allocation of 
3G licences (OFCOM, 2007)) and service providers have to make a return on their 
investment (Rackley, 2007). Interfacing with the networks of other service providers, 
both nationally and internationally, can also be expensive and any unnecessary 
overhead in the data stream will reduce the revenue earning potential of the system. 
(See, for example, Udupa’s (1999, pp.273-274) discussion of overhead produced by 
cryptography algorithms.)
1 Wireless applications include telephony, ‘smart phones’, Web browsers etc.
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As Gratton (2007) observes ‘wireless technology is used where a fixed infrastructure 
[wired2] would normally be difficult to deploy’ (p. 5). For example, electricity, water and 
gas distribution networks are remotely controlled and monitored using Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) infrastructure. (See, for examples, Patel etal. 
(2009) and Piggin (2010).) The range of potential targets from shipping to 
manufacturing and airports makes SCADA ‘an attractive target’ (Piggin, 2010, p. 36). 
The ENISA (2011) report highlights their concern about the increased use of SCADA 
infrastructure in the maritime sector and the potential for ‘the deliberate disruption of 
critical automation systems’ (p. 1) by threats such as Stuxnet. Stuxnet exploits 
combinations of ‘Zero Day’ vulnerabilities, rootkit alterations and antivirus evasion and 
‘is one of the most complex threats they [Symantec] have analysed’ (Piggin, 2010, p. 
36).
Wireless radio traffic is especially at threat from eavesdropping, location tracking, 
deception (spoofing), jamming (denial of service) and tunnelling when compared to 
the wired alternatives (Zeadally etal., 2007). Each of these will now be considered in 
turn. Stallings (2007) explains the five layers of the Internet Protocol ‘peer-to-peer’ 
architecture. These are: physical; network access; internet; host-to-host or transport; 
and application. As well as each layer representing a logical connection between 
peers, the layers also represent the point of access for attacking a network. For 
example, the physical layer ‘specifies the characteristics of the transmission medium, 
the nature of the signals, the data rate and related matters’ (p. 35). The transmission 
medium for wireless is the ‘ether’3 and the signal can be readily intercepted by 
anyone with suitable equipment. This leads to, perhaps, the most obvious
2 In this context, wired refers to the fixed landlines that connect exchanges etc.
3 The Oxford Reference Dictionary defines ether as ‘a medium through which electromagnetic waves 
were formerly thought to be transmitted’ (Oxford English, 1996, p. 481).
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vulnerability of radio traffic, eavesdropping. This can come in two forms, physical and 
virtual, and is normally undertaken to gain an advantage. For example, Gaitskell
(1998) points out that eavesdroppers are looking for passwords, address books, 
company data, or indeed anything that can offer a business or operational advantage 
and unlike other forms of attack, the eavesdropper does not want the sender or 
recipient of the transmission to know it has been intercepted. Virtual eavesdropping 
can harvest vast amounts of data very quickly. However, eavesdropping 
vulnerabilities are not confined to wireless radio and vital information can be exposed 
in conversation. As Clark (1997) points out, ‘it is easier to overhear a conversation 
rather than hack into a network’ (p. 713). Therefore, if people openly discuss sensitive 
security issues, and such conversations are overheard, then the eavesdroppers’ job 
is made easy. Mann (2008) argues that there are two reasons why organisations are 
less than willing to acknowledge this lack of security awareness amongst employees. 
First, the organisations which supply hardware, software and outsourced services 
cannot account for the actions of employees over whom they have little control. 
Secondly, it is far easier to implement technical countermeasures which are tangible 
and as a result relatively easy to monitor and change.
Mobile wireless security is also at threat from location tracking and location finding 
(Lees and Williamson, 2009). Mobile telephony uses a system of ‘polling’ to keep 
track of users who are accessing the network (Rishi, 2005). A ‘base station’ 
broadcasts its location and in return the wireless device transmits a signal allowing 
the system to route voice and data traffic to the appropriate area. Even without 
specific position data, any radio device can be located by direction finding equipment. 
(For examples of the use of direction finding equipment see ‘Station X’ (Smith, 1998).)
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Another position-related vulnerability of concern is ‘Geo-tagging’ whereby social 
media can be used to establish movement patterns and reveal the locations of users 
without the need for wireless interception (Luo et al., 2011). Traffic flow analysis 
methods can be used to monitor data streams and radio activity to reveal patterns of 
use (NATO, 2010). Traffic flow security uses methods which ‘conceal the presence of 
valid messages on wireless radio by causing the channel to appear busy at all times’ 
(NATO, 2010, p. 165).
‘Spoofing’ (NATO, 2010, p. 149) can be used on a radio circuit to cause confusion 
and deception. Spoofing techniques include re-broadcast of edited voice messages to 
misdirect operations. For example, it is possible to use readily available software to 
record voice messages and rapidly edit and retransmit the fake message in an 
attempt to misdirect the legitimate listeners. A version of spoofing, known as 
‘phishing’ (Anderson and Moore, 2009) utilises computers and telephones to direct 
people onto fake web sites with the aim of ‘obtaining bank details and other items of 
private information’ (p. 2717). A variant of this form attack is known as ‘spear 
phishing’ in which fraudsters will attempt to defraud using Trojans and other malicious 
software. (For definitions of malicious software see Pfleeger (1997, p. 179).) Jamming 
can be thought of as a ‘Denial of Service’. As with a wired network, a jamming attack 
can be launched against a radio network in the form of direct flooding of the entire 
band, selective frequency jamming or combinations of the two. Jamming was used 
extensively during 1939 to 1945 in all theatres of war including the maritime 
environment to disrupt communications and cause confusion. The Global Positioning 
System (GPS) may be particularly vulnerable to jamming, as suggested by research 
cited in Richards (2013) ‘a low power GPS jammer could stop all GPS receivers from
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working correctly within a 20 mile area’ (Kindle Location 1907). (For further examples 
of jamming see Schneier (2000) and Smith (1998).) Today, maritime military and 
merchant organisations are looking to Software Defined Radio and Cognitive Radio 
with Dynamic Spectrum Management and Dynamic Frequency Allocation in an 
attempt to ‘make more efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum’ (Rackley, 2007, 
p. 343). During their analysis of the security issues arising from this technology, Leon 
et al. (2010) identified jamming as a serious threat which could deny the use of the 
allocated spectrum to primary and secondary spectrum users. If deployed to sea, the 
new technology will face the Denial of Service (DoS) threats which from malicious 
code that can circumvent security measures (For examples of multi-vector malicious 
software see Pidgeon (2010).)
The rapid changes to technology often have an unknown impact on Internet Protocol 
security functions (Zwicky etal., 2000). For example, tunnelling is a technique which 
allows IP packets to cross co-operating networks. From a commercial point of view, 
tunnelling has the benefit of enabling telecommunications between the distributed 
parts of an organisation without the need to rent dedicated radio and line links which 
can be expensive (Hill, 2000). However, there are tunnelling techniques which can be 
exploited to bypass security enforcing functions. For example, wireless access 
networks can be vulnerable to a tunnelling form of attack, an example of which is 
given by Kalsson (2011). Although wireless radio continues to evolve and the benefits 
of flexibility and mobility are important to day to day life, it remains the case that 
launching an information bearing electromagnetic wave into the ether is not the best 
way of keeping that information private!
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2.3 ICT security taxonomy
This section looks at the taxonomy of ICT security so that the security aspects of this 
research can be better appreciated by those not familiar with such topics. There has 
been a transition from the traditional fortress security paradigm of ‘need to know’ 
towards an open Internet Protocol (IP) paradigm ‘need to share’ in which shared 
infrastructures cross international boundaries. ‘Need to know’ is primarily concerned 
with protecting the confidentiality of information as described by Krutz and Vines 
(2003a) and is still of importance when protecting sensitive information. In an attempt 
to achieve a balance between need to know and need to share, security standards 
such as BS77994 were introduced. Such standards use security risk management 
that balance the business need to share information against the security requirements 
to protect information (Qingxiong and Pearson, 2005). This transition has been driven 
by the ubiquitous nature of ICT and Caralli (2004) has mapped the shift from ‘need to 
know’ to ‘need to share’ as a series of changes. The starting point was ad hoc 
security, in which security requirements were added as an after-thought. Next came, 
vulnerability-based, where vulnerabilities were accounted for at a given point in time. 
Then, risk-based, which uses a balance between risk, vulnerability and cost to 
achieve a sustainable security solution. The final stage identified by Caralli (2004) is 
enterprise-based, which combines risk-based security management with the needs of 
the business. By 2013, ‘Cloud Computing’ has added a new dimension to ICT 
security. This will be considered towards the end of this section. (For a detailed 
description of Cloud Computing security see Krutz and Vines (2010).)
4 BS7799 has now been withdrawn. However, the basic principles are still valid and reflected in both 
the ISO 17779 standards and ISO 27000 controls.
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The role of security risk management is to draw together all aspects of security in a 
cohesive and cost effective manner (International Organization for Standardisation, 
2008). Security risk management methodologies call for a prominent management 
role in security (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002). To achieve ISO 27000 accreditation an 
organisations security management team have to demonstrate their understanding of 
the organisation, what the organisation is trying to achieve, where the organisation is 
operating and the technology they use (International Organisation for Standardisation, 
2008). In his self-styled ‘tongue in cheek’ review of management security, Berghel 
(2008) discusses ‘the false sense of security that can be engendered by following out 
of date and often obtuse standards’ (p.13). Several authors (see, for example,
Pfleeger (1997), Rees and Allen (2008), Kim, etal. (2005), Noe, etal. (2006), McGee, 
et al. (2007) and Herath and Herath (2008)) acknowledge the need for risk 
management principles to be applied early and throughout the life cycle of a project.
A number of security risk assessment methods can be found in the literature. For 
example, the CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) is one of the 
UK government’s ICT security risk methodologies (HMG, 2007). The CRAMM tool is 
also used internationally to justify the need for ICT security and to demonstrate 
compliance with ICT security standards. CRAMM provides a standardised method of 
the analysis and management of technical (hardware and software) and non-technical 
(physical and human) aspects of security. In order to assess these components, 
CRAMM is divided into two parts: Analysis which details what steps an organisation 
should take to identify its assets and the vulnerabilities of those assets to attack; and 
Management which is concerned with how to design, implement and monitor the 
security plan. The components of CRAMM are shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: CRAMM -  the components of security analysis and management (Siemens, 2007, web page)
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Another security risk method is the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003). (See Figure 2.2.)
The OCTAVE method is based on a risk management framework and involves 
identifying the critical assets which require security controls. This is achieved by using 
an ‘asset based threat profile’ (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003, p. 13-14) which identifies 
security vulnerabilities throughout the organisation and delivery partners, and 
develops an organisational security strategy. When using OCTAVE, Caralli and 
Young (2008) suggests that there is a need to identify purposeful activity throughout 
an organisation, not just security activity, so that a broader enterprise wide approach 
to security can be taken. He argues that this wider approach is needed to take 
account of the complexity of ICT systems and because of the move from private 
leased lines and tangible assets to intangible information-based assets based on
ManagementAnalysis
Identify critical assets that enable 
the purposeful activity of the 
organisation
Phase 1
Identify infrastructure 
vulnerabilities
Phase 2
Develop security strategy and 
plans.
Phase 3
Figure 2.2: OCTAVE (Alberts and Doroffe, 2003, p.34)
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‘cloud’ type architecture. He also points out that interconnection and 
interdependencies between organizations have increased dramatically and the 
boundaries are no longer clear. One example of an organisation that exemplifies the 
changes discussed by Caralli and Young (2008) is Nissan UK (Nissan, 2012) which 
offers an example of a modern manufacturing organisation based on outsourcing, 
integrated supply chains, and other external partnerships which have changed 
organisational boundaries and complicated the requirements of ICT security. This 
transition from closed bespoke architecture to open Internet Protocol architecture can 
lead to particular vulnerabilities to cyber-attack because cyberspace is ‘seamless and 
goes beyond national boundaries at the speed of light’ (Clarke and Knake, 2010, p.
2). Whitman and Mattord (2007) define a cyber-attack as ‘an intentional or 
unintentional attempt to cause damage or otherwise compromise information or the 
systems that supports it’ (p. 521). For example, re-routing where a router is forced to 
re-route packets because it believes there is a more efficient path. In reality, the re­
routed packets are either going to a malicious address or are being used as part of a 
distributed denial of service attack. The International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) Cyber Security Strategy Guide (International Telecommunications Union, 2011), 
also known as X.1205, has content that although not explicitly about barriers, does 
suggest objective barriers that could complicate or prevent progress towards a secure 
state in the maritime sector. For example:
•  International legal measures do not allow crime committed across borders to be 
successfully prosecuted
• Technical and procedural measures cannot prevent, detect or respond to cyber 
attacks
• Organisational structures inadequate to prevent, detect or respond to cyber 
attacks
• Inadequate knowledge and expertise of cyber security
• International co-operation, dialogue and co-ordination cannot be achieved
International Telecommunications Union, 2011, pp. 20-21
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The Internet Engineering Task Force publishes statistics for the categories of cyber­
attack. (Statistics are available at: http://www.IETF.org.) Their categories include 
‘human error’ which is often stated as a major cause of loss of information. For 
example, an administrator can create an incorrect filter setting in a firewall which in 
turn has the potential to compromise the system by permitting non-authorised access 
to sensitive areas of the system. Next, ‘deliberate trespass’ can be achieved using 
known vulnerabilities to software programs such as back-doors and bugs in the 
programme script. ‘Theft’, in a cyber-context, refers to a breach in confidentiality. The 
information on a system can be of high value in terms of industrial process, 
production costs, personnel records and other items, and their disclosure can have 
adverse consequences. Technical failures’ are not as common as once they were. 
The reliability of computers and associated peripheral and telecommunication 
equipment improves with each new generation of equipment. However, the possibility 
of hardware and software failure still has to be accounted for in a security plan. 
‘Common gateway interface scripts' can be subverted at the software level in the 
same way as a re-routing attack. Technical obsolescence’ is a problem when support 
for the system becomes more expensive and potentially vulnerable as new cyber­
attack techniques overcome older defences. The Internet Engineering Task Force 
also classifies malicious security activity under various headings. First ‘Administrative 
or user privileges were attempted’. For example, an attacker may attempt to subvert 
the system by using known or guessed access codes or passwords. Next ‘a denial of 
service was attempted’. This is where an attacker floods a network with requests for 
information. This can be at the machine level (Ping attack) or at the user level (spam 
attack). In these cases, valuable bandwidth and processing time is denied to the user. 
Then there is ‘an action that impacts the integrity of a file or database was attempted’.
In these cases, the attacker is attempting to change the file content to cause 
operating difficulties. For example, it may be possible for an attacker to change the 
delivery times of customer orders causing confusion and dissatisfaction. Another 
activity is ‘an attempt to exfiltrate information’. This activity can range from key board 
logging to capture information such as passwords or bank details to mining for 
specific information which may be of some value to the attacker. Next, opportunities 
can be taken to ‘attempt to exploit a miss-configuration in a system’. As with the 
earlier firewall example, any system misconfiguration can be exploited. For example, 
if a router can be re-programmed to transmit or receive data on an inappropriate 
communications channel. A popular malicious activity is ‘violating a site policy’. Here, 
web pages can be defaced or deleted, again causing confusion and dissatisfaction. 
Often malicious activity involves some form of cyber reconnaissance and can be 
coupled with a social-engineering. The desired result is to gain any information about 
the system including configuration, contents and passwords. The IETF talk about 
‘unknown activity’. This is a useful ‘catch all’ for malicious activity which has yet to be 
recognised as such. For example, intrusion detection software may detect 
unexpected activity but cannot decided whether it malicious or just exceptional. Also, 
a ‘zero day’ attack maybe detected but not yet classified as malicious. Finally, ‘natural 
causes’ such as a flood or lightning strike are not the same as cyber-attacks but they 
can have the same or similar adverse consequences.
The notion of layered defence is a relatively common one. (Discussions of the relative 
merits of using layered defence to make it difficult for an attacker to succeed can be 
found in Pfleeger (1997, pp. 13-14), International Organisation for Standardization 
(2008) and Piggin (2010, p. 38).) Although the layered defence paradigm is popular it
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is not always efficient in terms of providing effective ICT security because it can lead 
to complacency, errors in configuration and ultimately systems failure (Piggin, 2010). 
However, it is generally accepted that protecting against cyber-attack requires 
balanced layers and security management, concepts, policies and tools. (See, for 
example, The Open University (2008a).) There are numerous security 
countermeasure tools of which the following are fundamental and well reported: 
cryptography; firewalls; identification and authentication; antivirus software and 
security training. Each of these countermeasures will be examined in turn in this 
section.
Schneier (1996) originally argued that cryptography alone can solve security needs 
but later retracted this claim and instead argued that although cryptography provides 
an effective tool meaningful security ‘involves people: things people know, 
relationships between people, people and how they relate to machines’ (Schneier, 
2000, p. xi). One of the disadvantages of using any cryptography algorithm is the 
simple fact that it will increase the length of the associated data stream and so will 
both take longer to transmit and cost more (Udupa, 1999). Even so, cryptography is 
still one of the principle wireless security countermeasures. The two main 
cryptography formats are symmetric and asymmetric (CESG, 2008a) as given in 
Figure 2.3. Symmetric cryptography methods are widely used by military 
organisations. This traditional form of cryptography is expensive because of the need 
for bespoke hardware and software, and the need to ensure all trusted parties have 
the current cryptography keys (van der Lubbe, 1998, p.131). A relatively recent 
development of symmetric cryptography allows the current cryptography keys to be
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Figure 2.3 Comparison of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography
distributed over electronic media so reducing the need for a trusted physical 
distribution network. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is an example of 
commercially available symmetric cryptography algorithm (The Open University, 
2008b). Asymmetric cryptography works by having a private and public cryptography 
key which means that there is no need for expensive distribution networks. Rather, 
the public key can either be either sent in plain text via e-mail or stored on a trusted 
server which acts as a telephone directory of public keys. This works because 
information encrypted with a public key can only be decrypted with the equivalent 
private key, which must be closely guarded if security is to be maintained. It should be 
noted that information encrypted with the private key can be decrypted with the 
equivalent public key. RSA (named for Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) is an example of 
a commercially available asymmetric cryptography algorithm (The Open University, 
2008b). Secure Socket Layers (SSL) uses a combination of both methods of
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cryptography to make best use of their individual strengths and weaknesses (The 
Open University, 2008b). For example, symmetric encryption and decryption is faster, 
but needs key distribution. Asymmetric encryption and decryption is slower by 
comparison, but offers longer key lengths and so is potentially more secure.
Symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic methods are vulnerable to cryptanalysis. If 
a data stream is encrypted then cryptanalysis techniques can be used by the ill- 
disposed (van der Lubbe, 1998). Technically, the longer the cryptography key length 
then the stronger the stronger the protection (CESG, 2008a). However, keys can be 
stolen or lost making it possible for a third party to pose as a trusted party. Pfleeger 
lists three functions of a cryptanalyst:
1. Attempt to break a single message
2. Attempt to recognise patterns in encrypted messages
3. Attempt to find general weaknesses in an encryption algorithm
Pfleeger, 2000, p. 23
Another way of protecting data is to disguise its existence and this is known as 
Steganography; one method of which is to ‘subtly merge message bits within a data 
stream’ (Schneier, 1996, p. 1). This method is also useful for delivering virus 
payloads.
A firewall is intended to provide a break between the outside world and the ICT 
system it is designed to protect. Khalil etal. (2010) claim that: 'the three primary goals 
of network security which are confidentiality, integrity and availability can be achieved 
by using firewalls' (p. 204). Indeed, Zwicky points out that: ‘for many people a firewall 
is the first and last line of defence’ (p. 21). However, Zwicky also notes the limitations 
of firewalls in delivering network security including:
• Not a protection against an insider attack
• Using virus protection as part of the gateway process is slow
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• Configuring and updating firewall software can be time consuming
• Packet flooding can occur and so leave the internal network vulnerable
Zwicky, 2000, p. 24
The purpose of identification and authentication is to stop unauthorised access and 
represents one of the original countermeasures developed for ICT security.
Traditional identification and authentication requires users and administers to tell the 
system who they are and prove that they have permission to access the system 
(Golding, 2008). This is still widely achieved by having a ‘user name’ and password, 
which can be either user or machine generated. This method of identification and 
authentication has several potential flaws and a more recent development, described 
by Plaga (2009) as biometrics, makes use of ‘intrinsic [human] physical or 
behavioural features’ (p. 447) such as retina scans and fingerprinting which take the 
place of identification and authentication user names and passwords.
Malicious software comes in many shapes and forms and is usually defined by the 
means of delivery and intended outcome. For example, a Trojan Horse is normally 
lines of code hidden within an authorised application with the aim of ‘exploiting the 
legitimate authorisations of the invoking process’ (Krutz and Vines, 2003b, p. 925). A 
virus is self-sustained and will attempt to infect system files and applications, and will 
normally deliver its malicious payload when a trigger is activated (Krutz and Vines, 
2003b). The distinction between a virus and a worm is that, in addition to delivering a 
malicious payload, a worm can work its way independently across connected 
networks (Schultz and Shumway, 2002). It is possible to combine the three attributes 
of Trojans, viruses and worms to make the job of anti-virus software that much more 
difficult. (See, for example, STUXNET in Piggin (2010).) Anti-virus software, and all 
the derivatives, also comes in many shapes and forms. However, they all suffer from 
similar shortfalls including those identified by McAfee (2011):
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• Out of date patches for known vulnerabilities to applications and operating 
systems make antivirus software next to useless
• The antivirus signatures are not updated
• The spread of a virus can outpace antivirus updates
Delivering effective security training and improving security awareness are important 
countermeasures. Krutz and Vines (2003b) suggests that the starting point for 
security training at the organisational level is:
1. Policies
2. Standards
3. Guidelines
4. Procedures
5. Technical training
6. Hypothetical security vulnerability scenarios
Krutz and Vines, 2003b, p. 28
Both training and awareness should target the message that not undertaking or 
following security can lead to problems. Individuals who are not security trained must 
understand how their actions and inactions can impact on the security of the 
organisation. Raising security awareness can be achieved by:
• Lectures and presentations
• Electronic self-help presentations
• Posters and newsletters
• Incentives
• Reminders
Krutz and Vines, 2003b, p. 26 
Overall, countermeasures can lead to complacency; software can go out of date, and 
the overall effort may not be cost effective. However, a balanced set of 
countermeasures which are easy for people to use and maintain are generally 
accepted as important to maintaining system security. Notwithstanding the limitations 
of cryptography, firewalls, identification and authentication, antivirus software and 
security training, and the fact that they are neither the solution for every security
33
aspect of a networked system, nor the sole sufficient safeguard against network 
misuse, and despite development trends that threaten them, they still deliver 
important components of a layered defence. The dangers, characteristics of ICT and 
security terminology revealed so far are summarised in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Terminology that represents dangers to ICT security in a maritime environment
New dangers of the growing reliance on maritime ICT______________________
Lack of awareness of security issues_____________________________________
Problems posed by the complex nature of maritime ICT____________________
Regulation of ICT security in a maritime environment not in place___________
Issues with virtual private networks_______________________________________
Issues with automated systems__________________________________________
Issues with marine radio and wireless radio_______________________________
Issues with the loss of distress urgency and safety communications_________
Unknown impact of incidents_____________________________________________
Lessons from military maritime ICT____________________________ __________
Eavesdropping__________________________________________________________
Location tracking________________________________________________________
Spoofing_______________________________________________________________
Jamming_______________________________________________________________
Tunnelling and software defined radio and dynamic freguency allocation
Issues with transition from fortress security to cyber security________________
False sense of security__________________________________________________
Issues with layered defence______________________________________________
Need to know verses need to share_______________________________________
Risk based security processes___________________________________________
Security analysis models________________________________________________
The need to understand cyber security in a maritime environment___________
Countermeasures and layered defence leading to complacency and mistakes
2.4 Sector specific security literature
Life at sea is characterised by Collins and Hogg (2003) which describes seafarers as 
‘the ultimate distributed workforce’ (p. 209) because they work in a ‘global industry in 
continuous operation, without geographical or temporal boundaries, and increasingly 
reliant on virtual technologies’ (p. 210). Their paper does not consider barriers to 
security per se but does note that security constraints and sensitivities stopped them 
from gaining first-hand experience at sea. By drawing on the work of Baert (1998),
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Davies and Parfett (2000) and cross sector work such as Black and Ulrich (1999) and 
Collins (2002) they review the use of ICT in the maritime sector, mainly the potential 
for exploiting satellite communications and discuss the pros and cons of personnel 
management and welfare in the context of distributed international crews. Their 
recommendations include providing seafarers with better access to ICT including the 
provision of dedicated computers for training and recreation. Collins and Hogg also 
point to the need to invest in ‘knowledge management to improve remote 
collaboration’ (p. 236) and ‘light data’ (p.237) methods for down loading maritime 
distance learning to ships.
The integration of the information sharing systems led the New Zealand Government
(1999) to voice concerns over the possible effects of computer software ‘bugs’ on 
critical ICT at sea. They commissioned an enquiry into the nature of the systems 
required to maintain a vessel at sea. The associated report identifies a wide range of 
ICT dependent systems including: propulsion, electrical generators, stabilisation, 
steering and damage control. The report also highlights the importance of navigation, 
radio and safety communication systems.
When describing their deployment of complex systems to warships, QinetiQ (2006) 
states that ‘there is an increasing reliance on networked information technology (IT) in 
ship-wide and telecommunication systems’ (p. 1). At a tactical level, merchant and 
military vessels need to communicate and Lees and Williamson (2009) describe 
methods for ‘radiocommunications between British merchant ships and HM warships’ 
(p. 191) which includes voice and data and voice. Very High Frequency (VHF) voice 
circuits are the principle means of ‘bridge to bridge’ communications and are not 
encrypted. Sluiman (2010) notes that:
Vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden receive passage guidance, 
recommended routing, and threat assessments when they send an 
initial report to the UK Maritime Trade Operations office in Dubai.
However, wireless systems to communicate such unclassified 
sensitive information to merchant ships do not always provide 
protection against unauthorized disclosure.
Sluiman, 2010, p. 76
Sluiman goes on to describe the need to encrypt radio with merchant ships so that 
this threat can be reduced. Data circuits used to communicate between merchant and 
military vessels use equipment which do have encryption. It is however possible to 
buy relatively cheap decryption software and Sluiman (2010) claims that, during a trial 
using such decryption software:
The software flawlessly decoded the Inmarsat C frames, assembled 
the messages, and logged them. This effectively means that maritime 
criminals with no more than a basic knowledge of radio technology 
and computers can read all Inmarsat C messages sent from an LES 
[Land Earth Station] after an investment of $3,400 on equipment and 
software.
Sluiman, 2010, p. 77
It is not unreasonable to suggest that the research reported in this thesis anticipated 
the findings of the report by ENISA (2011) of their investigation into cyber security in 
the European maritime sector. Although the ENISA (2011) research only identifies 
one barrier to maritime ICT security ‘the lack of awareness on cyber-risks’ (p. 17), the 
short, medium and long term priorities could point to potential barriers if these 
priorities are not achieved or are lacking in some way. (See Table 2.2.) For example, 
several of the ENISA (2011) priorities have been, in past research, flagged as 
potential barriers. These include: problems with agreeing information exchange 
between allies (ITU, 2011); inadequate security awareness strategies (Ebrahim and 
Irani, 2005); and failure to agree roles and responsibilities (Alberts and Dorofee, 
2003).
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Table 2.2: ENISA short, medium and long term priorities (ENISA, 2011, pp. 19-20) mapped to potential 
barriers
ENISA short, medium and long term priorities Potential barriers
Stimulate dialogue and information exchange Organisations unwilling or unable to co-operate
Raise awareness about the criticality of this 
subject
Organisations unsuccessful at raising awareness
Develop strategies and good practice Strategies and good practice not effective
Develop cyber security training Poor understanding of the needs of cyber security 
training
Define roles and responsibilities towards cyber 
security
Poor understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities of cyber security
Define and implement a holistic, risk based 
approach to maritime cyber security
Organisations unwilling or unable to comply
Take appropriate measures in order to add 
considerations towards cyber in regulatory 
frameworks governing the maritime sector
Governments unwilling or unable to comply with 
new regulatory frameworks governing the 
maritime sector
Develop standards and enforce regulations Organisations unwilling or unable to co-operate
Develop information sharing and analysis centres Unable to afford new organisations
Align international and European policies Unable to achieve agreement on policy alignment
Add cyber to regulatory frameworks in the existing 
frameworks applicable to the maritime sector
Unable to make the necessary changes to 
existing frameworks
2.5 Barrier literature
In an examination of enterprise security, Allen (2005) suggests that ‘increasing the 
awareness, knowledge, and understanding of security in an organization is a 
necessary first step to changing common beliefs’ (p. 21). Allen conducted interviews, 
workshops and conferences in an attempt to ‘increase awareness’ and ‘encourage 
action to address security at an enterprise level and as a governance concern’ (p.
39). The findings identified ‘several pervasive barriers that often make enterprise 
security a daunting undertaking, requiring tenacity and perseverance’ (p. 19). A major 
conclusion of Allen’s work is that enterprise security faces ‘formidable disincentives to 
addressing security at more than just a tactical, technical level’ including:
• Security is hard to define and implement
• Security is not supported by a universal standard
• Security can be seen as having negative impacts such as cost and 
inconvenience when implemented, and is usually seen as, at best, 
avoiding disaster or business impact (cost) rather than providing 
benefit and competitive advantage.
Allen, 2005, p. 21
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In an effort to track how barriers have changed over the years, Chitura et al. (2008) 
set out to determine if the barriers reported in literature on the preliminary take up of 
e-commerce in the 1990s differ from the barriers reported between 2000 and 2008.
To achieve their aim, they conducted a review of the work of Abell and Lim (1996), 
Lawson etal. (2003), MacGregor and Vrazalic (2004), Stanfield and Grant (2003) and 
other authors. Their analysis provides a range of social, management and technical 
barriers which are associated with the take up of e-commerce which suggested the 
range of barriers that existed in the late 1990s still existed in 2008 together with ‘a 
seemingly new breed of barriers’ (p. 9).
It is interesting to note that early barriers to take up included ‘concerns about privacy 
and security issues with the use of the Internet’ (Chitura etal., 2008, p. 3) and 
‘concerns about security of e-commerce/payment systems’ (Chitura etal., 2008, p. 9) 
because data security, secure electronic payment systems and on-line banking still 
cause concerns today. For example, Ball (2010) undertook an exploratory case study 
to investigate data protection (DP) in a call centre based in South Africa. She cross 
referenced a series of interviews, observations and secondary data ‘in order to 
identify variation in the way different elements of the employment relationship and DP 
were described’ (p. 299). Of particular interest for this research are her observations 
of the secure working practices of the call centre work force. Each call worker had 
ready access to private information and that she ‘observed (staff) leaving the building 
with their diaries, which contained customer details, in the evening' (p. 300). Senior 
management considered the use of customer data for ‘unauthorised purposes' (p. 
301) to be an abuse of privilege. However, 'where there was something to be gained 
(i.e. a sale), a serious DP breach went unpunished' (p. 301). Accidental mistakes
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were also observed when call centre workers ‘read out personal details to the 
customer rather than asking them the questions which would confirm what was on the 
computer' p. 301. This tends to support the argument that people who work within the 
organisation can pose as significant a threat as those who have unauthorised access 
to the systems. (For further examples of internal threats to organisations see Wall 
(2007), Kshetri (2006), and Casey (2000).)
Ebrahim and Irani (2005) undertook work to build a framework for conducting 
government business over the Internet (e-government) ‘to provide an integrated 
architecture framework for e-government adoption that can address and identify the 
standards, infrastructure components, applications, and technologies for e- 
government’ (p. 589). This work included a critical analysis of the impact of barriers 
on such projects to classify ‘the barriers that might complicate the implementation of 
the proposed architecture framework’ (p. 589). Using multiple sources including 
Gefen and Pavlou (2002), NECCC (2000), Robins (2001) and Zeichner (2001), they 
drew up a list of barriers to security and privacy:
• Threats from viruses, worms and Trojans
• Absence of privacy of personal data
• High cost of security applications and solutions
• Unauthorised external and internal access to systems and information
• Lack of knowledge for security risks and consequences
• Assurance that transaction is legally valid
• Lack of security rules, policies and privacy laws
• Inadequate security of government hardware and software 
infrastructure
• Lack of risk management security programme
• Unsecured physical access to building or computers rooms
Ebrahim and Irani, 2005, p. 602
Looking in more detail, one of their findings was that ‘a barrier frequently cited is the 
need to ensure adequate security and privacy in an e-government strategy’ (p. 603). 
This barrier manifests as the inadequate provision for computer security, privacy and
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confidentiality. Another of their findings suggests that effective security will help ‘build 
citizen confidence and trust in the online services and transactions (pp. 603-604).
Returning to Ebrahim and Irani (2005), they noted the finding of Medjahed etal., 
(2003) that suggest ‘security of infrastructure is still one of the most crucial and least 
understood issues associated with internet-based communication and applications’ 
(Cited by Ebrahim and Irani, 2005, p. 601). This remains valid today with the 
emergence of Cloud Computing and Cyber-security where central services and 
applications make the challenges of data privacy that much harder. (For a description 
of Cloud Computing security see Krutz and Vines (2010).) From a security 
perspective, Cloud Computing represents a return to the ‘time-sharing model that was 
widely employed in the 1960s before the advent of relatively lower-cost computing 
platforms’ (Krutz and Vines, 2010, Kindle Locations 290-291). Barriers arising from 
such systems may have an unrecognised effect and may even apply in ways that are 
beyond the control of the participants. For example, the ways in which ICT systems 
are inter-connected may deliver commercial benefits but may also have 
consequences for security that have not been accounted for. In their cross sector 
research on the long term economic significance of ubiquitous ICT, undertaken on 
behalf of the ITU, Fleisch etal. (2005) discuss and evaluate the barriers faced by the 
retail, logistics, automotive and aviation, and pharmaceutical industries and then 
apply their findings to the telecommunications industry. Amongst their findings is that 
the provision of data security and data protection is essential if secure transactions 
and the protection of personal data is to be achieved. They illustrate their point by 
stating that ‘this ubiquitous data becomes both more valuable and more vulnerable, 
because it allows a very comprehensive picture of a person and their behaviour to be
40
compiled’ (Fleisch et al, 2005, p. 11). They also suggest that without security, the full 
benefits of ICT will not be realised. Although not concomitant with security, the 
following barrier may be significant in the maritime ICT environment because of the 
impact of automation. The threat of ‘infrastructure breakdown’ when ‘many objects 
can only function properly when connected’ (Fleisch etal., 2005, p. 11) points to the 
possibility that as maritime ICT evolves to achieve a greater integration in a way that 
is not yet recognised, then failures in one object may have ‘knock on’ effects on-board 
and across the maritime sector.
In their review of work from a multidisciplinary research programme, Anderson and 
Moore (2009) suggests that repeated security failures and the need for diverse 
organisations to share and interact over virtual systems and infrastructures has forced 
information security to evolve from the technical discipline of computer science into 
one that involves experts from many fields. Their information security research 
programme is combining with economics and psychology in an attempt to gain new 
insights into traditional information security issues such as ‘privacy, bugs, spam and 
phishing’ and ‘more general areas of system dependability and policy’ (p. 2718). Of all 
their findings, three are of particular interest for this thesis. The first is that in a virtual 
network environment ‘security failure is caused at least as often by bad incentives as 
by bad design’ (p. 2717). For example, from an economic perspective ‘People who 
connect insecure machines to the Internet do not bear the full consequences of their 
actions’ (p. 2718). They suggest that ‘designers can structure interactions to minimize 
hidden action or make it easier to enforce contracts’. The second are the increasing 
instances where criminals are turning to the use of ‘psychology’. For example, the 
‘ease with which computer users are deceived by fake websites’ (p. 2723).They also
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note that ‘Insecure software dominates the market for the simple reason that most 
users cannot distinguish it from secure software’ (p. 2723).
It is useful to consider correlations between barriers from research fields that are not 
explicitly about ICT security but do have sociological, management and technical 
issues that are relevant to a closed environment on-board ships. For example, using 
a case study approach, Watts (2010) reviews the barriers to ‘higher education 
distance learning in the prison setting’ (p. 1). She highlights the contribution of the
Open University’s open distance learning model but notes that, the provision of a tutor
to help with the on-line material is often missing in prison. Watts also draws on the 
work of Simpson (2009), Demiray and Sharma (2009), and France and Beaty (1998) 
to show how difficult distance learning can be. It is not too difficult to extrapolate her 
conclusions into a maritime environment in which security education and awareness 
have to be made available anywhere in the world:
■ Ships are very stressful places and this negatively affects 
concentration and study motivation.
■ The distraction caused by continuous background noise.
■ Routines that lead to restricted opportunities to study.
■ Limited or no direct one-to-one support.
■ Lack of access to suitable distance learning technology.
Based on Watts, 2010, pp 3-4
Another example, although not concerned with barriers to ICT security as such, 
comes from Storey and Buchanan (2007).They present a number of interesting social 
and management barriers that may be relevant to the maritime sector. In their project 
working paper on patient safety they draw on literature and their own empirical 
research in eight acute hospitals in the UK to identify six barriers caused by 
professional ‘close shops’. For example, they use five barriers identified by Amalberti 
and Auroy (2005) the first of which is caused by ‘performance and productivity focus’
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(p. 11). This is relevant to the maritime sector because of the pressures imposed by 
demanding delivery and turn around schedules. Their next barrier ‘professional 
autonomy’ (p. 11) and the need for checks and balances when professional 
discretionary powers can override policy is important because life at sea conforms to 
a strict hierarchy and individuals make mistakes which can in turn can lead to serious 
incidents at sea. Their third barrier is ‘craft worker mind-set’ or ‘the individual working 
practice of an 'expert', versus the standardised work practice of the organisation’ (p.
13). At sea and away from a central authority, then mariners have to be self- 
sufficient. As with the health care industry, the challenge here is to embody the best 
traditions of the service whilst integrating new operating conditions. When things do 
go wrong, then their barrier ‘Over-protection of professionals’ (p. 14) can come into 
play such that if a community on-board is ‘close knit’ then they may try to cover up 
incidents which need to be reported. Following on, another interesting barrier is that 
of ‘complacency and the complexity of extant systems’ (p. 14) particularly if 
extrapolated to secure ICT because of the operational and safety implications. Storey 
and Buchanan add a sixth barrier ‘the legitimacy or otherwise of audit and advice’ (p.
14). Overly complex rules and regulations can cause confusion and stress and 
working practice will return to ‘old ways’ once the audit team leave.
2.6 Barriers: generating key words
A general definition of a barrier is ‘an obstacle or circumstance that keeps people or 
things apart’ (Oxford English, 1996, p. 115) and so at the start of this review, a barrier 
was assumed to be either an obstacle that prevents a secure operating state, or a 
circumstance of the secure operating state that creates a barrier. However, the 
literature suggests that barriers are somewhat more complicated than simply
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obstacles and circumstances. For example, social and technical issues mix to 
produce new dangers which have to be dealt with if disasters at sea are to be 
avoided. This theme will be developed as the research progresses. For now, recalling 
that the barriers reported in Chapters 1 and 2 are not intended to pre-judge the 
barriers that may or may not be revealed by the research reported in this thesis, they 
do give a breadth of topics that will help generate key words that can be used to 
identify and then focus on barriers that are present in the maritime data. It is 
anticipated that the differences between ICT barriers ashore and afloat will have 
similarities and differences that are significant and worthy of further research. Table
2.3 draws together the barriers highlighted in the literature so that the relevance to the 
maritime domain can be considered in the light of the empirical evidence which 
emerges from the subsequent research.
Table 2.3: Barriers: Key concepts highlighted in the literature so that the relevance to the maritime 
domain can be considered in the light of the empirical evidence which emerges from the subsequent 
research.
Reference Description
ENISA (2011) The lack of awareness on cyber-risks.
Allen (2005) There are formidable disincentives to addressing security at more than just a tactical, technical 
level.
Security is hard to define and implement.
Security is not supported by a universal standard.
Security can be seen as having negative impacts such as cost and inconvenience when 
implemented, and is usually seen as, at best, avoiding disaster or business impact (cost) rather 
than providing benefit and competitive advantage.
Chitura et al. (2008) An announcement of data loss can lead to damage of confidence.
External attacks on critical infrastructure and the proliferation of cyber-crime.
Conflict between security and ‘open system’ architecture as new business opportunities increase 
threats and vulnerabilities.
Security technology can be rendered ineffective by a failure to differentiate among critical 
information assets, poorly designed operating procedures or lax attitudes towards security within 
an organisation.
Ball (2010) Threats posed by outsourcing. 
Internal threats to an organisation.
Krutz and Vines (2010) Cloud Computing security issues.
Storey and Buchanan 
(2007)
Performance and productivity focus.
Professional autonomy or the need for checks and balances when professional discretionary 
powers can override policy.
Craft worker mind-set or the individual working practice of an 'expert', versus the standardised 
work practice of the organisation.
Over-protection of professionals or the need for scrutiny of individuals.
Complacency and the complexity of extant systems.
The legitimacy or otherwise of audit and advice.
Continued....
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Medjahed et al. (2003) Interconnected network issues critical but not understood.
Ebrahim and Irani (2005) Threats from hackers and intruders.
Threats from viruses, worms and Trojans.
Absence of privacy of personal data.
High cost of security applications and solutions.
Unauthorised external and internal access to systems and information. 
Lack of knowledge for security risks and consequences.
Assurance that transaction is legally valid.
Lack of security rules, policies and privacy laws.
Inadequate security of government hardware and software infrastructure. 
Lack of risk management security programme.
Unsecured physical access to building or computers rooms.
Fleisch et al. (2005) Lack of data security.
Lack of privacy.
Loss of confidence due to security incident.
Infrastructure breakdowns when many objects can only function properly when connected. 
Social exclusion when ICT is not available to all.
Incorrect automated decisions and the damage they can cause.
Anderson and Moore 
(2009)
People who connect insecure machines to the Internet do not bear the full consequences of their 
actions.
Insecure software dominates the market for the simple reason that most users cannot distinguish 
it from secure software.
The ease with which computer users are deceived by fake websites.
Many people say they value privacy yet act otherwise when online.
The societal misperceptions of risk. W hy is it, for example, that most people care too little about 
online security and privacy, yet overreact to terrorism?
Watts (2010) Insufficient ICT to support distance learning.
(Ships) are very stressful places and this negatively affects concentration and study motivation. 
The distraction caused by continuous background noise.
Routines that lead to restricted opportunities to study.
Limited or no direct one-to-one support.
Collins and Hogg (2003) Lack of access to ICT for seafarers.
The need for dedicated computers for training.
Invest in knowledge management to improve remote collaboration.
Invest in ‘light data’ methods for down loading maritime distance learning to ships.
Sluiman (2010) Lack of security on voice circuits.
Weakness of encryption software.
Poor security operating practice by service providers.
Roumboutsos efa/.(2005) Attacks against maritime targets ashore
Dunlop and Smith (1994) 
Goldsmith (2005) 
Rackley (2007)
Limitations of using EM spectrum.
Gaitskell (1998) 
Clark (1997) 
Mann (2008)
Eavesdropping.
Rishi (2005) 
Smith (1998) 
Luo et al. (2011) 
NATO (2010)
Location tracking.
NATO (2010) 
Anderson and Moore 
(2009)
Pfleeger (1997)
Spoofing.
Schneier (2000) 
Smith (1998) 
Rackley (2007) 
Leon eta l. (2010)
Jamming (Denial of Service).
Hill (2000) 
Kalsson (2011)
Tunnelling.
Piggin (2010) Adaptive malicious software (For example, Stuxnet).
ITU (2011) International legal measures do not allow crime committed across borders to be successfully 
prosecuted.
Technical and procedural measures cannot prevent, detect and respond to attacks 
Organisational structures inadequate to prevent, detect and respond to attacks.
Inadequate knowledge and expertise of cyber security.
International co-operation, dialogue and co-ordination cannot be achieved.
Continued .. . .
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Internet Engineering Task 
Force (2007)
Human error.
Deliberate trespass. 
Theft.
Natural causes. 
Technical failure. 
Technical obsolescence.
Pleeger (1997) 
International Organization 
for Standardisation (2008) 
Piggin (2010)
Need to know verses need to share.
HMG (2007)
Alberts and Dorofee 
(2003)
Caralli and Young (2008)
Risk based security processes and security analysis models.
Clark and Knake (2010) The need to understand cyber security.
Whitman and Mattord 
(2007)
Schneier (1996) 
Schneier (2000)
Van der Lubb (1998) 
CESG (2008)
Open University (2008)
Countermeasures and layered defence leading to complacency and mistakes.
2.7 Conclusion
The body of literature dealing with maritime ICT security is not substantial but there is 
a significant amount of literature examining ICT security in other contexts that is 
relevant to this work. It has thus been possible to identify a range of potential barriers 
that can be taken forward for consideration. Drawing on the results of this literature 
review enables the following research questions to be formulated:
1. How are mariners responding to the increasing use of ICT and how and 
to what extent is their security behaviour adapting to the changes in 
technology?
2. What has been the impact of ICT on maritime organisations’ security 
culture?
3. How have maritime authorities and organisations responded to the 
potential threats and vulnerabilities of maritime ICT?
4. Can the barriers be used as the basis for a secure ICT profile that can 
be used successfully in a maritime environment?
The next chapter will describe the research methodology and analysis used to 
progress this research.
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Chapter 3 
Investigating the barriers to ICT security in a maritime environment: 
research method, analysis and implementation
3.1 This research: purpose and background
Chapter 1 identified the operational and ICT security aspects that are important to 
mariners. Although examination of the literature revealed only limited historic 
research on ICT security in the maritime setting, the literature review reported in 
Chapter 2 revealed a rich body of research in the allied area of security in a non- 
maritime (but relevant) setting. For example, the security dangers faced by shore side 
Virtual Private Networks and wireless radio have been examined in some detail. Upon 
closer examination it became apparent that this rich understanding has evolved from 
the reporting and analysis of successive ICT security incidents with roots dating back 
to the 1988 ‘Internet worm’ (Casey, 2000, p. 209). However, specific literature about 
the security dangers faced by ship board ICT and the way in which ship board ICT, 
maritime radio and shore infrastructure now interact in real time is not readily 
available. The review also looked at barriers to ICT security to identify key concepts 
that are most likely to be relevant to ICT security in the maritime sector. For this, a 
general definition of a barrier ‘an obstacle or circumstance that keeps people or things 
apart or prevents communication’ (Oxford English, 1996, p. 115) was used to begin to 
identify the nature of barriers.
The literature suggest that real world barriers are a complex mix of technical and 
social issues and that any barrier can display characteristics that depend upon
objective and subjective viewpoints. The barriers assembled from the literature as set 
out in Table 2.3 are representative of the broad range of potential barriers faced by 
mariners using ICT in a maritime environment. The remainder of this chapter presents 
the research methodology used to investigate the barriers in ‘real world’ maritime 
organisations and the logic underpinning the methodology decisions.
3.2 Research methodology
The research methodology is designed to provide a robust yet flexible approach to 
investigating the barriers to ICT security in a maritime environment so that the 
emergent barriers can be used to develop a secure ICT maritime profile that will be 
capable of being updated on an on-going basis.
The barriers to ICT security that are being explored in this research result from the 
combination of complex technical issues with complex social issues in a maritime 
environment. There is the need to explore mariners’ experiences of ICT use at sea 
whilst recognising that their beliefs, behaviours and values can be just as important 
and relevant as the properties of the ICT that they use. ‘Objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
research are often presented as opposites but neither captures the complexity of the 
maritime security situation or the balance required between technical and social 
issues.
Corbin and Strauss (2008) suggest that both objective and subjective viewpoints have 
their advantages and disadvantages and indeed, at times they do actually both make 
use of the same techniques. Fortunately, there exists a half-way point between the 
extremes of objective and subjective where, as Eastery-Smith etal. (1991) suggest, 
a researcher can find a ‘contextual field of information’ (p. 25). It is this contextual
field of information that this research will seek to examine as it tries to identify 
barriers. Exploratory studies such as those described by Blumer (1969) offer several 
advantages for this research, especially in the absence of a body of directly relevant 
maritime literature. One important advantage is that it will allow the researcher the 
freedom to ask questions and review multiple sources of data, whilst maintaining an 
open mind to seek new insights (Saunders etal., 1997).
Qualitative data gathering was an important element of the research methods 
deployed. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that one of the strengths of qualitative 
data is that it can ‘focus on naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural settings’ (p. 
10). To give a depth of understanding rather than a superficial breadth, interviews 
rather than survey methods were selected (Saunders etal., 1997). To achieve this 
depth of understanding of the real world experiences, information was gathered 
during one-to-one semi-structured interviews with Royal Navy related personnel 
involved with the provision and use of ICT. The interviewees’ knowledge of ICT is 
relevant for three main reasons. First, from a historical perspective, they will have 
witnessed ICT evolve both at sea and on land. As such, they are likely to be able to 
share their insights into good and bad practice. Secondly, from their current 
operational perspective, they will know how ICT is being used in a range of situations. 
In this sense, they may not have the answers to problems but they should have 
suggestions about what might constitute solutions. They will also be privy to that 
which Potter (2006) refers to as ‘grey literature’ (p. 168) and/or data that is not in the 
public domain but that may be important to this research. Thirdly, from a future 
perspective, their knowledge of proposed new ICT could be invaluable in informing 
the direction work to build the proposed security profile needs to take.
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The interviews were semi structured to allow emerging ideas to be explored and ‘to 
clarify your understanding of a problem’ (Saunders, 1997, p. 78). Walsham (2006) 
suggests that during the interviewing process the role of the researcher can range 
from ‘neutral observer’ to ‘a full action researcher’ (p. 321). For this research, the 
researcher assumed the role described by Silverman (2000) as an ‘empathic 
observer’ a mid-way point between the neutral observer and full action researcher 
described by Walsham (2006).
Having identified the field of information and established the data collection method, 
the next step was to establish the method of data analysis. Miles and Huberman 
describe analysis thus:
To review a set of field notes, transcribed or synthesized and to dissect 
them meaningfully while keeping the relations between the parts intact, 
is the stuff of analysis. This part of analysis involves how you 
differentiate and combine the data you have retrieved and the reflections 
you make about this information.
Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 56 
The emergent themes drawn from the interview transcripts are assigned to categories
and concepts much like the coding described by Miles and Huberman (1994). Corbin
and Strauss (2008) suggest that:
A researcher can think of coding as "mining" the data, digging beneath 
the surface to discover the hidden treasures contained within data.
Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Kindle Locations 1019-1027
In the context of this research, analysis can be seen as an attempt to make sense of 
the data whilst being mindful that prior to analysis, the interview questions have 
already undergone a series of encoding and decoding. For example, Foddy (1995) 
notes that ‘researcher encodes question, respondent decodes question, respondent
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encodes answer and researcher decodes answer’ (drawn from Foddy (1995), Figure 
3.1, p. 26). The coding for the analysis of the Royal Navy data started by 
summarising the data from each interviewee. Next, the broad range of key terms 
drawn from the literature were used to focus the data and so make the range of 
categories ‘progressively narrower as the research progresses’ (Saunders etal.,
1997, p. 79). A tabular representation of the interviewee’s opinions was then built and 
structured to reduce the complexity of the subject matter and enable the emergence 
of themes arising from the research data. The resultant categories were combined 
into related concepts; links between concepts identified, and interpretive coding used 
in an attempt to integrate all the threads of this research. An interpretive view of the 
result of such analysis is offered by Geertz (1973) ‘what we call our data are really 
our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their 
compatriots are up to’ (p. 9). The interpretations are founded on personal experience, 
the literature and other source and data from Royal Navy interviews, whilst being 
mindful of Corbin and Strauss (2008) who note that ‘in the end only the data 
themselves are significant, but it helps to have a little insight to start with’ (Kindle 
Locations 598-600).
There are many options when it comes to justifying the methodology chosen for this 
research. For example, Yin (2003) suggests that it is possible to ‘judge the quality of 
any given design according to certain logical tests’ (p.33). He goes on to describe four 
tests that are relevant across the social sciences but only three are applicable to this 
research:
1. Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied.
2. External validity: establishing the domain to which a study’s findings 
can be generalised.
3. Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of the study -  such as 
the data collection procedures -  can be repeated with the same 
results.
Yin, 2003, p. 34
To meet the construct validity test, this thesis has drawn on a wide range of literature 
and data in an attempt to provide ’convergent lines of enquiry’ (Yin, 2003, p. 36).
Also, this thesis provides an accurate record of the research undertaken. To meet the 
external validity test, concepts and implications are derived which are intended to 
apply beyond the immediate research focus. To meet reliability criteria, the design of 
this research has been deliberately chosen to make it relatively straightforward to 
follow. Yin (2003) makes the point that the purpose of reliability is to be able to 
replicate the research but not the results perse.
A compelling work on making research appealing and convincing is that of Golden- 
Biddle and Locke (1993) who describe three criteria:
1. Authenticity -  appeal to readers to accept that the researcher was indeed 
present in the field and grasped how the members understood their world.
2. Plausibility -  make claims on readers to accept that the findings make a 
distinctive contribution to issues of common concern.
3. Criticality - endeavor to probe readers to re-examine the taken-for-granted 
assumptions that underly their work.
Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993, p. 595 
Walsham (2006) describes authenticity as a demonstration ‘that the authors have 
‘been there” (p.326). Prior to this research, the author spent 14 years at sea and a 
further 11 years working in maritime headquarters. During this research, the author 
visited the Portsmouth site regularly and was involved with various maritime ICT 
projects. The distinctive contribution made by this research is described in Chapter 7, 
but in summary the research provides an updateable maritime ICT profile that can be 
used by military and commercial organisations. Finally, it is intended that this
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research will challenge the maritime sector to rethink their current lack of awareness 
of maritime ICT security issues.
3.3 Refining the techniques and procedures
Having established the methodological approach for the data collection, the next step 
was to refine the techniques and procedures for gathering the data (Saunders etal., 
1997). A scoping exercise was developed to assess interest in this research topic, 
establish contact with potential interviewees and to alleviate concerns that exist about 
the sensitive nature of security issues. Royal Navy contacts were approached in 
Portsmouth and London and asked to act as intermediaries to help establish contact 
with potential interview candidates. A ‘neutral observer’ (Walsham, 2006, p. 321) 
stance was taken throughout the exercise.
3.3.1 Pilot interview
The scoping exercise was undertaken at the Portsmouth and London sites between 
the 23rd and 27th of February 2009 culminating with a pilot interview in London on the 
27th February 2009. Preliminary questions designed to consider the idea that barriers 
are obstacles to progress were developed to inform the pilot interview. The questions 
were based on the material set out in Chapters 1 and 2, and designed using ideas 
from Foddy (1995), Miles and Huberman (1994), Potter (2006) and Carnegie Melon 
Institute (2007). Kvale (1996) has identified nine types of question asked in qualitative 
interviews and these were used to think about the types of questions and how they 
might best be framed.
•  Introducing questions: 'Why did you...?' or 'Can you tell me about...?'
Through these questions you introduce the topic.
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•  Follow up questions: Through these you can elaborate on their initial answer. 
Questions may include: 'What did you mean...?1 or 'Can you give more 
detail...?'
• Probing questions: You can employ direct questioning to follow up what has 
been said and to get more detail. 'Do you have any examples?' or 'Could you 
say more about...?'
• Specifying questions: Such as 'What happened when you said that?' or 
'What did he say next?'
• Direct questions: Questions with a yes or no answer are direct questions.
You might want to leave these questions until the end so you don't lead the 
interviewee to answer a certain way.
• Indirect questions: You can ask these to get the interviewee's true opinion.
•  Structuring questions: These move the interview on to the next subject. For 
example, 'Moving on to...1
• Silence: Through pauses you can suggest to the interviewee that you want 
them to answer the question!
• Interpreting questions: ‘Do you mean that...?' or 'Is it correct that...?'
Kvale, 1996, pp. 133-135 
The pilot interview (SY1) was recorded on disc, with the interviewees’ permission. 
Walsham (2006) notes the advantages and disadvantages of tape recording 
interviews. These are summarised in Table 3.1. One additional advantage with digital 
media is the availability of software that, notionally, converts recordings into text. 
However, the overriding impression was that although the potential candidates 
expressed willingness to be recorded they actually appeared ‘uncomfortable’ with 
being recorded when they were speaking so the practice of tape recording was 
discontinued for the main interviews.
Table 3.1: Advantages and disadvantages of tape recording interviews (Walsham, 2006, p. 323)
Advantage: Disadvantage:
•  Truer record of what is said compared with 
taking notes.
• It is possible to return to a transcript later for 
alternative forms of analysis.
• It is useful for picking out direct quotes.
• It frees the researcher to concentrate on 
engaging with the interviewee.
•  It is popular with neo-positivist reviewers.
• It is very time consuming.
•  May make interviewee less open or less truthful.
•  Tape-recording does not capture the tacit, non­
verbal elements of an interview, which are crucial 
aspects of the experience for the researcher.
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Four conclusions were reached as a result of the scoping exercise. The first is not 
surprising; those who participated in the informal discussions made it clear that 
security is a sensitive topic and needs to be handled accordingly. The Assistant Chief 
of Staff of the Communications and Information Systems Division stated that he was 
happy to allow access to personnel and documentary material with the caveats that 
the chosen personnel were willing to take part in interviews and that any documents 
used had to be unclassified. To meet these stipulations, all contacts with personnel 
were preceded by an explanation of the nature of the research and the thesis itself 
contains no material that can identify specific vulnerabilities of any individuals or 
organisations. Secondly, whilst the informal discussions suggested that an 
understanding of security barriers as firewalls does exist, the concept of barriers to 
secure ICT proved to be less well understood. To help the situation, the pilot interview 
questions were refined to help obviate some of the issues associated with the use of 
security terminology. Thirdly, the informal conversations revealed a common concern 
relating to the introduction of the HMG Information Assurance Maturity Model (CESG, 
2008b). The purposes of this model, designed in partnership with the Central 
Electronic Security Group (CESG), are to improve awareness of information security 
issues across all HMG Departments and to mitigate the widely-publicised losses of 
personnel information. (For examples of these losses see Burton (2008) and 
Hannigan (2008).) The questions used in the pilot interview were modified to probe 
the incidents which lead to the introduction of the Information Assurance Maturity 
Model and the impact on the Royal Navy. Fourthly, the informal discussions revealed 
the fact that unlike people in very many other settings, Royal Navy personnel (circa 
2009) do not use the term ICT in normal circumstances. As a consequence the 
interview data contains abbreviations and such as CIS (Communications and
Information Systems) which can be used when referring to either the CIS Branch of 
the Royal Navy or when referring to CIS as an operational capability. Other examples 
include NEC (Network Enabled Capability), IT (Information Technology), and a range 
of terminology such as ‘Formal Messaging’ which refers to the Royal Navy’s primary 
Command and Control communications system that provides secure text based 
messaging between headquarters, establishments and ships. For the purposes of this 
research the acronyms and terminology are grouped under the heading of ICT. Within 
this chapter and Appendices A and B these terms are explained as they arise and are 
also tabulated in the ‘Acronyms, abbreviations and maritime specific terminology’ 
section at the start of this thesis.
3.3.2 The interviewees: Criteria for selection
The selection of the interviewees was based on the desire to gather data from a cross 
section of personnel that was as representative as possible of the ICT community 
(Saunders, 1997, p. 78) and possess a variety of different skills and experience. 
Following a short discussion with the Assistant Chief of Staff for CIS, approval was 
received to use the Royal Navy Staff Directory to identify the current incumbents in 
the posts that would most likely meet one or more of the following criteria:
• Sea going experience to help understand the situation where possible
• Senior management to gain a management perspective
• Experience in security or training delivery
• Experience in current or previous security roles
• Experts from the RN communications and information systems (CIS) including 
intelligence
• Consultants who support the Royal Navy
• Any experience using ICT at sea or on land
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By reviewing MODUK documents, reference material and other sources, a career 
profile of the potential interviewee population was built. For example, Civil Servants, 
including those serving in the Ministry of Defence, can elect to follow a security-based 
career path and as such they receive dedicated security-related training for their jobs. 
(See, for examples of Information Security Competencies, Cabinet Office (2005).) 
However, the Royal Navy has no specific ICT security branch and so officers and 
ratings are temporarily attached to security jobs from their parent branches. This 
introduces an interesting dimension of continuity when considering the scope of Royal 
Navy security jobs. The Royal Navy Intelligence Branch was disbanded in 1990 
(INT2), but following the terrorist attacks in America in 2001 and the subsequent 
increase in the perceived need for intelligence officers generally, work was in hand to 
re-form the specialisation in 2009. (The Royal Navy Intelligence Branch was re­
formed in 2011.) Between 1990 and 2011, however, officers were appointed to carry 
out intelligence jobs on an ad hoc basis in a similar fashion to those working on 
security. Another relevant area is the RN Weapons Engineering Branch. This has 
undergone several changes over the last fifteen years. For example, during the 1990s 
the Weapons Electrical Branch was merged with the CIS Branch but the result was 
not widely acknowledged as successful and the two branches were de-merged in 
2009. Potential interviewees in this area were those who represented a range of 
experience including systems engineering afloat and ashore, project management, 
teaching and general management responsibilities. Potential interviewees 
representing the CIS Branch were a mix of Civil Servants and Royal Naval personnel. 
Their job descriptions were wide ranging, taking in anything from a project manager to 
front line support or systems design and implementation. The Civil Servants tended to 
have relatively long tenure in post whilst Royal Navy officers and ratings could expect
to be in post for anything from one to three years. All the jobs mentioned in this 
section can also be filled by retired personnel recalled to duty or by Maritime 
Reservists. (Further information on the conditions for Full Time Reserve Service 
personnel is available via MODUK (2010a).) To enrich the overall field of data, 
civilians who work for the Royal Navy and MODUK as external consultants were also 
invited to take part. Interviewees in this category had a mix of Merchant Navy, military 
and commercial experience in information management and security fields.
After a review of the data collected during the scoping exercise, a return visit was 
made to the Portsmouth site. 27 candidates were approached directly or by telephone 
and asked if they would agree to take part in the research. 18 agreed to be 
interviewed, of whom 3 subsequently withdrew. The 15 personnel who were 
interviewed are listed in Chapter 4, p. 66, Table 4.1, where they are grouped into five 
categories based on the Royal Navy branch structure in Table 3.2. Several of the 
prospective interviewees indicated that the views they were expressing were their 
own opinions and did not necessarily represent the views and behaviour of the Royal 
Navy, MODUK or any other maritime organisation. With one exception (INT1), the 
interviewees stated that they were willing for their opinions to be reported. After a 
short discussion, INT1 agreed to be quoted anonymously. The interviews were 
conducted in London or Portsmouth. The high level Command structure of HMG, 
MODUK and Royal Navy is given in Table 3.3 to help situate the research by showing 
where the interviewees work and their security responsibilities.
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Table 3.2: Summary of interviewee sorted by career categories
Career category Number in 
career category
Identification range
Security experts
(MODUK and RN ICT security personnel)
3 Sy1 to Sy3
Intelligence
(RN intelligence analysts)
2 Inti and Int2
Engineering and education
(RN electrical and electronic engineering and
education)
4 Engl to Eng4
Communication and Information Systems (CIS) 
(The management and implementation of CIS 
capability)
3 CIS1 to CIS3
External consultants
(Those who support the RN and MODUK)
3 Con1 to Con3
Table 3.3: Command structure: the hierarchy of HMG, MODUK and Royal Navy
Organisation Security responsibility Reports to Situation circa 2013
HMG Creates legal statutes 
Directs Departments of 
State (including MODUK)
Electorate Labour government 
replaced by coalition 
government in 2010. 
Widespread redundancies 
underway across the 
MODUK.
Ministry of Defence 
London site
Sets MODUK security 
policy
Monitors progress 
Arbitrates disputes 
between Military 
Commands
Reports to HMG Reports to HMG
Fleet Headquarters, 
Portsmouth site 
(Renamed Navy 
Command Headquarters 
in 2010)
Enacts MODUK security 
policy.
Modifies security policy for 
maritime environment
Reports to MODUK New 2013 Command 
structure devolves certain 
powers down to the three 
military Commands
Ships and establishments 
worldwide
Enacts Royal Navy 
security policy and other 
security policies for joint 
operations
Reports to Fleet 
Headquarters on RN 
issues. Reports to Joint 
Headquarters Northwood 
for joint operations
Fleet Headquarters 
Portsmouth renamed 
Navy Command 
Headquarters in 2010
3.3.3 Major modifications based on the findings of the scoping exercise
Several major modifications to the draft interview schedule were made as a result of 
the scoping exercise. First, it had been intended to use a diagram of MODUK security 
functions with the aim of helping the interviewees understand the context of the 
questioning. However, following the informal discussions, it was decided not to use
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the diagram because of the danger it would encourage interviewees to focus on 
specific security issues and thus risk ‘leading the interviewees’ (Foddy, 1995).
Second, it was decided to refine the wording of the interview questions. In this way, it 
was intended to make the topics understandable by using their own terminology (such 
as ITSy and CIS in place of ICT) whilst allowing the interview questions to remain 
flexible, and the interviewer to probe for barriers. Also, 3 questions (Questions 4, 5 
and 6) were added to probe the issues surrounding information handling and the 
Information Assurance Maturity Model. Follow on questions drawn from Miles and 
Huberman (1994) were kept to hand to help probe interviewees’ responses. To reflect 
these changes and to help with data storage and retrieval, the questions were re­
grouped under the four new headings: environment; technology; systems failure; and 
systems management. (See Table 3.4.) The final major modification was instigated 
because of the sensitivity of this subject. As Walsham (2006) notes, ‘One is often 
unsure about potential harm to participants, cannot always enable fully formed 
consent, do sometimes invade some elements of privacy, and may ‘deceive’ about 
the precise aim of one’s research’ (p. 327). To alleviate concerns of this nature, the 
researcher drew together information from Royal Navy (2009) diversity and equality 
documents and Reynolds (2003) guidelines on information technology ethics to 
produce a set of personal research guidelines. A copy was e-mailed to each 
interviewee prior to the meeting. The guidelines are supplied at Appendix A. 
Participants were assured that their anonymity would be respected and permission to 
use their data was obtained from all interviewees’ prior to the interviews. One final 
observation, as Preece (1994) points out, establishing trust is important but ‘should 
not lead to the interviewee being encouraged to give the answers they believe the 
interviewer wants and so obscuring the true situation’ (p. 87). Every effort was made
to avoid the researcher’s own thinking taking precedence over the interviewee’s 
opinions (Silverman, 2000). The questions used to guide the semi-structured Royal 
Navy interviews are supplied as Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Interview and follow on questions used to start and maintain the flow of the ‘semi-structured 
interviews’
1. In your opinion, does working and living at sea present challenges which are different to other environments?
2. If we were at sea today how do you think we would be using information and technology?
3. In your view, to what extent will new information technology capability play a role in maritime activity?
4. Please name three characteristics that sum up the use of information in your organisation
5. In your opinion, does your organisation consider information to be an important asset
6. W hat changes to Information Assurance have taken place recently?.
7. From your experience, please describe the likely impact of a  temporary or permanent loss of maritime information and 
technology capability?
8. Will future maritime network capabilities lead to new security threats and vulnerabilities in IT systems?
9. If so, what role could ITSy and systems failure methodologies play in protecting maritime assets?
10. In your opinion, is poor understanding of security practice a continuous cause of security incidents?
11. How will ITSy risk management evolve in a maritime environment?
12. Will accepting cumulative risk have adverse consequences on ITSy in a maritime environment?
13. Are you aware of any more general security methodologies which could be applied to maritime IT?
14. If so, to what benefit?
15. How are the electronic and physical security threats and vulnerabilities faced by maritime systems any different to their 
terrestrial counterparts?
16. How do you think electronic and physical security threats and vulnerabilities will change with time as new network 
technology is deployed?
17. a. Can terrestrial IT and systems methodologies be successfully applied in a maritime environment? Or
_________ b. Will new maritime technologies require new IT and systems failure methodologies?________________________________
Follow on questions, drawn from Miles and Huberman (1994):
•  “Have you thought ab o u t ?”
“Why?”
•  “In what way?"
•  “For instance, give me an example.”
•  “W hat ca u se d  ?” (Casual antecedents).
•  “W hat was the purpose in doing ...? ” (Goal antecedents).
•  “What happened a fte r .... ?” (Casual consequences).
•  “How do you mean that?”
•  “Tell me more about that. ”
•  “Anything else?”
•  “How  was it possible for ‘the interviewee’ to do . . .” (Enabling factors).
___________________________________________________________________________________________Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 24
3.4 The Royal Navy interviews: Data handling
Immediately after each interview, the written notes were typed into Word™ 
documents. On completion of the write up, two parallel activities were undertaken. 
First, for the London interviewees, the documents were e-mailed to their work 
addresses, followed by telephone calls to each interviewee to confirm the accuracy of 
their own document. Second, a return visit was made to the Portsmouth site in
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November 2009 and each interviewee’s own documents were discussed face to face 
to confirm the accuracy of their own document. All the interviewees (London and 
Portsmouth) were given the opportunity to comment on the content and accuracy of 
their own document. With one exception, all the interviewees agreed to the accuracy 
of their own document. One interviewee (INT1) pointed to a sensitive subject that had 
been recorded in their document. Following a short discussion, the detail of the 
subject was removed from their document. Once this activity had been completed, the 
document texts were imported into an Excel ™ spread sheet in preparation for the 
analysis phase. The spread sheet was structured to reduce the complexity of the 
subject and allow the barriers relevant to this research to emerge in a form that could 
be readily used in the design of the updateable maritime ICT security profile. Coding 
for analysis of the Royal Navy data started with summaries of the interviews. These 
are set out in Chapter 4. Three interviews were cancelled. The first of these was 
planned to be with a US naval officer, who was working as a liaison officer with the 
Royal Navy but he had to return to US before the scheduled interview. The other two 
were with a German naval officer and a MODUK Civil Servant but both were 
cancelled by the intended interviewees due to pressure of work.
3.5 Additional data: The Merchant Navy
One of the advantages of exploratory research is the freedom to consider aspects
which may not be immediately obvious to the subject (Saunders etal., 1997).
Researchers taking a positivist approach may consider deviations from the main aim
as showing a lack of direction (Easterby-Smith etal., 1991). However, it was decided
to undertake a parallel activity to that of the Royal Navy data collection, in an attempt
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to gain an understanding of the ISPS Code, which although a physical security risk 
assessment could be helpful in this research. Additional data was collected from 
Merchant Navy officers when the researcher undertook a ‘Proficiency as Ships 
Security Officer’ course. The purpose was to gather data from Merchant Navy officers 
relating to their practical experiences with security at sea. Special emphasis was 
placed on gathering their opinions of the ISPS Code in order to determine the validity 
and utility of the Code to help build the proposed updateable maritime ICT security 
profile. Preece (1994) argues that informal conversations offer ‘a better indication of a 
respondent’s true attitudes’ (p. 120) but also warns that care must be taken not to 
deviate too far from the topic in hand. Observations were made during the 
interactions between the attendees and the course leader. The purpose was to 
identify key security issues that arose. The attendees raising the issues were then 
approached during break periods and asked to comment on their ideas and to confirm 
that they would be happy to be cited. Written notes were taken during the course with 
the permission of the course leader and the attendees. The notes were recorded in a 
single document but the final document was not circulated to the attendees.
The Merchant Navy notes are used to describe the emerging issues of physical 
security and incidents at sea that could be used in scenarios in the absence of data 
on secure ICT maritime incidents. In a parallel activity, a review of maritime incident 
data from secondary sources was undertaken to try to reveal the potential threat 
actors and impacts that can be used to inform the updateable maritime ICT security 
profile. The subsequent data and the results of the analysis are described in Chapter
5.
63
3.6 Drawing together the threads and practical application
This research was intended to investigate barriers to ICT security and to help in the 
real world in terms of informing attempts to counter actual and potential dangers. To 
achieve this, it is intended to draw together the threads of this research into an 
updateable maritime ICT security profile using the ISPS Code as a reference point 
and OCTAVE for ICT structures. To satisfy formal security requirements, the profile 
contains an analysis part and a management part. Barriers were used to inform the 
formal evaluation and management parts of the profile, and act as guidelines for use 
by non-security personnel. Updates will be provided using Horizon Scanning 
methods. Overall it is intended to provide a new understanding of barriers that will 
help mariners conduct their day-to-day operations safely and securely. These topics 
are described in detail in Chapter 6.
3.7 Monitoring information from multiple sources
The literature and other sources of information were monitored throughout the period 
of this research to help keep abreast of current developments in the maritime sector 
including ICT and security. This information was used to supplement the data 
collected from literature and interviews and to act as data triangulation points. 
Triangulation, in this instance, is not used to point to a fact as described by Yin (2003) 
but rather, to indicate that a number of independent sources are agreeing or 
disagreeing in some way and so highlight that a noteworthy theme may exist (Savory 
and Fortune, 2013).
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3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has described the methodology by which this thesis attempted to build 
on the general literature and other papers reported in Chapters 1 and 2 so that the 
‘real world’ barriers to secure maritime ICT can be explored and the results used in 
the design of an updateable maritime ICT security profile. The next chapter will report 
the findings of the Royal Navy interviews and present the results of the subsequent 
analysis.
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Chapter 4 
Royal Navy: Data, analysis and preliminary findings
4.1 Introduction
As explained in Chapter 3, a series of 15 interviews were conducted with Royal Naval 
related personnel in London and Portsmouth between February and September 2009 
in order to gain an insight into real world barriers to ICT security in the maritime 
environment. This chapter sets out the data gathered and presents analyses of it.
4.2 Summaries of the interviews
Table 4.1 shows a brief description of each of the people interviewed and provides a 
pseudonym for each interviewee in order to be able to refer to each interviewee whilst 
preserving anonymity. In this sub-section each interview will be summarised in turn.
T a b le  4 .1 : S u m m a ry  of th e  in terview ees
Interviewee
pseudonym
Background of the interviewees (Notes from each interview are supplied in column 2 of the table in Appendix 
B)
SY1 A Civil Servant, responsible for the Department’s (MODUK) Information Security policy
SY2 A Royal Navy officer serving in IT security with over five years’ experience in this subject
SY3 A Royal Navy officer filling a  security role for two years
INT1 A Royal Navy intelligence officer with 25 years’ experience in MODUK
INT2 A Royal Navy Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) specialist with over 
twenty years’ experience
ENG1 A Royal Navy engineer with 20 years’ experience in ship systems management and project management
ENG2 A Royal Navy engineer and education officer with 16 years’ sea going and shore based experience
ENG3 A Royal Navy Weapons Electrical Officer with 14 years of experience in submarines
ENG4 A Royal Navy officer with over twenty years of education and management experience
CIS1 A senior Civil Servant, working in information systems support
CIS2 A Royal Navy officer with over twenty years’ experience in RN, Joint and NATO CIS and engineering
CIS3 A Royal Navy officer with over 12 years’ experience of CIS capability development
CON1 A civilian employed as a project manager and is a former Merchant Navy Radio Officer
CON2 A civilian security consultant working on H M G ’s Information Assurance Maturity Model
CON3 A civilian information management consultant with over twenty years of experience in the subject
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SY1 is a Civil Servant with over 15 years of experience in MODUK security and is 
responsible for setting the Department’s information security policy. A pre interview 
‘chat’ with SY1 was most informative, including several off the record remarks which 
suggested that the MODUK has a certain way to go to achieve effective security in a 
networked environment. In the interview itself, SY1 described an emerging real time 
information exchange environment. In this environment, formerly standalone systems 
are working together to provide everything from safety at sea, to new methods of 
reducing operating costs. SY1 expressed concern that the impact of the loss of these 
systems has not been fully thought through. Also, legacy ‘manual’ skills are no longer 
taught and there is an over reliance on satellite technology. The potential 
consequences of an attack against GPS was cited; specifically, the potential impact 
in a military context that could lead to the loss life, and in a business context that 
could result in a company having to file for bankruptcy. In SY1 ’s opinion, problems 
faced afloat and ashore will be similar. However, special consideration has to be 
made for the corrosive effect of salt water, working conditions, and availability and 
compatibility of spares. Whist discussing network-enabled capabilities, SY1 cited 
obstacles including: atmospheric limitations; time needed to download software 
patches; fall-back procedures if the ‘Home’ network is under attack; additional burden 
on staff; and increased opportunities for an adversary. SY1 suggested that the threats 
will be the same both afloat and ashore. Threat Actors are both internal and external 
to the organisation. SY1 appeared to favour a security risk management rather than a 
risk avoidance approach to the problems faced by the MODUK by stating that ‘We 
need to be firmly embedded in business; we need to have a good understanding of 
business, and the business needs to understand where we are coming from’. In 
considering what needs to be protected SY1 cited both the workforce and information.
Security needs to be ‘built in’ rather than ‘bolted on at the end of a project' which is 
claimed will have a disproportionate cost. Whilst discussing security risk, SY1 stated 
that ‘I am not sure whether businesses fully understand that the individual risks they 
are carrying may have an impact on somebody else. At senior level I am not sure 
they understand the cumulative effect’. Following a short discussion on standards,
SY1 stated that The security controls within the MODUK would fully meet and exceed 
the ISO 27000 controls and this has been so for many years. It has been said that the 
ISO standard is catching up’.
SY2 is a Royal Navy officer, who appeared to be annoyed at being asked questions 
about security. However, as the interview progressed, the interviewee relaxed and the 
value of the answers improved. Overall, the interviewee was of the opinion that the 
RN and MODUK have the right security processes and practices in place. However, 
the (MODUK) security manual is considered to be large and unwieldy by the 
community that use it. The reaction to security breaches in 2007/2008 may have been 
inappropriate and the changes to accounting and tracking that were implemented 
could have been more effective. When considering operations, the interviewee 
suggested that there are no new threats but changing ‘threat actors’ and the 
associated security vulnerabilities need a more ‘holistic approach’ and a better 
understanding of security by all players. The interviewee cited the nuclear firing chain 
as an example of potential operational compromise which could have devastating 
consequences. Because of the critical nature of information and systems, the 
interviewee suggested that there is a need for ships to be able to work without links to 
UK or other commands. When asked about cumulative risk, the interviewee was of 
the opinion that Navy Command risk management can be ‘ill judged’ suggesting that 
the information needed for informed risk management is not always available. Other
key words used by the interviewee but not included in this summary are: Protective 
Marking; Impact Table; Automatic Information System (AIS), and Accreditation.
SY3 is a Royal Navy officer who began by expressing concern about the use to which 
his answers would be put. Following a short explanation the interviewee agreed to 
discuss security issues and raised some interesting points. The interviewee talked 
about the difficulty of ensuring that Users read and adhere to Security Operating 
(SyOps) instructions. Users circumvent the rules and the use of USB memory pen 
was cited as an example The rules state that only MODUK authorised (crypto 
enabled) data pens can be used with MODUK systems and that these data pens 
must not be used on any other system (e.g. private laptop). So, if a member of staff is 
under pressure to finish work, and this can only be done at home, then they will break 
this rule. Rules are also overridden in urgent operational circumstances. For example, 
to transfer information between international partners. Communications security 
processes are generally considered to be good, but even here Users have been 
known to break the rules. The interviewee did not consider training to be a problem. A 
technical concern raised, is the ability to get anti-virus and patches to units. MODUK 
policy does not allow certain types of file extensions to be used over the network. This 
means that patches have to be mailed to ships and so can be out of date before 
being applied. When talking about wider MODUK issues the interviewee expressed 
concern about the ‘disconnect’ between what the military security organisation needs 
and the commercial service provider delivers; specifically, the destruction of evidence 
when service providers’ priority is to restore the service not maintain forensics. The 
interviewee also described how the MOD’s Computer Emergency Response Team 
and Joint Security Coordination Centre organisations work to protect networks and
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systems. The interviewee also described the responsibilities of the RN Warning, 
Alerting and Reporting Point (WARP). This organisation deals with Information 
Systems. Another organisation deals with compliance checking, and there are 
physical security teams. We briefly discussed the numbers of RN IT security incidents 
in 2007/2008 but the interviewee does not want the figures to be released to the 
public domain. The interviewee made the statement that ‘We spend a lot of time and 
resources protecting our information’.
INT1 is RN intelligence officer with 25 years’ experience in MODUK. At first this 
interviewee was concerned about her lack of specific security experience or 
expertise. However, once settled, the interviewee was able to give valuable ‘User’ 
insight into operational security. This interviewee made the point that, at sea, ‘the 
operational imperative takes precedence ’. In other words, trying to apply security 
practice and principles when the ship is sinking is not necessarily a good idea. The 
interviewee suggested that working jointly with other nations each with their own 
systems, standards and procedures ‘can lead to bending of the rules’. When asked 
about protecting information the interviewee’s view was that ‘there can be a 
disconnect between a user’s awareness and an expert’s requirements’. This suggests 
that a user can break the security rules without being aware that this is happening. 
The interviewee cited the operational need for data transfer between systems against 
the risk of miss-use of devices such as data pens. An overall awareness of the 
situation is required to ensure effective protection of information. The interviewee was 
of the opinion that HMG has over reacted to the 2007/2008 information security 
breaches. On the subject of training, the interviewee again talked about the 
operational imperative. ‘We are trained not to break the rules. But obeying the rules
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and doing the job right takes time. Therefore there has to be value judgement’. The 
interviewee suggested that there is a need for the RN to improve its information 
culture. One of the interviewee’s concerns was that ‘growing expectations for IT are 
not always being met’. The interviewee also suggested that there should be plans in 
place when things go wrong. Rather than disconnect systems from networks new 
technology could allow security managers to execute a more surgical response to 
incidents. This interviewee was the only one to mention the Official Secrets Act ‘In 
general, in the Services we deal, live and breathe security. We have the Official 
Secrets Act as the ultimate sanction’.
INT2 is a Royal Navy Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance (ISTAR) specialist with over twenty years’ experience. The 
interviewee was pressed for time which resulted in a rushed interview and less depth 
(30 minutes). The interview started with a discussion about recent ICT events. He 
suggested that the migration to a new system, which took place in 2008,was a step 
back in capability. He was also concerned about the amount of time required just to 
manage e-mail on a daily basis. While discussing life at sea he pointed out the 
constraints due to bandwidth, limited space, and strenuous routines. There is also 
pressure on the availability of equipment. As an example he cited that ‘juniors’ have 
to queue to get on the system. However, the ability to ‘fight the ship is well 
provisioned’. Returning to the issue of bandwidth, INT2 suggested that the lack of 
bandwidth leads to serious information deficiency. In INT2’s opinion there is not an 
information overload, rather ‘people pushing rubbish’.
ENG1 a Royal Navy engineer with 20 years’ experience in ship systems management 
and project management. The interviewee appeared relaxed and willing to answer the
questions. In the interviewee’s experience the maritime environment is more difficult 
to work in compared to a similar land-based environment. Technical issues cited 
included a lack of both bandwidth and communications connectivity. One effect is that 
ship staff still require paper documents to be kept up to date rather than rely on the 
electronic version held on the network in the UK. In the opinion of the interviewee 
support activity is not good and time is wasted reformatting information which is still of 
little value to Users. One of the difficulties identified by the interviewee is a lack of 
training. When asked about information assurance, the interviewee noted that there is 
a paradigm shift away from the ‘need to know’ towards a ‘need to share’. In terms of 
continuity and recovery planning, the interviewee said that ‘We [RN] have lost the 
knack. Information Assurance is ignored, not trained, not exercised’. Greater 
complexity of connections and poor working practice will worsen the situation. Whilst 
talking about joint operations with UK and international partners giving rise to 
opportunities for the ill-disposed, the interviewee reflected on the lack of general 
security training, security understanding and security control and cited an incident 
were a local Internet service provider was allowed to set up an Internet ‘hotspot’ on­
board a ship. Also, the deficiencies in security awareness compel security ‘crack 
downs’ which in turn can stifle business activity. ‘With a lack of understanding you 
cannot take risks.’ Even so, the interviewee stated that in his opinion an electronic 
security attack on a ship would be relatively expensive -  there are likely to be 
cheaper options for conducting attacks. When asked about security threats and 
vulnerabilities the interviewee cited commercial outsourcing and sharing commercial 
networks which, whilst reducing costs, do raise the vulnerability to attack. ‘We can 
defend the data with crypto over such networks but we do not defend the service 
provider’.
ENG2 is an engineer and education officer with 16 years’ sea going and shore based 
experience. Citing the example of submarines, the interviewee talked about the 
challenges of an independent maritime unit including intermittent connectivity and 
limited bandwidth . He believes that technology will become smarter and potentially 
lead to a reduction of the number of units to achieve the same effect. In his 
experience, there is a greater use of data transmission compared to several years 
ago. When discussing information, the interviewee expressed the opinion that RN 
information management is inefficient with too much none-targeted information. 
Information management organisation on-board is undergoing re-organisation ahead 
of the changes required by the Information Assurance Maturity Model which itself is 
HMG’s response to the data loses of 2007/2008. (See, for descriptions of data losses, 
Burton (2008), Hanigan (2008) and CESG (2008b).) Returning to technology issues, 
the interviewee talked about the likely effects of the loss of legacy fall-back to signal 
traffic and an inability to conduct optimal maritime operations specifically in joint 
environment. He believes the impact will worsen as the dependence grows. The 
threats are not new but there is improved ability to carry out a network attack. It is 
worth an enemy investing in attack capability. The interviewee suggested that the 
MODUK does not have a map of IT architecture being deployed and this makes 
management and defence of the networks inefficient. When discussing systems 
failure the interviewee suggested that the RN does not plan for recovery in the same 
way that a civilian organisation would. Security training is not considered to be wrong. 
The interviewee believes that Users find that ‘Carelessness is simpler [easier] than 
security’. Returning to the IAMM, the interviewee expressed the opinion that the data 
losses were due to carelessness and a lack of appreciation of how easy it is to lose 
large volumes of information from electronic media when compared with the same
physical volume being lost or stolen from an office. However, he did think there has 
been an element of overreaction. Finally, the interviewee expressed concern over: 
increasing burden on individuals; reliance on commercial services such as Airwaves; 
the possibility of 'Jamming1; single points of failure; and the limited number of 
satellites. In a land environment you have alternative data routing that are not 
available at sea. However, he pointed out that a ship has a certain security that land 
environments don’t have.
ENG3 is a Royal Navy Weapons Electrical Officer with 14 years of experience. The 
interviewee highlighted the challenges of; long deployments and limited 
communications; business continuity; irregular working patterns; exercises present 
problems of endurance; and noise. He pointed out that the physical distribution of 
books and manuals are now gone. Information management was categorised as 
inconsistent and it frequently difficult to find a unique single source of truth. Also 
incoherent which leads to bad practice. This, in turn, leads to additional workload and 
‘mountains of data which is useless’. Interviewee recognised that the HMG review 
has led to tighter procedures for handling and carrying data. Security measures are 
enforced to stop data leaving secure areas. System failure leads can be devastating; 
takes time to get back into old ways of working; leads to User frustration, and the loss 
of key information for decision making. In a coalition there must be a balance 
between security and openness. Current risk based approach to systems can be 
erratic and can slow down the speed of progress. However, lip service to security 
measures runs the risk of completely corrupting the operation. He believes that ‘we 
are the poor cousins in terms of bandwidth. Most information systems take little 
consideration of bandwidth’. He suggested that expectations are too high ‘At home
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you can expect broadband and more’. He went on to say that £On-board ship there is 
a single input path, which is expensive, technically limited and so we are constrained’. 
The interviewee suggested that work should be carried out to improve bandwidth 
efficiency. When asked about the threats, the interviewee talked about the limited 
number of ‘points of penetration’ [physical boundary around the hull] and that the RN 
uses protection techniques such as radio encryption. In the opinion of the interviewee, 
security training is poor from both an information and systems view point.
ENG4, a Royal Navy officer with over 12 years’ experience of engineering capability 
development and combat systems accreditation. This interviewee regards the 
maritime environment to be more secure in the sense of a mobile metal box. There 
are difficulties due to bandwidth and he cited for example issues such as virus 
updates, patch information and ensuring access to latest advice and policy. He 
expressed concern with shore-based support solutions and reach back. Ship staffs no 
longer want to wait to get into harbour for solutions to problems, and this has security 
implications. When discussing information as an asset to be protected, the interview 
suggested that information management and security issues are not fully thought 
through at sea. He cited for example that the procurement of computing and 
communications equipment does not match the needs and limitations of the maritime 
environment. He described how the expectation is to be constantly in touch and how 
it is easy to get lost in red tape as a result. The interviewee also expressed concern 
about the lack of understanding in applying the ways of working. He believes that 
there is a lack of training at the basic level. Effort is in hand but need to embed ways 
of working within the RN culture. He believes that the needs of information assurance 
and the needs for networked capability are causing problems. On the one hand there
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is the need to reduce the level of data transfers. On the other hand, there are 
operations based on the need to share. He suggests that effective assured delivery is 
what is needed. On the subject of systems failure, the interviewee was of the opinion 
that there is an over reliance on IT to conduct some compulsory tasks with no fall­
back and a lack of disaster recovery. He described the push to a single network and 
likened it to ‘putting all the eggs in one basket’. The interviewee believes that there is 
a poor understanding of security requirements due to over complication and 
contradictory instructions. For example, removable media must be encrypted but the 
approved technology is not available. He suggested that there is pressure on people 
to circumvent the rules to achieve outputs. While discussing security threats, he 
described how systems are designed and then security is applied. He believes there 
needs to be a step change in information systems design.
CIS1 is a senior Civil Servant, working in information systems support. The 
interviewee asked why he had been selected to answer questions about security. 
Following a short discussion he accepted the logic and was willing to answer the 
questions openly. This interviewee highlighted the following key problem areas. He 
believes that there is an information overload and the lack of deployed technology to 
help. Not all RN is using the cultural and behavioural guidelines and protocols put in 
place to help. Also, web technology is emerging as a solution but not everyone is 
using it properly. Staff have inconsistent levels of experience when using ICT. For 
example, they are still using attachments rather than links to document stores. He 
suggested that staff do not appreciate collaborative working versus dissemination or 
publish to wider audience that is now possible using team sites. Finally, records 
management is poor due to inadequate software and poor culture. Whilst discussing
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Information Assurance (IA) the interviewee suggested that HMG’s initial reaction to 
the 2007/2008 security incidents was a ‘knee jerk reaction’. The interviewee also 
suggested that IA should now be set on the same footing as diversity etc. otherwise 
there is a risk of loss of skills. Whilst discussing the likely impact of systems failure, 
the interviewee mentioned reputational damage to MODUK, RN and C4ISTAR and in 
extreme circumstances the impact on operations. A virus could lead to the loss of 
capability as demonstrated by the multiple Conficker incidents. Fall-back systems 
such as Military Messaging are available now but new infrastructure with limited 
resilience can be a single point of failure and can lead to IP hacking vulnerability. The 
interviewee expects experienced hackers will look to exploit vulnerabilities in terms of 
malware and executable code. A further issue is that more sophisticated IT will 
require extra skills and on-board support. The interviewee went on to describe how, in 
a self-contained environment (at sea), a ship can be disconnected from the network 
and still run. In the opinion of the interviewee, poor understanding and training is 
probably the major cause of security incidents. Another cause is staff under pressure 
to deliver and so having to circumvent the rules, ‘Achieving output is more important 
than security’. The interviewee noted that the Commanding Officer on-board a ship is 
more empowered to take risk than a counterpart ashore.
CIS2 is a Royal Navy officer with over twenty years’ experience in RN, Joint and 
NATO CIS and engineering. The interviewee described working at sea in a hostile 
environment in terms of both the enemy and also the elements. In his experience 
limited bandwidth presents constraints ‘which are not frequently remembered by the 
wider community’. Technology is eroding the degree of independence which has 
been cherished by mariners. The temptation exists to ‘micro-manage’ from shore.
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While talking about Information technology, the interviewee used terms such as 
‘decision superiority’ and the dependence good information and information 
management. His response suggested that information overload is sometimes an 
issue. A benefit of the new technology is ability to ‘spread local situational awareness 
and to contribute to the wider picture’. There is now a requirement for smarter 
information management and for the need for local specialists and cited the re- 
introduction of a naval intelligence capability as one example. In the interviewees’ 
opinion, the technological barriers are falling, but the bandwidth limitations and costs 
of commercial service providers are causing problems. He returned to the idea that 
other Services taking part in joint operations assume ships have a continual presence 
and high bandwidth, which is not always the case, especially during operational 
silence periods. The interviewee suggested that the major barriers are cultural. He 
then talked about the balance between the benefits of sharing and the risks of 
inappropriate sharing or operational compromising of operational security. The 
interviewee described information management as ‘incoherent and aspirational.
There is a huge desire to do better’ and ‘there is a realisation that we could do a 
whole lot better’. While talking about protecting information, the interviewee 
mentioned the differences between physical security and ‘cyber’ security. He went on 
to say that The current ‘flavour’ of our protection regime is very much centred on 
recent, very public, breaches of personnel data’. He suggested that the ‘need to 
know’ is currently taking precedence over than the benefits of sharing. Security 
guidance for Service personnel is available in Joint Service Publication 440 (JSP 440) 
(Ministry of Defence UK, 2009) and other restricted documents. The interviewee 
noted that accreditation and risk management structures are also undergoing 
changes. The boundaries and responsibilities of risk owners, as networks proliferate,
need to be defined. He stated that ‘We cannot get a crisp definition of what an 
information asset is’. Returning to the public data losses suggested that Information 
Commissioner had ‘effectively put the MODUK on quarterly report’. He then went on 
to describe the changes that are coming into force, and the bench marks being used 
to monitor progress (Information Assurance Maturity Model). The interviewee 
suggested that too much effort had gone into the technical aspects of the Defence IT 
infrastructure. He suggested that more effort is now required to exploit the benefits of 
a common network across Defence. Another issue is that ‘the boundary between 
operations and operations support is increasingly fuzzy’. In the opinion of the 
interviewee the common network does makes the RN ‘a more attractive target and 
the potential for more significant impact if an adversary is successful’. However, the 
counter argument is that a common network allows the use of more effective 
protection and awareness of our networks health and the attacks to it. On-board 
expertise will need to be uplifted so that cyber battle damage and repair can be 
continuous, spontaneous and augmentation from shore. The interviewee stated that 
the majority of security incidents are caused by their own people. Training and 
awareness are undergoing overhauls. He talked about computer network defence 
and attack but not sure how to work this in because we did not go into any detail. He 
suggested that there is a need for ‘better understanding of process and process 
ownership and therefore who is empowered to manage risk, decide what are your key 
assets to be protected and developing a proper risk management approach rather 
than an ad hoc one’. Legacy technology still in use is causing problems, for example 
the cost of the upkeep of obsolete equipment and unsupported software. From an ICT 
security perspective, being at sea is best ‘By inference we might think that we are 
potentially at less threat because of the tenuous nature of our connectivity and our
lack of continual presence makes us less attractive to external attack. I think the 
internal vulnerabilities are just as acute and the impact is potentially more acutely felt 
through the lack of expertise on-board and the lack of the ability to rapidly ship in that 
expertise. Once again, the bandwidth constraints to remotely apply patches and 
reach back to the hub. Physical security is much improved - you have a tin box 
around you to protect and deter’.
CIS3 is a Royal Navy officer with over twenty years of CIS operations and 
management. The interviewee described how the technology available ashore is now 
more accessible on ships. He cited the example that in 1984 mariners would place 
high frequency (HF) radio telephone calls through operators and by 2004 dial direct, 
web browsing and satellite television were available in the right conditions. Access to 
the Internet helps in disaster relief. For example, readily available satellite pictures of 
earthquakes can be used to help understand a situation. Then, by using the 
Automatic Identification System (AIS), the positions of merchant ships can be 
pinpointed and by the use of Inmarsat telephones they can be directed to assist. One 
of the security issues is the misuse of the AIS. He suggested that commercial gain 
can be obtained from knowing where your competitors’ ships are. He also suggested 
that certain commercial companies are directing Masters to turn off their AIS. AIS can 
also be used for good. For example, in 2005 a Royal Navy helicopter ‘ditched’ into the 
Gulf of Oman. AIS and INMARSAT were used to coordinate the rescue. The 
interviewee explained why information is so important to the RN. He went on to 
describe why information management is difficult, time consuming and expensive.
The information assurance problem is being addressed following on from the HMG 
security initiative. He suggested that it will take a lot of time and effort to make
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successful. On systems failure, he pondered the potential impacts. He suggested that 
at worst huge impact on UK and world economy. An EM pulse could lead to economic 
meltdown and he cited the likelihood that, without further funding, GPS satellites are 
due to ‘fall out of the sky’ in 2018. The interviewee talked about internal and external 
threats. He described how firewalls and other security measures are enforced shore- 
side. However, there have been examples where ships staff have upload virus using 
their own memory devices. There is a lack of understanding of doing this sort of thing. 
‘We are always playing catch up with technology. As Singh (1999) points out, it is 
difficult to play catch up because of the rate of change’.
CON1 is a civilian employed as a project manager and is a former Merchant Navy 
Radio Officer, keen to help and provided contacts with commercial organisations. 
Having experience in both the Merchant Navy and Royal Navy, the interviewee was 
able to describe the on-board working environment in some detail. The following 
points were captured: relatively small community; almost wholly work-focused with no 
recreation or other outlets; the physical environment can be challenging, the weather, 
sea states and cold; there are long working hours with disrupted sleep patterns; and 
the confined space and closed community can lead to tension. Personal issues can 
exist and you have to be flexible. The interviewee went on to describe how working 
practices have changed from virtual isolation from your organisation and 
infrastructure when not alongside to 24 hour contact almost anywhere in the world. 
This feeds the stress already caused by the environment’. The interviewee 
expressed concern for those working at sea today including incessant information 
requests, enquires etc. When discussing the 2007/2008 data losses the interviewee 
noted that whilst that loss was due to lax policy and procedure, the reaction has been
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a massive overcompensation and is hampering business, The organisation as entity 
does not understand the value of information’. Systems failure would immediately 
stop current dynamic command and control capability. This would impact on any form 
of decision making. They would use different words in a commercial organisation but 
the effect is the same’. Education of people is probably one of the biggest causes of 
failure. This is not a new challenge. The current approach to IT security is not intuitive 
and not yet simple enough to make training etc. simple. Whilst discussing threats to 
the networked systems, the interviewee talked about how the scale and scope of 
threats will be the daunting factor. The interviewee was concerned with the possibility 
that the infrastructure was introducing a single point of failure. Because of physical 
displacement of platform to land the point of linkage becomes point of failure, and 
because maritime platform alternatives and diversity are limited. On the subject of risk 
management, the interviewee talked about the need to ‘evolve a method of risk 
management that is not just the current method of risk aversion’. Complexity means 
the ill-disposed, or anyone who may wish to attack the MODUK, need to become 
more sophisticated.
CON2 is a civilian security consultant working on HMG’s Information Assurance 
Maturity Model (IAMM). The interviewee talked about the challenges faced in 
delivering situational awareness or sharing information. He explained the difficulty 
defending your own and others information such as the ‘Duty of care’. He went on to 
talk about difficulties maintaining communications links including atmospherics, 
propagation and bandwidth limitations. The interviewee then described how pressure 
on the system puts pressure on security principles ‘it is difficult to bring security 
principles to bear at extreme distances’. In the opinion of the interviewee information
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assurance should not be technology driven. He cited the idea that ‘what do I need to 
do, what do I need to prosecute, how do I prosecute it and how can I do that keeping 
a high quality of IA to do it’. So what technical solutions are available for me to do 
that. When considering the progress being made towards effective security, the 
interviewee suggested that progress is being made. A common [MODUK] 
understanding of terminology remains a challenge. Indeed, the use of [MODUK] 
terminology is different to that used in government. He also expressed concern that 
there is a lack of understanding of how information can be used correctly and that 
training is required. The lack of understanding of the technology makes it difficult to 
understand security risks. When you lose the understanding of the integral linkages 
between security, management information, knowledge management and exploit 
information starts to break down. The interviewee believes that the initial reaction, to 
recent security incidents, was to stop data sharing, but data sharing/movement is now 
improving, ‘MODUK losses of information are starting to drop off’. Moving onto risk 
management the interviewee stated that There is no money to go back to an entirely 
risk free world -  and life isn't risk free’. When asked about the effect of cumulative risk 
taking he talked about data disaggregation, financial risk reaching critical and a 
growing realisation that risk should not be allowed to stack up. [It has been the 
author’s experience that data disaggregation has defied solution for many years and 
could be a project in its own right. The subject sounds straight forward in principle].
On the subject of threat, the interviewee believes that a good maritime threat and 
vulnerability analysis has not been conducted. As a result, decisions are being made 
without the full facts.
83
C0N3 is a civilian Information Assurance consultant. The interviewee suggested that 
it is better to have security technology that supports people rather than technology 
with all the ‘bells and whistles’. He went onto to put forward the observation that bad 
security practice is a cause for incidents but also the need to get the job done leads to 
taking short cuts. If security practice is embedded in normal business then business 
practice should improve and management of risks become standard practice. Another 
point raised is the new linkage between career progression and disciplinary action 
such that the no blame culture is being replaced with facing the consequence of 
actions. This linkage is leading to improved behaviour on the part of users. The 
interviewee did not believe that accepting cumulative risk will have adverse 
consequences on ITSy in a maritime environment. He went on to explain that risk can 
be sensibly managed as long as mitigation processes are in place. Whilst discussing 
the IAMM he highlighted the effects of raising conscience, it identifies the frailties in 
explicate ways and helps to identify the investment strategy needed in order to 
improve. It would help if MODUK would adopt normal risk management processes in 
this area. However, MODUK is doing the right things; it just needs to get better. The 
security methodology and processes are good enough. The interviewee suggested 
that the maritime environment is a major driver on electronic and physical security 
threats. There is a need to apply the threat assessments and mitigation in the 
business context. There is a need to embed security design into capability design so 
that it enables rather than dampens and weakens practice. The interviewee observed 
that there is nothing worse than a bolted on security measure. The best way to 
achieve safety is by design from the first stage. He believes that ICT procurement 
across government should be based on design. [After the interview we talked about 
other MODUK initiatives, one of which is the three part MODUK Information Strategy
(MODIS). Previous versions of MODIS did not have a security component. The next 
version will].
A complete record of all the RN interview notes is supplied in column 2 of the table in 
Appendix B.
4.3 Data collected
The RN notes and data were mapped into a table using an Excel™ spreadsheet for 
ease of data handling, as explained in Section 3.4. This spreadsheet was built with 
four columns. Certain of the interviewee’s answers covered more than one topic. 
Where this happened the data have been separated into data blocks. The first column 
shows the mapping of the data block with its associated question from Table 3.4. The 
interviewee’s opinions, as recorded at the time of the interviews, are mapped out in 
the second column. In this way, the data trail can be established (Yin, 2003), which in 
turn will help fellow researchers reflect on the original data, should they chose to 
conduct further research. The third column contains the results of the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data using open coding and ‘in-vivo concepts’ (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, Kindle Locations 1017-1018). The fourth column records the research 
codes associated with barriers to ICT security. (See Section 3.2.) Data collected from 
ENG1 is provided here as an example. (See Table 4.2.)
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Table 4.2: Extract of ENG1 data presented in four columns
Data
block
and
question
Interview ee's opinions  
o f ICT security in a m aritim e  
environm ent
R esearcher’s interpretation o f 
interview ee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
Yes it does. You have the element of 
bandwidth which makes it more difficult. 
Other environments are similar: mobile 
environments. W e have a paucity of 
communications connectivity.
1. Restrictions due to bandwidth
2. Similar restrictions apply in land 
environment
3. Limited communications options
181. Bandwidth
182. Mobility
183. Single point of failure
B
Q2
W e spend more time sitting on e-mail. 
Unfortunately systems are still stove piped. 
Organisation boundaries within single 
platform [chain of command] require 
communications using e-mail with little 
automation [no web working]. This means 
our on-board information exchange is poor. 
W e still have to make sure our paper BRs 
are up to date and correct.
1. Intelligence, management, 
warfare etc. all on their own 
system
2. Self-imposed network 
restrictions
3. Duplication of effort (Paper and 
electronic books)
4. In case on-board systems fails
184. Stove pipe v shared
185. Command and control
186. Internal information exchange
187. Duplication of effort
188. Contingency documents
C
Q3
Enormously. From a communications point 
of view [IT] is very important, but lots of 
underlying support activity is not done well.
1. Important for operations
2. Support activity
189. Operational security
D
Q3
Operations stuff is weighed off [well done] 
but the support side absolutely terrible. For 
example, making reports and returns.
1. Reports and returns 190. Management
E
Q 3
How the information is held, including 
spread sheets; there is no compatibility and 
different formats. It is the same information 
but people busy reformatting. The 
information should be available -  most tools 
are geared up to top level management. As 
such, the resultant information is no use to 
Users.
1. Time wasted reformatting to 
satisfy different parts of the same 
organisation
191. Needs one source of truth
F
Q 4
Haphazard, haphazard and haphazard; I 
refer back to my previous answer!
1. Haphazard
2. Haphazard
3. Haphazard
192. Information management
193. Information exploitation
G
Q5
Information is an important asset, but it 
depends on which level of the organisation 
you talk about. At higher levels it is very 
important; lower down not cognisant of 
what information means. People are not 
trained
1. Information is an asset
2. Awareness of information as an 
asset varies across the 
organisation
194. Information as asset
195. Awareness
H
Q6
There has been a bit of a shift. IA, in my 
view, completely focused on not getting it -  
the need to know. Showing signs of making 
sure getting it -  the need to share. Poor on 
making sure information accurate and 
correct. Big factor of not managing it well.
1. Returned to an earlier 
paradigm, need to know, because 
of data losses
2. Starting to settle back into need 
to share
3. Issues with information 
management
196. Need to know v need to 
share
197. Information management
I
Q 7
As it stands from a support point of view 
and the way they operate or organised -  if 
IT stops then everything stops. Ships don’t 
sail, helicopters don’t fly. IA processes 
should have allowed continuity -  having the 
right fall-backs -  but we have lost the 
knack. IA is ignored, not trained, not 
exercised.
1. IT critical for all operations
2. Lack of fall-back capability
3. Lack of contingency plans
4. Lack of IA awareness and 
understanding
5. Lack of training
6. RN does not practice for 
working without IT
198. Dependence on IT
199. Fall-back
200. Contingency
201. Awareness and 
understanding
202. Training
203. Exercise
J
Q8
MT WAN etc. will give more access points 
and lead to more complexity. Difficult to co­
ordinate encryption key handling. IP crypto 
may help. In a maritime environment [IP 
crypto] by 2012 perhaps further.
1. Greater complexity of 
connections and poor working 
practice will worsen the situation
2. Traditional cryptographic 
methods too expensive and 
complex for international network 
working
204. Technical complexity
205. Multiple unguarded access 
points
206. Key distribution
K
Q8
Complete integration into Dll. You cannot 
use it for what you need it for. New 
vulnerabilities to Centre. Single point of 
failure.
1. Ubiquitous network
2. Impact of non-availability
3. New vulnerabilities not 
accounted for
4. Single point of failure
207. Ubiquitous network
208. Impact of non-availability
209. New vulnerabilities not 
accounted for
210. Single point of failure
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A summary of the categories and their attributes emerging from each interview was 
then built. An example is provided in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Example of data categories and attributes extracted from ENG1
CategoryENG1
Outcome
Environment
People’s security behaviour
Organisation’s security culture
Technology
Critical assets
Sources of threat
Attributes
Internal information exchange 
Duplication of effort 
Operational security 
Management 
Needs one source of truth 
Awareness and understanding 
Security awareness 
Training
Command and control
Lessons from ashore
Security training
Lack of security awareness
Risk management
Contingency documents
Costs
Co-operation between military and service providers
Need to know v need to share
Information management
Contingency
Exercise
Information exploitation
Bandwidth 
ICT is safer at sea
Single point of failure
Bandwidth
Cyber trust
Stove pipe v shared
Technical complexity
Multiple unguarded access points
Cryptographic key distribution
New vulnerabilities not accounted for
Mobility
Needs one source of truth 
Information as asset
Contracting out 
Safer at sea 
Capable adversary 
Ubiquitous network 
Threat to sen/ice provider 
Dependence on IT 
Fall-back
Impact of non-availability
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4.4 Analysis: Preliminary barriers
Looking across the RN data’s categories and their attributes yielded nine barriers. 
These were:
1. Tensions experienced between security experts and ICT users
2. Operational imperatives override security requirements
3. Security requirements impeding business process
4. A limited ability to recover from disruption
5. Unable or unwilling to share security incident information
6. Inadequate security training
7. Disruption to situational awareness
8. Unpredictable behaviour of people in difficult situations
9. A lack of ICT security awareness
These will be discussed in this sub section.
1. Tensions experienced between security experts and ICT users
ICT security requires formal structures and absolute compliance by users. Equally, 
users require flexibility and freedom to operate under the prevailing conditions and 
circumstances. This conflict leads to the first barrier which manifests itself as criticism 
of security processes by users. For example, citing security method which is too 
difficult to follow and security instructions that are not clear and often contradict one 
another:
Don’t make it too complicated or boring. The current approach to IT 
security is not intuitive; not yet simple enough to make training etc. 
simple.
CON1J
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Conversely, there is criticism of users by security experts who claim that the 
principles and processes are more than sufficient to provide security if they are 
implemented correctly:
The RN and MODUK have the right security processes and practices in 
place.
SY2L
However, the same security expert expressed the opinion that:
The MODUK security manual is considered to be large and unwieldy by 
the community that use it.
SY2L
Such tensions are not limited to security and operations. The ISPS Code points out 
that there care must be taken between balancing the requirements of physical 
security and those of health and safety.
2. Operational imperatives override security requirements
This barrier tends to manifest when users need to act with flexibility in extreme 
circumstances. For example:
I recently headed a team working in six separate domains. Each domain 
represented one country with different technical standards and operating 
procedures. Ashore we follow the rules, but work afloat requires an 
ability to conduct risk management. If the IT is insufficient, for example 
different networks, unconnected standalones and the need to use 
private IT then that can lead to ‘bending of the rules’.
INT1A
Security experts argue that security is there to protect all, regardless of the prevailing 
conditions and circumstances. The Royal Navy have introduced ‘Impact Tables’ to 
access potential damage.
A ‘Protective Marking’ is related to national security breach. The Impact 
Table expands this into the loss of capability.
SY2I
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The truth probably lies somewhere in between such that any security process has to 
be balanced against operational imperatives.
3. Security requirements impeding business process
This barrier is different to the previous barriers because of poor security process 
being built into operational systems such that need to know is taking precedence over 
the need to share. This is akin to ‘fortress’ mentality where it can be difficult if not 
impossible to do business if overly draconian security measures are in place.
4. A limited ability to recover from disruption.
This barrier is the one that is most readily voiced by experts and users. From a 
security perspective:
Crews must be prepared for autonomous working; there is a need for 
ships to be able to work without links to UK or other commands.
SY2D
The complexity of marine ICT is not helping the situation:
Greater complexity of connections and poor working practice will worsen 
the situation.
ENG1K
It is particularly important to be self-sufficient and to be able to recover from incidents 
because of the likely separation from immediate assistance:
Could be catastrophic to the business which in a military context could 
lead to a loss of life in a business context could result in a company 
having to file for bankruptcy.
SY1K
5. Unable or unwilling to share security incident information
This barrier typifies organisational barriers. It is not unreasonable for companies to 
want to protect their own vulnerabilities, and giving away details about how they have 
suffered would jeopardize their commercial well-being. Commercial intelligence could 
give competitors a vital advantage:
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Commercial gain can be obtained from knowing where your 
competitor’s ships are. I understand that certain commercial 
companies are turning off their AIS. This is allowed in high threat 
areas.
ENG2B
The act of sharing information is, in itself a barrier when the communication channel 
is not secure:
Naval ships often call us up on VHF and ask us for details of our 
passage. This seems a bit silly; anyone could be listening!
MN3
6. Inadequate security training
This barrier appears to have agreement across the interviewees with one exception: 
I do not think training is a problem.
SY3F
More often, the view is held that:
Training is a huge issue. We are trying to improve.
ENG1L
Also:
Security training is poor from both an information systems and information 
technology view point.
ENG4L
A third engineer pointed to a lack of understanding:
.... there have been examples where ship's staff have upload virus 
using their own memory devices. There is a lack of understanding and 
training which leads to this sort of thing.
ENG2J
In addition:
The lack of understanding of the technology makes it difficult to 
understand security risks.
CON2G
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Rapid changes to ICT can make previously provided training obsolete, and even with 
training in place, all’s not well:
With only a few hours training I have to read books to catch up.
ENG4L
7. Disruption to situational awareness
This barrier has broad and profound consequences for those at sea. At its least 
disruptive, a loss of information can lead to inconvenience, perhaps a delay to a 
schedule or moving into an area of bad weather that could have been avoided had a 
weather forecast been received on-board. At its most disruptive, the loss of such 
information can lead to a severe incident with the potential to lead to a maritime 
disaster.
8. Unpredictable behaviour of people in difficult situations
This barrier represents a fascinating aspect of life at sea. One could use the indicator 
that information overload is causing stress:
It was not long ago that when you sailed you disconnected from the 
organisation and infrastructure. In a period of 20 to 25 years that has 
radically changed. The rate of change has increased and network 
enabled ships leads to longer detached working. This all feeds the 
stress already caused by the environment. I think it must be 
horrendous to be at sea and being fed by the e-mail machine -  
information requests, enquires and demands.
CON1B
However, this stress could be self-imposed:
There is not an information overload, rather people pushing rubbish.
INT2F
The main source of data for this barrier comes from secondary data and the way 
people behave in circumstances which they are not familiar with. For example, they 
may not be willing to carry out security duties in difficult circumstances (Self­
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preservation). Remote monitoring and control from shore can lead to an even greater 
reduction of skills to deal with security issues on-board. There are psychological 
barriers caused by isolation from family and friends for extended periods. Inter 
personal issues can become a problem:
It’s a relatively small community. Focus almost holey work focused 
with no recreation or other outlets. The physical environment can be 
challenging, the weather, sea states and cold. There are the long 
working hours with disrupted sleep patterns. The confined space and 
closed community can lead to tension. Personal issues can exist and 
you have to be flexible.
CON1A
9. A lack of ICT security awareness
This barrier has fundamental implications. It could be argued that this lack of 
awareness is due to an idiosyncrasy of the organisation. However, the need for a 
supposedly mature security organisation such as the RN to introduce the Information 
Assurance Maturity Model suggests otherwise:
Information Assurance Maturity Model, which is HMG’s response to 
the data loses in 2007/2008.
ENG3D
The Information Assurance Maturity Model was introduced across UK government 
departments in an attempt to stem and then correct the loss of personal data and 
increase information security awareness across the National Health Service, the 
Ministry of Defence and other government departments and agencies (CESG, 
2008b).
4.5 Analysis: Barriers and how they manifest themselves
A second pass was made through the RN data in an attempt to understand how 
barriers manifest themselves in the maritime environment. To achieve this
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understanding, it was necessary to consider how the security, ICT and operations 
interact. Figure 4.2 shows a high level representation of the associated relationships.
N e e d s
N e e d s
Figure 4.2: Interaction of operational, ICT and security components
In ideal conditions, the secure start state is such that confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) are functioning normally which in turn supports nominal ICT 
operations and the ability of the ship to float move and fight is at optimum efficiency 
from a secure ICT perspective. If a barrier to ICT security were to manifest then this in 
turn could have an adverse impact on the operational end state. In an extreme case, 
a barrier could stop normal ICT security functions which in turn could put the ship and 
her crew in danger. For example, if a navigational aid is taken out of service at a 
critical juncture. A barrier could complicate or confuse the security functions such that 
the operational end state is achieved but may not be fully trusted. Likewise, a barrier 
may slow a security function such that the end state is achieved but in this case it 
may be too late (cf. closing the barn door after the horse has bolted). A barrier may 
be present that causes concern in certain areas and yet is not recognised in others. In
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this condition it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of security. A summary of these
impacts is shown in Figure 4.3.
Secure start state Barrier to ICT security manifests Impact on operational end state
Danger to 
float move fight
Barrier can stop ICT 
security functions
Potential for DAD that 
has not been noticed
CIA
Barrier has no obvious 
effect
CIA
CIA
Barrier can complicate 
or confuse security 
functions
CIA Barrier has unknown 
effect
End state may or may 
not have been 
achieved
End state achieved but 
confused
End state 
compromised
Barrier can slow 
security functions
End state may be 
achieved but later than 
planned
CIA
Figure 4.3: Barriers to secure ICT and how they manifest themselves
The impact can be further compounded because any given barrier can have multiple 
properties and dimensions and as such barriers can be conditional, or may not apply 
in all circumstances. For example, a security process itself can create uncertainty:
Greater complexity of connections and poor working practice will 
worsen the situation.
ENG1K
Such barriers may exist whilst the ship is alongside, but are greatly reduced when at 
sea and not connected to a radio network or vice versa. However, care must be 
taken to avoid complacency even when at sea and not connected to a network. For 
example, ‘French Navy surrenders to Conficker’ (The National Business Review, 
2009) was an incident which started at sea on a standalone system and quickly 
spread when the system was connected ashore. This barrier category would be
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manifest when users do not understand or are not even conscious of the need for 
ICT security. This incident was reported to have occurred in a Middle East port:
... to improve welfare connectivity a local Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) was used to set up a ‘hot spot’ on board a ship.
ENG1M
In this case, no consideration was given to the security implications of having an 
unauthorised wireless transceiver on-board and the resulting potential for eaves­
dropping, interference, and other security issues as described in Chapter 2.
Barriers can create significant obstacles to day to day operations and could have 
longer term consequences if business aspirations cannot be met or are interrupted in 
some way. A typical aspiration for ICT is:
.... support not only the critical safety at sea, but will support the 
business drivers, certainly in the Merchant Service, which will be 
reducing operating costs whilst maximising profit.
SY1A
Barriers of this type are those that could impede operations with the potential to 
initiate security breaches, and would likely be manifest when there are conflicts 
between the various departments, even a certain level of resentment. For example:
During our last safety inspection we were criticised for padlocking 
hatches and doors. This went against our security inspection which 
required the same doors and hatches to be locked in some way.
MN9
Barriers can be dangerous and this category is of particular interest especially in the 
context of Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), when a long way from immediate support in 
a potentially hostile environment. For example ‘Limited ability to recover from 
disruption’ would be dangerous if, due to the prevailing conditions and circumstances, 
mariners were unable to restore float move fight due to a lack of contingency 
capability. Barriers in this category will lead to incidents and disasters and will have to 
be alleviated as quickly and effectively as possible. One engineer suggested that a
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loss of radio communications may not be an immediate issue but the loss of control of 
ship’s systems could have an immediate impact:
You can think of a big merchant ship losing communications may not 
be so serious -  losing control of machinery mid Atlantic?
ENG2
Another engineer stated that:
If IT [ICT] stops then everything stops. Ships don’t sail, helicopters 
don’t fly.
ENG1H
Should such a barrier lead to an incident or disaster at sea, then a self-contained, 
rapid response and recovery will be essential. For example, when HMS Nottingham 
grounded and subsequently lost main power, the battery powered GMDSS equipment 
was used to radio for help (Royal Navy, 2002). Individual stress factors are also 
characteristic of this this group of barriers:
We end up doing this [security officer] and have no time for our day 
job.
MN1
If a barrier is characterised as dangerous and is also attributed to an organisational 
shortfall, then this should be rectified or ameliorated. If, on the other, a barrier is 
characterised as inherent and is attributed to the laws of electromagnetic propagation, 
then the best that can be done is good design and an understanding of how to get the 
best from the prevailing conditions. This level of detail would be used by security 
experts rather than the users, and could help in the design, implementation and 
management of secure.
Barriers can be circumstance, location-dependant or inherent such that the owners 
and crew have little or no control and so would have to alleviate the impact if an ICT 
incident of this type were to take place. Of course, having a disaster recovery plan is 
essential, regardless of what caused the incident in the first place.
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4.6 Conclusion
Analysis of the RN data, gathered between February and September 2009, has 
provided an insight into real world barriers to ICT security in the maritime 
environment. The first nine barriers that emerged from the data led to further 
consideration of the nature of barriers and how they manifest themselves. The results 
suggest that an understanding of barriers and their complex social and technical 
interactions could indeed be used to advance the understanding of security issues 
associated with the use of ICT systems in the maritime environment. It will therefore 
be appropriate to use them as a stimulus to develop a secure ICT maritime profile 
that will be capable of being updated on an on-going basis. This work will be further 
developed in Chapter 6 but before that the next chapter will present research 
undertaken to look at the Merchant Navy.
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Chapter 5 
Merchant Navy: Data and analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at the Merchant Navy data gathered between June and September 
2009. First, the data collected from opportunity based discussions with Merchant 
Navy officers will be presented. Then, a review of the structure of the ISPS Code Ship 
Security Assessment is undertaken to identify those components that are suitable for 
use within the proposed updateable maritime ICT security profile. Finally a review of 
maritime incident data from secondary sources will be used to reveal the potential 
threat actors and impacts that can be used to inform the updateable maritime ICT 
security profile that will be developed further in Chapter 6.
5.2 Data from the Merchant Ship Security Officer Course
In accordance with the methodology set out in Chapter 3, the data reported here was 
gathered on an opportunity basis during informal one to one conversations with 
Merchant Navy officers attending a Ship’s Security Officer training course held in 
South Shields. During the course, there was no direct mention made of ICT security. 
However, certain aspects of on-board operations and physical security did arise 
which have implications for secure ICT. The key points to emerge from the 
conversations are set out below in the following order:
1 The attendees
2 Resource issues
3 Additional security technology requirements
4 Ship’s ICT
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5 Physical security
6 Safety verses security
7 Summary
1 The attendees
The course was delivered by an ex Master Mariner who made the point that the ISPS 
Code came into existence to help member nations strengthen their physical security 
processes on-board and in harbours, and as such does not cover secure ICT. The 
Merchant Navy officers attending were representative of a range of maritime sector 
activities including liquid natural gas (LNG) carriers, tanker management, bulk cargo 
carriers and the off-shore oil and gas industry. Permission to take notes and talk to 
individual was sought during the introduction session. There were no dissenters.
2 Resource issues
The first thing to emerge from discussions with officers was that there are resource 
issues where the need for additional crew to take on security responsibilities cannot 
be met because of budget constraints. Even where the ISPS Code calls for dedicated 
security staff, the work falls to existing crew members in addition to their principle role 
on-board. One officer summarised the situation thus:
We end up doing this [Ship Security Officer] and have no time for the 
day job
MN1
This is a sentiment which echoes those expressed by officers in interviews reported 
by Price (1972) about their life at sea in the 1930s:
We are inundated with little jobs that we don’t get paid for and this 
stops us from doing our real work
Price, 1972, p. 11
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Price (1969) noted that as result of the concerns from the 1930s, working practices 
across the maritime sector were updated to improve working conditions and reduce 
working hours. The impact of the introduction of new security practices suggests that, 
in this instance, lessons about best working practice have either been overlooked or 
set to one side.
3 Additional security technology requirements
The ISPS Code requires ship authorities to fit a ‘Ship Security Alert System’ (Lees 
and Williamson, 2009, p. 43) to their vessels for the purpose of sending a covert 
message to the ship authority in the event of an attack. Upon activation of the system, 
the relevant authority such as the ship’s owners’ can contact the military to ask for an 
armed intervention. If an armed response team is close enough, it can be dispatched 
and in position before the attackers can press home their attack or flee the situation.
The system is activated by a ‘panic button’. Some ships have just one such button but 
others have a number distributed around the vessel. However, because the existence 
of the Ship Security Alert System is in the public domain (see, for example, Hesse 
and Charalambous, 2004) it could itself be targeted with the aim of disabling the 
security system before it can be activated. False alarms are also a problem:
I set off an alarm once, because I did not know the ‘panic button’ was 
a pressure switch on the deck next to the chart table
MN2
Clearly, if there were to be a large number of false alarms the impact of genuine 
alarms would be likely to diminish (cf. the boy who cried wolf).
In addition to problems resulting from malicious intent, communications security can 
also be breached inadvertently:
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Naval ships often call us up on VHF and ask us for details of our 
passage. To me this seems a bit silly; anyone could be listening!
MN3
An officer described the help that merchant mariners receive from the UK Maritime 
Trade Organisation:
I don’t know who they are but we give them our position using e-mail 
and they give us information about where the pirates are
MN4
The UK MTO was established in Dubai in October 2001 ‘to act as an interface 
between military and merchant naval services across the entire maritime industry and 
work closely with coalition forces’ (Royal Navy, 2013). If the ICT is not available to 
provide this service, or indeed the information can be falsified, then merchant vessels 
could be lured into dangerous situations and denied help or support. (The Maritime 
Trade Information Centre was established in Portsmouth July 2013.)
4 Ship’s ICT
The role of the Royal Navy was briefly discussed and typical of the comments made 
is this one:
We do talk to them [Royal Navy crews] but I am not sure they know 
what we do or that we have to keep to tight schedules
MN8
What happens if RN and MN have to work together and the communications and 
computer networks are not compatible or available?
There are occasions when ship’s ICT is not ‘state of the art’ and although it cannot be 
confirmed by the researcher as the norm, one officer did comment that:
We get the office’s (Company HQ) old IT when they get their new 
computers
MN6
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5 Physical security
The course leader, drawing on his experience as a Master pointed to changes linked 
to ships security that have occurred over the years:
My job was to keep my ship, my crew and my cargo safe. The last 
thing I would have wanted is barbed wire, locked citadels and armed 
guards. Times have changed
CL1
He continued:
Ships today carry more cash than they used to in my day -  mainly to 
pay local chandlers and non UK crew
CL1
It is not unreasonable to speculate that if companies have migrated away from paying 
crews and local chandlers with cash, towards an e-commerce or indeed e-banking 
way of working then the physical threat of theft may reduce but the virtual threat to 
ICT could increase.
Whilst discussing how physical security is provided, one officer stated that:
We are not military people, we do not arm ourselves and we do not 
want to. Russian sailors are trained to military standards and they are 
quite happy to defend themselves
MN5
HMG issued guidelines in 2011 which now allow British flagged ships to carry armed 
guards (HMG, 2011). Again, if the physical threat is effectively countered, then the 
virtual threat to ICT could increase.
6 Safety verses security
There are clashes between the requirements of safety and security. One officer 
stated that:
During our last safety inspection we were criticised for padlocking 
hatches and doors. This went against our security inspection which 
required the same doors and hatches to be locked in some way
MN7
103
7 Summary
Overall, the Merchant Navy perspective on security is interesting. There appears to 
be limited resources to carry out the requirements to counter pirate and terrorist 
activity, let alone any emergent ICT security requirements. Also, there are conflicts of 
interest between security, safety and day to day operations. The emergent 
requirements of secure ICT are not being addressed in a coherent way.
5.3 The ISPS Code: Function and structure
The ISPS Code is a physical security risk assessment tool that was instigated by the 
member nations of the IMO as a direct result of the attacks against United States in 
2001 (International Maritime Organisation, 2004). In this section, its function and 
structure will be explored to identify those components that are suitable for use within 
the proposed updateable secure ICT maritime profile.
A ship security assessment has three principle elements. The first element deals with 
the need to identify ‘existing security measures, procedures and operations’ 
(International Maritime Organisation, 2003, p. 12). The second is concerned with the 
need to identify and evaluate ‘key shipboard operations that it is important to protect’ 
(p. 13). The third element is about establishing the order of importance of security 
measures by the ‘identification of possible threats to the key shipboard operations 
and the likelihood of their occurrence’ (p. 13). The final element is the need to identify 
‘weaknesses including human factors, infrastructure, policies and procedures’ (p. 13) 
that will require addressing in the ship security plan.
The structure of the ISPS Code is not dissimilar to that of other security risk 
assessment methods such as CRAMM and OCTAVE (See Figure 2.1 and Figure 
2.2). Put simply, both structures are in two parts. The first part details what need to be
done and second details how to do it. Therefore, it is intended to use the ISPS Code 
as the basic framework; whilst using OCTAVE to provide the necessary secure ICT 
terminology as shown in Table 5.1. It may be possible to re-use data gathered from 
the physical security assessment. Examples of the data gathered by the Ship’s 
Security Officer are shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.1: The proposed components and elements of an updateable maritime ICT security profile
Elem ents
Proposed use of existing ISPS  
Code for physical security 2 part 
structure
Part 1
What needs to be done (Physical security)
Part 1
W hat needs to be done (Secure ICT)
Part 2
Plan to do it (Physical security)
Part 2
Plan to do it (Secure ICT)
Com ponents
Proposed use of restructured 
OCTAVE for ICT aspects, based 
on this research and to mirror the 
ISPS Code
An updateable database of barriers to secure ICT 
in a  maritime environment (This research)
Proposed new component, a 
Barrier database to provide 
information for security and non­
security personnel as described in 
this thesis
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Table 5.2: Components of a Ship Security Plan which may inform an ICT Security Plan
ISPS Code, 2003, p. 57 
Physical security
Structural integrity 
Personnel protection systems 
Procedural policies
Radio and telecommunications 
systems, including computer systems 
and networks
Other areas
Existing security plans
Critical assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities.
Information in the ship’s security assessment
Identify restricted access ICT compartments and areas.
Strength of access control to restricted access ICT compartments and areas.
Identity cards and other security functions.
Identifies the officers responsible for security
The ISPS Code only mentions ICT. There are no internationally agreed provisions for 
ICT security procedures and processes.
Boundaries between ICT and other areas. Can they be clearly delineated?
W hat is already being done or is planned?
A starting point for the ICT security evaluation.
5.4 Potential ICT security incidents
Very little data exists regarding breaches of maritime ICT security but it is possible to 
shed light on the likely consequences of breaches by looking at failings that have 
resulted from other causes. The following general maritime incidents and activities 
have been identified as appropriate sources of information and are set out in this sub 
section under the following headings:
1. Criminal activity
2. Pirate activity
3. Terrorist activity
4. People acting under stress or duress
5. Mechanical and procedural failure
6. Inadequate training
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These will now be looked at.
1. Criminal activity
Although the reported cases of deliberate targeting of secure maritime ICT systems 
are extremely rare, there is an increased potential to deliberate or accidental security 
incidents as recently confirmed by ENISA (2011) report on ICT security in the 
maritime sector. Most recently, an attack on the ICT systems of the port of Antwerp 
(Bateman, 2013) gives a portent of things to come. As Gill (1995) notes ‘maritime 
crime has been a part of day to day life at sea for centuries’ (p. 21). These activities 
range from insurance fraud and tax evasion to smuggling and theft of cargoes. Even 
though the understanding of these activities lies beyond the scope of this thesis, there 
is a growing likelihood that the people involved could attempt to exploit weaknesses 
in maritime ICT security. For example, if effective physical countermeasures weaken 
the links between terrorism and piracy then they may turn to cyber-attacks against 
marine ICT. Many of the issues related to piracy and terrorism lie beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but both activities are worthy of some consideration because of their 
current impact on merchant trade and the potential impact if they attempt to exploit 
ICT weaknesses.
2. Pirate activity
Whilst It has been suggested that there is little distinction between maritime pirates 
and terrorists operating at sea as both groups use similar tactics and therefore, as 
Chaturvedi (2010) argues ‘both problems need to be tackled with a unified effort’ (p. 
24). However, Chaturvedi also points to the divergent motives of the two groups in 
that ‘piracy is mostly undertaken for financial reasons, terrorism for political or 
religious reasons’ (p. 24). Incidents of piracy on the high seas have increased in
violence and desperation (Lloyd's List, 2011). A review of the reports of pirate attacks 
reveals common operating practices including the use of small fast craft to intercept 
merchant and other vessels. (See, for example, the article entitled ‘Applications and 
Shortcomings of the Law of the Sea in combating piracy: a South East Asian 
perspective’, Collins & Hassan (2009).) There is also evidence to suggest that more 
sophisticated pirate operations use larger craft as support and supply vessels, and 
that even hijacked vessels have been used to act as an operating base. (See, for 
example, ‘South Sea piracy, the Petro Ranger hijack’, Economist (1999).) The pirates 
depend upon rapidly overpowering the relatively small crew complement on board 
merchant and other vessels.
As a countermeasure to piracy off the Somali coast, complex military technology is 
being pitted against desperate humans who have limited resources and nothing to 
lose (Jeory and Glannangell, 2011). Rothe and Collins (2011) argue that ‘this military 
approach is like applying a sticking plaster to a major wound and avoids solving the 
underlying problems’ (pp. 329-343). Glavovic and Boonzaier (2007) suggest that the 
main way of reducing piracy is to improve the livelihoods of coastal communities. For 
example, a One Earth Future Foundation study (Hurlburt, 2011) expresses concern 
over the impact on the Somali community where ‘piracy affects food security and 
endangers Somali youth’. There is a strong temptation to attack shipping in areas 
where economic poverty is widespread (Pham, 2010). The opportunity to carry out 
attacks tend to occur where there is political instability and where vessels have 
restricted ability to manoeuvre (Hastings, 2009). Pham (2010) notes that ‘piracy has 
always been a land-based crime which happens to manifest itself at sea’ (p. 326) and
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which suggests that any attempt to solve the problem will need to take a multi­
dimensional approach which includes disrupting pirate’s logistic bases ashore.
3. Terrorist activity
Although their motivations may be different, a review of the reports of attacks 
suggests that terrorist tactics at sea are comparable to those of pirates. For example, 
terrorist attacks off Indonesia have employed similar methods to the pirates off the 
Somali coast including the use of small fast craft and larger supply vessels in support 
roles (Banlaoi, 2005). However, political motivation can lead to alternative terrorist 
tactics as demonstrated on the 7th of October 1985, when four terrorists took control 
of the liner Achille Lauro5 off the coast of Egypt and demanded the release of 50 
Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons (Smith e ta l, 1985).
Whereas pirates would likely prefer to stay out of the news, terrorists may welcome 
the headlines. The next two incidents have been classed as ‘suicide attacks’ giving an 
indication of the lengths certain terrorists will go to. It was reported that the American 
CIA worked with the Yemen security services to reveal intelligence6 which linked the 
attacks on the Cole and the Limburg to the same terrorist group (Global Security, 
2002). The Limburg incident was also significant because it was said to have been 
the first successful destructive strike at a sea going related target made by a terrorist 
group.
Destructive attacks against shore infrastructure can also be detrimental afloat even if 
no direct harm to mariners was intended. For example, on the 10th of April 1992 the 
original Baltic Exchange building was severely damaged in a terrorist attack which
5 Also see, Italian fishing vessel 1971 and 2 passengers killed in fire alongside 1981 (Watson, 1995, p. 
208)
6 By intercepting mobile telephone and satellite telephone messages.
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killed three people (Baltic Exchange, 2011). The activation of an ICT contingency plan 
allowed trade to resume quickly, first at Lloyd's of London and then in less damaged 
parts of the Baltic Exchange itself (ib. id.). However, it was the terrorist attacks in 
America on the 11th September 2001 which led directly to the implementation of the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (International Maritime 
Organisation, 2003, p. 3). The ISPS Code deals with physical security threats and 
has no guidelines regarding the threats to maritime ICT; the International Maritime 
Organisation defers this responsibility to the International Telecommunications Union. 
Although the ISPS Code is a physical security risk assessment tool and guidelines for 
implementation of physical security, some of the data collected for a Ship Security 
Plan could be used to provide information for maritime ICT security profiles. For 
example, locations of ICT compartments, citadel arrangements, and emergency 
procedures.
4. People acting under stress or duress
The cruise ship Oceanos foundered off the west coast of South Africa on the 3rd 
August 1991 (ABC News, 1991). Whilst a Greek Board of Inquiry found the 
commanding officer, Yiannis Avranas, and four other officers negligent in their duties, 
the sinking was blamed on damage caused by heavy seas to one or more sea valves 
which quickly flooded an electrical generator compartment. Normally this 
compartment would have been considered watertight, and the flooding should have 
been contained. However, water entered other compartments via plumbing 
penetrations, so by-passing their water tight integrity7. What if this could be achieved 
remotely?
7 HMS Nottingham also suffered the problem of: ‘secondary flooding’ via: ‘compartment cable glands 
and ventilation penetrations’ (Royal Navy, 2002, p. 8).
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On 27 July 2005,11 people died when a support vessel collided with the Mumbai 
High North production platform off the west coast of India (Baily, 2011). The resultant 
fire razed the production platform to sea level, destroyed a helicopter and the supply 
vessel itself foundered several days later. Rapid activation of the ‘platform disaster 
management plan’ averted a natural disaster when the sub-surface safety valves 
were promptly shut down. What if these valves could not have been shut down by a 
STUXNET type attack?
MV Herald of Free Enterprise provides another example of an incident caused by 
crew negligence and adverse commercial pressure (Sheen, 1987). Having sailed 
from Zeebruge on 6th of March 1987 the bow doors were left open, and during a turn 
to port, water entered the main car deck. The resultant free surface flood was not 
deep but was sufficient to cause the vessel to heel to port, eventually coming to rest 
on her port side in shallow water. 197 people died but 120 people, who had been 
trapped between decks, were eventually rescued (Watson, 1995). The jury in the 
subsequent coroner's inquest returned verdicts of unlawful killing (Records from BBC 
News Archive, 1987). However, Justice Turner directed the jury to acquit the 
company and several of the defendants. The inquest did set a precedent by 
confirming that the charge of corporate manslaughter is admissible in English courts, 
it was to take another 20 years before corporate manslaughter would become a 
criminal act in England (The Law Society, 2006). Herald of Free Enterprise was 
salvaged and sold for scrap in 1987 (Watson, 1995).
The next incident serves to highlight the adverse effect of commercial pressure, the 
impact of design change, crew stress and the cost to the environment when incidents 
are not well handled. Transporting hazardous cargoes by sea is a daily occurrence
and incidents involving such cargoes can have a damaging impact on the 
environment as demonstrated when the Liberian ‘flagged’8 crude oil tanker Torrey 
Canyon ran aground on Pollard's Rock off Cornwall's western coast during the early 
hours of the 18th of March 1967; all the crew were rescued by helicopters and 
lifeboats (Records from BBC News Archive, 1967). The subsequent Liberian 
investigation placed the entire blame for the grounding on a navigational error by 
Captain Pastrengo Rugiati, under pressure to meet a deadline, tried to take a short 
cut between Land's End and the Isles of Scilly (Nanda, 1967). However, it was likely 
that other factors were in play and Cahill (2002) reported that the structure of the 
Torrey Canyon had been altered such that the original design capacity of 60 000 
tonnes was doubled to 120 000 tonnes following re-building in Japan, which led to the 
ship being under powered and slow to manoeuvre. Cahill also noted that a personal 
dispute between the Captain and the Chief Mate may have affected the Captain's 
Judgement. An article in the Guardian (2011) has suggested that ‘the incident itself 
was handled disastrously by British authorities at the time allowing the entire cargo to 
be released’ and that ‘the prevailing winds and weather caused 15% of the 119,328 
tonnes of crude oil to hit the UK coast whilst most of the rest of the oil ended up on 
the Channel Islands and Brittany’. The adverse long term effect of such incidents was 
highlighted by the claim in the same Guardian article that ‘the legacy of this disaster is 
still killing wildlife’.
5. Mechanical and procedural failure
The failure of equipment and operational procedures can come at a high human cost, 
especially when operating 8,000 miles from home and with limited logistical support. 
On the afternoon of the 4th of May 1982, whilst on patrol to the east of the Falkland
8 Flagged -  the country in which a vessel is registered.
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Islands, HMS Sheffield (a Type 42 destroyer of the Royal Navy) was hit amid ships by 
an air to surface missile; the impact of the missile and the resultant fire and smoke 
killed 20 officers and ratings and injured a further 26 (Records from BBC News 
Archive, 1982). The BBC reported that ‘within five hours the fires, dense black smoke 
and loss of essential services9 forced Sheffield to be abandoned’ (lb. id.). Help was 
close at hand for the survivors nevertheless attempts to save the ship finally failed 
when, four days later, Sheffield foundered in deteriorating weather. A Royal Navy 
Board of Inquiry10 revealed a complex set of events and a number of critical technical 
and human deficiencies which contributed to the loss of Sheffield (Royal Navy, 1982). 
On the face of it, a ship sinking as a consequence of military action has little 
relevance to a study looking at barriers to ICT security but one of the main findings of 
the investigation was that mutual interference between satellite communications 
equipment and electronic warfare equipment had led to the latter equipment being 
turned off throughout the period under investigation. This deprived the crew of 
situational awareness data at a critical time. It was also found that an important 
communications circuit was not manned during the lead up to the attack and this 
caused vital intelligence to be missed (lb. id.). It is also worth noting that equipment 
and operational deficiencies were known about before the incident but the cost of 
correction was too high.
Incidents at sea are not confined to maritime mobile vessels11. On the 27th of March 
1980 123 people from several nations lost their lives when a floating accommodation
9 Firefighting capability, electrical supplies and communications.
10 The Board assembled on the 7th June 1982 with the mandate to investigate both the situation 
leading up to and the conduct of the responses during and shortly after the incident. The investigation 
was conducted by serving officers of the Royal Navy.
11 ITU description used to denote vessels of all descriptions as distinct from production and other 
structures that can be towed.
113
platform, the Alexander L. Kielland, capsized after one of the floatation legs sheared 
off in heavy seas; 89 people were rescued (Bignell and Fortune, 1984). Bignell and 
Fortune paint a vivid picture of the events leading up to the incident and in the 
immediate aftermath. They argue that the design, construction and operation of the 
platform had intrinsic flaws. For example, had the crew followed operational 
procedure when the floatation leg sheared off, then the watertight doors and hatches 
would have been closed and as a result the platform may not have capsized as 
quickly, potentially giving more time for additional survivors to escape. The 
investigation report noted problems both with the life raft communications equipment, 
and the ‘on scene’ incident co-ordination of the rescue effort; the incident commander 
changed several times and critical information about the situation was lost. The 
severe weather conditions also contributed to the poor co-ordination of the rescue 
effort. As the years have passed various conspiracy theories have arisen. For 
example, the accident is said to have been a deliberate act of sabotage in an attempt 
to stop Norway from exploiting North Sea gas and oil fields (Stavanger Museum, 
2005). The possibility was raised that the ecological and human cost of gas and oil 
extraction in the North Sea was too high to continue and it would be interesting to 
speculate on the current economic situation in the UK had this line of reasoning been 
acted upon.
6. Inadequate training
The next incident highlights the consequences of shortfalls in seamanship training 
and poor situational awareness which led to the severe damage caused to a Royal 
Navy destroyer when, on the evening of the 3rd September 1988, whilst attempting a 
complicated manoeuvre in the dark, HMS Southampton collided with MV Torbay, a
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container ship (Royal Navy, 1988). Southampton was badly damaged, with the 
starboard side of the bridge being crushed beyond habitability. No one was killed but 
several serious injuries were caused; the crew succeeded in keeping Southampton 
afloat and then steamed her to safe waters. The ensuing Board of Inquiry placed the 
blame for the collision on the negligence of certain senior officers and the lack of 
experience of junior bridge watch officers which led to the resultant ‘failure to 
communicate intentions’. It was reported that the evidence given to the Board of 
Inquiry was often contradictory and lacking in detail which resulted in the Board of 
Inquiry recommending that ‘a ‘Black Box’ recording system should be installed in all 
warships to help future investigations’ and that ‘investment should be made in a 
Bridge Simulator to improve training’. Both these recommendations were accepted by 
the Admiralty and the necessary investments made. The Royal Navy was without an 
important anti air asset for nearly two years and the cost of rebuilding was substantial 
because of the unique nature of the vessel. It is interesting to note that Members of 
the Board of Enquiry reported that they were denied access to MV Torbay for legal 
reasons.
5.5 Conclusions
Looking across the Merchant Navy data and the failings from other causes reveals 
that life at sea can be fraught with difficulties and that the ability to float move fight is 
of paramount importance to enable human activity in a maritime environment. ICT 
systems enable many aspects of life at sea and that there is a complex set of 
relationships between people, organisations, operations, environment and technical 
factors. ICT security is important everywhere but is difficult to achieve and maintain 
even in non-threatening environments. Life at sea has to be self-sufficient, robust and
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able to recover from failure in exceptional circumstances if disasters are to be 
avoided. Mariners have a dependence on maritime systems of all types including 
emergency communications, engineering and logistics. The people using maritime 
ICT systems are under constant pressure, and in the face of incidents they can tend 
towards self-preservation rather than the needs of the many. There are complex 
national, international, organisational and legal issues. Insufficient training and 
awareness can lead to incidents. The previous scenarios when applied to maritime 
ICT security may appear far-fetched and with little supporting evidence. However, 
what if, for example, physical piracy becomes less lucrative or difficult to achieve?
Will the threat actors turn to potential security vulnerabilities of remote ICT, or at least 
the threat of cyber-crime to extort money? It may be possible that the headline 
‘French Navy surrenders to Conficker worm’ (The National Business Review, 2009) 
could become the ‘norm’ rather than the exception. It may be possible to combine an 
attack against shipping in strategic locations with a cyber-attack on critical shore 
infrastructure. For example, Singapore is said to be one of the busiest ports in the 
world with over 6000 people keeping 1000 ships moving 24 hours a day (Phang, 
2008). The operation of the port relies on automated ICT including the port 
management, cargo handling and traffic control systems. Also, Singapore harbour 
authorities have invested in an extensive wireless (WiFi) network (Anjum, 2008). The 
physical environment is unforgiving and protecting critical ICT assets by identifying 
the barriers will be important.
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Chapter 6 
Barriers to ICT security in a maritime environment
6.1 Introduction
This research has confirmed that the increasing dependence on ICT adds an 
additional security dimension to the complexities of working at sea. This chapter will 
draw together the different threads in the preceding chapters to design and build an 
updateable maritime ICT security profile that will help mariners moderate the effects 
of such security complexities. This profile is intended as a standalone entity although 
there is also scope for its integration into the ISPS Code for use as part of a sector 
wide holistic security assessment tool.
6.2 Barriers as a stimulus to develop a secure ICT maritime profile
This research has revealed a complex set of ICT interactions on-board, in a notionally 
secure metal box safe from ICT threats and vulnerabilities. However, the situation 
changes markedly when improved radio connectivity and the ability of remote web 
working are added to the equation. In this situation, mariners have to deal with the 
competing requirements of the ‘need to share’ operational paradigm and the ‘need to 
know’ security paradigm. One example of barriers that characterise conflict is when 
business drivers override security whilst security attempts to control a range of 
operational behaviours. If future maritime ICT incidents do have similar aetiologies 
then it is possible that mariners will be able to share a common understanding of 
barriers to ICT security which is applicable afloat and ashore. This understanding will 
take account of human behaviour and will be cost effective if properly administered.
Barriers, and the early reporting of potential barriers, could be used as indicators of 
possible ICT security issues. HQs and other organisations could then alert the ship’s 
crew to new developments using plain language rather than security terminology. 
Crews could then report their concerns back to the appropriate authority. This notion 
can be expanded by using barriers as a two way translation tool. Again, the barriers 
could be presented in plain language for the users to consider and a deeper 
explanation of the barrier could be made available for security experts.
Whilst the barriers emerging from the research data are representative of the diverse 
range of issues faced by mariners, they are also redolent of the socio-technical issues 
associated with the disasters described by authors such as Turner (1983), Bignell and 
Fortune (1984), Toft and Reynolds (1999) and Pidgeon (2010). Assembling barriers 
into barrier groups may yield new insights, as Toft and Reynolds (1999) attempted to 
achieve when looking for ‘common learning patterns’ (p. 35) from the analysis of the 
findings of public enquiries.
Barriers could be used to identify the need for security countermeasures. For 
example, this could be used to identify where one countermeasure may serve in the 
place of multiple countermeasures. If the interpretation of a barrier appears in multiple 
boxes, as shown in Table 6.1, then this could indicate that a common ancestry exists 
and that it may be possible to find a countermeasure that will be effective across a 
range of security activities.
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Table 6.1: Barrier groups useful for security experts to identify common security countermeasures
Dangerous barriers Conditional barriers Barriers causing 
significant obstacles or 
problems
Location dependant or 
inherent barriers
People XXX X
Organisation XX
Environment XX XXXX XX
Technology XXX
Barriers could inform decisions about the level of escalation required should the 
security situation change. For example, the ISPS Code has three security levels for 
escalating a ship’s preparedness if intelligence is received regarding the possibility of 
a physical attack. These levels are:
• Level 1 -  Normal (No intelligence or other indicators)
• Level 2 -  Heightened (Attack likely) (Extra security patrols etc.)
• Level 3 -  Exceptional (Imminent or underway) (Disconnect from network until
all clear) (Emergency procedures initiated)
International Maritime Organisation, 2003, pp. 64-65 
Barriers could also be used to help assess threat factors. For example, Information
Security Standard 1 (CESG, 2009) lists the items which should be considered when
deciding the issues that should be assessed based on the prevailing security
conditions and circumstances. For example, by comparing the threat factors with
maritime specific barriers, as shown in Table 6.2, it would be possible to inform the
deliberation between a Ship Security Officer and members of the ship’s crew
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Table 6.2: Threat factors (Drawn from Information Security Standard 1, CESG, 2009, p. 12) mapped to maritime 
barriers
Threat factors  
(IS1 residual risk assessm ent)
Maritim e barrier
1. Environment factor -  the factors that will be 
exploited by groups of potential attackers.
Ship isolated at sea (Physical attack) 
High value target (Cyber blackmail)
2. Number of potential attackers. This number will 
change depending upon the location of the vessel. 
Likely to be higher when alongside and connected 
to landlines.
Internal attack population 
External attack population
3. Clearances of potential attackers. Internal personnel not having the correct clearances. External attack 
groups will seek to discover passwords and other parameters needed to 
access the network.
4. Outcome/Impact level Outcome = likelihood v impact (See Table 6.3)
5. Technical facilities. The means to carry out an 
attack
How good are the cyber criminals?
6. Technical opportunities. Weaknesses in the system.
7. Publicity of the existence of the system or 
information.
It is assumed that the attack groups are aware of the existence of the 
target systems
8. Proactive monitoring Intruder Detection Systems. 
Network management.
9. Quantity of data. How much data is stored in 
one location?
Value of data to ‘float move fight (FM F)’ and ‘disclosure alteration 
destruction (DAD)’
10. Assurance of countermeasures. Common 
Criteria. Penetration testing.
Security technology can be rendered ineffective by a failure to differentiate 
among critical information assets, poorly designed operating procedures or 
lax attitudes towards security within an organisation.
Barriers could be assigned an outcome level based on impact and likelihood. For 
example, impact is the effect that an incident will have on the ship and her crew:
• Low -  negligible impact on the organisation (Safety)
• Medium -  considerable but existence not threatened (Urgency)
• High -  existence threatened (Distress)
Lees and Williamson, 2009, p. 19
Likelihood of an incident can be classified thus:
• Low -  practically never
• Medium -  once a year
• High - once a week or more often
The Open University, 2008c, pp. 43-44 
The barrier outcome level is then derived from the intersection of likelihood and 
impact as shown in Table 6.3. This outcome level would then indicate the barriers that 
should receive primacy when designing contingency plans.
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Table 6.3: Outcome levels based on similar tables from the Open University (The Open University, 2008c) and 
OCTAVE (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003, p. 222)
Impact
Likelihood
Low Medium High
Low Low outcome Low outcome Medium outcome
Medium Low outcome Medium outcome High outcome
High Medium outcome High outcome High outcome
6.3 Maritime ICT security profile: A design proposal
The five key design elements to emerge from the research, literature and secondary 
data are:
Part 1: The building blocks
Part 2: Ship’s ICT asset assessment and risk evaluation 
Part 3: ICT security strategy and management plan 
Part 4: How to update the profile - Method and sources of information 
Part 5: Input from non ICT security experts 
Each of these will now be considered in turn.
Part 1: The building blocks
In order to illustrate how well the barriers revealed by this research will work to help 
mariners to identify problems with achieving ICT security, the foundations and 
building blocks for an ICT security profile have to be established. This research has 
identified two primary contenders for this purpose: the ISPS Code (International 
Maritime Organisation, 2003); and OCTAVE (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003).
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From a ship’s physical security perspective, there are two key parts to the ISPS 
Code, the ship security assessment (SSA) which articulates what needs to be done in 
terms of security, and the ship security plan (SSP) which defines how to carry out the 
security requirements. Although the ISPS Code deals with physical security, the 
foundations needed for an ICT security profile are implicit. Indeed, the ENISA (2011) 
research (introduced in Chapter 1) suggests that there is a need to add an ICT 
security component to existing regulatory frameworks if a sector wide holistic security 
solution is to be achieved. Figure 6.1 and Table 6.4 show the parts of the SSA and 
SSP relevant to ICT that are being proposed as the basic building blocks for an 
updateable maritime ICT security profile. It should be noted that the components of 
Figure 6.1 have been assembled from text descriptions in the ISPS Code; the Code 
itself has no diagrams.
Provides lessons from  experience and changing circumstances
Initiates and provides 
information Provides information
Physical risk assessment
Physical security risk assessment feeds into
Assessment of ship's 
physical 
vulnerabilities
Review of current 
physical threats
Ship security 
assessment Ship security plan
Figure 6.1: Basic building blocks drawn from an ISPS Code ship security assessment and ship security 
plan
122
Table 6.4: Description of components for physical risk assessment identified as relevant to an ICT security 
profile (IMO, 2003)
Ship security assessment (IMO, 
2003, p.57):
Review of current physical threats 
(IMO, 2003, p.57):
Assessment of ship’s physical 
vulnerabilities (IMO, 2003, p.60):
1. Detail the organisation structure of 
security for the ship
1. Knowledge of current security 
threats and patterns
1. Conflicts between safety and security 
measures
2. Detail the ship’s relationship with 
the Company, port facilities, other 
ships and relevant authorities with 
security responsibilities
2. Recognition, on a non- 
discriminatory basis, of 
characteristics and behaviour 
patterns of persons who are likely 
to threaten security
2. Conflicts between shipboard duties and 
security assignments
3. Detail the communications within 
the ship and between other ships 
and port facilities
3. Techniques used to circumvent 
security measures
3. Watch-keeping duties, number of ship’s 
personnel, particularly with implications on 
crew fatigue, alertness and performance
4. Level 1 operational and physical 
that will always be in place
4. Methods used to cause security 
incident
4. Any identified security training 
deficiencies
5. Allow level 2 to be quickly 
achieved and where necessary to 
level 3
5.Any security equipment and systems, 
including communication systems
6. Audit to respond to experience 
and changing circumstances
7. Detailed reporting procedures
Whilst the ISPS Code can offer the foundations for the ICT elements of an SSP, 
additional ICT-related building blocks are required to complete the proposed 
framework for the updateable maritime ICT security profile. It is proposed to draw on 
OCTAVE for this. OCTAVE is a 3 phase information security risk assessment process 
that has been selected to provide this function because of its operational bias, ‘plug 
and play’ structure and similarities to the processes in the ISPS Code. These 
characteristics allow the proposed ICT building blocks to be a mirror image of the 
structure of the ship security assessment and ship security plan, but using OCTAVE 
security threat, vulnerability and risk terminology in place of the physical security 
terminology. In this way, it is intended to have a format that security experts can 
readily appreciate. The associated OCTAVE risk template can be modified for a 
maritime-specific ICT risk assessment. The foundations and building blocks from the 
ISPS Code and OCTAVE are brought together in Figure 6.2 and the ICT risk 
evaluation template is given in Figure 6.3.
123
't : Provides lessons fro m  experience and chanRlng circum stances
Ship s e c u rity
Ship s e c u rity  p lan
Physical risk a ss es s m en t
ICT risk ass es s m en t
A ssessm ent o f  ship's  
physical 
v u ln e ra b ilitie s
R e v ie w  o f  c u rre n t  
th re a ts  to  ICT
A ssessm ent o f  ship's 
ICT v u ln e ra b ilitie s
R e v ie w  o f  c u rre n t  
p hysical th re a ts
Ship's ICT asset
Can p ro d u c e  a s tan d  
a lo n e  ICT s ec u rity  
ass es s m en t
ICT s e c u rity  s tra teg y  
a n d  p lan .
Figure 6.2: Fusion of ISPS Code and OCTAVE components, a framework for an updateable maritime ICT 
security profile.
Sources of threat 
to CIA
Incidents - likelihood, 
impacts and outcomes
ICT asset under evaluation
Barrier database
Modification of sensitive 
information
Disclosure or viewing of 
sensitive information
Destruction or loss of 
important information, 
hardware or software
Interruption of access to 
important information, 
software applications or 
services (e-mail, Web etc.)
Deliberate actions by people 
Inside organisation 
Outside organisation
Accidental actions by 
people
•  Inside organisation
•  Outside organisation
•  Yourself
System problems
•  Hardware
•  Software
•  Unavailability of related 
systems
•  Malicious code
•  Other
Other problems
•  Power outages
•  Water unavailable
•  Telecommunications 
unavailable
o Internet Service Provider 
unavailable
•  Natural disasters
•  Other
Figure 6.3: The OCTAVE method (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003, p. 94) adopted to provide a maritime 
specific ICT risk assessment template and an additional component ‘Barrier database’
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In order to use the asset assessment it is necessary to feed the results into a 
maritime specific ICT risk evaluation template. The assessment results would then be 
tabulated into an ICT risk profile. From this risk profile, security experts could create 
and implement an ICT security strategy and management plan that can be used as a 
standalone entity or to inform the ship security plan. The result of the fusion 
represents a traditional security model that will require a certain level of security 
training and expertise to complete evaluations successfully. An additional component 
will be required to bridge the perceived gap between security experts and mariners. 
Figure 6.4 shows this component feeding into the Ship security assessment, although 
it could also feed into the ICT risk assessment if the assessment were being used as 
a standalone entity.
guidance
Provides lessons from experience and changing circumstances
Initiates and provides
initiates and provides
Physical risk assessment
Physical security risk assessment feeds into
ICT plan
Provides lessons from experience and changing circumstances
Initiates and provides
ICT risk assessment
ICT security risk assessment informs
Assessment of ship's 
physical 
vulnerabilities
Review of current 
threats to ICT
Review of current 
physical threats
Assessment of ship's 
ICT vulnerabilities
Ship security planShip security 
assessment
Can produce a stand 
alone ICT security 
assessment
ICT security strategy 
and plan.
Ship's ICT asset 
assessment
Updateable database of indicators presented in non technical language that can be used to monitor security issues by all mariners.
Figure 6.4: Updateable database with feeds to risk assessment and users
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Part 2: Ship’s ICT asset assessment and risk evaluation
The purpose of an ICT asset assessment is to identify ship-specific ICT assets in 
terms of their location, the associated wiring and power supplies, and the information 
required to run the ship. As this is the start of the assessment process, there will be 
potential for conflict between security, safety and operational barriers which 
evaluators need to be aware of including the following:
• Conflicts between boundaries of security and health & safety
• Conflicts between physical security and ICT security assessments
• Misunderstanding of local conditions
It is important to identify the location of all ICT assets and to this end three 
boundaries are required as provided in Figure 6.5.
Global boundary:
•  Maritime trade
•  Attack population
• Organisations - national 
and international
• The littoral
• Sea Areas of Operation
• Meteorology and 
oceanography
•  Technology 
communications and 
information outside of 
the control of the ship’s 
crew
S hip ’s boundary:
Ship’s hull, superstructure, 
points of access and secure 
areas
Aerials, cable runs, portable 
ICT storage and 
transducers
Virtual external boundary  
(W hen connected to  other 
entities)
V irtual in ternal boundary  
(W hen standalone)
Delineated by the locations of the 
on-board IC T systems. IC T likely 
to be distributed around the ship 
and connected via wireless, 
copper or fibre.
Virtual
conne
external boundary exists when 
jcted to shore, other ships or ai
the ship is 
craft etc.
Enabled by the ship’s radio 
and satellite systems
Figure 6.5: Three notional boundaries for an ICT security assessment, and showing networked ICT 
systems connecting across these boundaries
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The first is the global boundary which encompasses those entities that can affect the 
ship or be affected by it. Such entities lie outside the control of the ship’s crew, 
although attempts may be made to influence. Example barriers include:
• Interactions with organisations and the external attack population
• The littoral and Sea Areas of Operation
• Meteorology and oceanography
• Technology communications and information outside of the control of ship’s 
crew
The second is the ship’s physical boundary as defined in the ship’s asset groups, 
provided in Table 6.5, and will include the hull, superstructure, access points and 
secure areas. The ICT asset assessment will provide ICT specific areas that are not 
covered by the ship’s security assessment (for example, cable and aerial runs, aerials 
and other transducers and the locations of portable ICT including radios and other 
hand held devices). The third is the virtual boundary which has two distinct aspects. 
First, there is the virtual internal boundary that can be delineated by the locations of 
the on-board ICT systems (for example, computers, peripherals, sensors and data 
storage). Such ICT systems are located in areas, access to which can be readily 
controlled and are not connected to entities which lie outside of the control of the 
crew, such as the Internet. Second, there is the virtual external boundary which 
extends the virtual internal boundary when connections are made between entities 
using fixed land line (when alongside or at a buoy), marine radio or satellite links. 
Protecting the information that leaves the relatively safe confines of the virtual internal 
boundary requires more thought and greater effort. Figure 6.6 provides an illustration 
of the distribution of a ship’s ICT and ICT supported or enabled functions.
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Table 6.5: Ship asset groups, ICT and possible barriers
Ship asset groups Asset Barrier
1. Ship’s ICT Aerials 
Cable runs
Situational awareness equipment (Radar etc.) 
Distributed ICT  
SOLAS and GMDSS  
AIS and LRITS
Importance of fixtures and fittings not 
realised or accounted for
Unable to operate if ‘disclosure alteration 
or destruction of information occur
Unable to call for help
2. ICT supports Remote control
Management
Seamanship
Engineering
Logistics
Ability to float move fight’ impaired
3. Ship’s functional areas Working spaces 
Citadel
Limited access compartments 
Restricted access compartments 
Bridge, easy to identify on most types of ship. 
Secondary control positions
Conflict of interest between departments.
4. Crew performing 
operational functions
Seamanship
Engineering
Logistics
Lack of security awareness
Aerial arrays for short range radio 
communications (Inter-ship  
communications if in range) and for long
Global boundary:
Marine radio components, provided by 
space and ground technology (Also see 
figure 1.3). 
Electro-magnetic (EM) spectrum.
navigation and recreation).
Bridge and
Physical access via upper
Life saving equipment
hatches (ISPS Code). 
Mooring and anchoring.
OamagecontrolMachinery Control Room and Remote cargo
Remote steering control Remote machinery monitoring dliary machinery
Key:
1 m Ship asset groups:
Local area netw ork(s) •  T Cryptographic system Z Long Range Identification  and
Tracking System  (LRITS) L
Satellite aerials GMDSS G 1. Ship's ICT
+ 2. ICT supportsRadio aerials A u to m a te d  Identification 3. Ship's fun c tio n a l areas
System  (AIS) A 4. Crew  p e rfo rm in g  o pera tio n a l
Radio eq u ip m e n tfix e d functions
and portab le R
Figure 6.6: Locations and distribution of ship’s ICT and ICT supported or enabled functions
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The problems of risk evaluation run deeper than simple threat and vulnerability 
calculations. For example, Tullock and Lupton (2003) describe the understanding of 
risk as being challenging, not least because of the social and temporal dimensions 
involved:
.... understandings about risk, and therefore the ways in which risk is 
dealt with and experienced in everyday life, are inevitably developed 
via membership of cultures and subcultures as well as through 
personal experience. Risk knowledges, therefore, are historical and 
local. What might be perceived to be ‘risky’ in one era at a certain 
local may no longer be viewed so in a later era, or in a different place.
As a result, risk knowledges are constantly contested and are subject 
to disputes and debates over their nature, their control and whom is 
to blame for their creation.
Tulloch and Lupton, 2003, p. 1 
Risk must take account of everyday life, cultures, sub cultures and personal
experience. Risk knowledge is historical and local and is constantly contested. For
example, interconnection of systems has a cumulative effect over time:
I am not sure whether businesses fully understand the individual risks 
they are carrying may have an impact on somebody else. At senior 
level, I am not sure they understand the cumulative effect.
SY1Y
Risk may not be appreciated or arbitrary:
I suspect risk taking is ill judged. We probably take risk we do not 
know about.
SY2M
Several of the Royal Navy interviewees noted issues similar to that raised by SY1V:
I see a greater need for security risk management. We security 
professionals could adopt the head in the sand approach: ‘the answer 
is no, now what is the question?’ The effect that has on business is 
potentially catastrophic. We need to be firmly embedded in business; 
we need to have a good understanding of business and the business 
needs to understand where we are coming from.
SY1V
SY1 V’s statement contains a good example of security risk avoidance where security
experts may try to avoid the issue by using delaying tactics:
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The answer is no, now what is the question?
SY1V
Here lies a barrier between the traditional ‘need to know’ security paradigm versus 
the business oriented ‘need to share’:
.... the current ‘flavour’ of our protection regime is very much centred 
on recent, very public, breaches of personnel data. Therefore, the 
pendulum has swung back towards the ‘need to know’ and a focus on 
protecting information and not sharing, rather than deriving the 
benefits of sharing.
CIS1H
The literature contains many examples of social barriers including:
• Societal misperceptions of risk.
Anderson and Moore, 2009, p. 2718
• Performance and productivity focus can on one hand lead to high risk 
strategies and subsequent adverse events. On the other hand over­
regulation can have unintended consequences.
Storey and Buchanan, 2007, p. 11
Returning to threats and vulnerabilities where virtual security can be breached at the 
speed of light:
They (mariners) face the same threats and vulnerabilities and 
therefore the risk is the same perhaps just in different time scales.
SY1L
Therefore, using the OCTAVE method will help to identify the generic sources of 
threat to confidentiality, integrity and availability:
• Internal (Deliberate) (accidental) (Crew and passengers)
• External (accidental/secondary effect) (Terrorist, pirate, others) (Deliberate)
• System problems
• Other problems
Drawn from Alberts and Dorofee, 2003, p. 94 
The vulnerability assessment attempts to identify infrastructure weakness. It is 
anticipated that ships will have varying degrees of vulnerability depending upon their 
location and current state of radio connectivity. The overall result is an ICT risk profile 
for the ship, an example of which is provided in Table 6.6. This is turn informs the ICT 
plan for security countermeasures to support day to day operations.
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Table 6.6: The result of a notional ship’s ICT asset assessment and risk evaluation, mapped to the ship 
asset groups and the components under evaluation
c 05.= W 
»- CO 
Q_ 03
1. S hip ’s ICT 2. ICT supports
A eria ls  and se nso rs D ay to day o p era tio n s
Radio
com m un ication s
E lec tric a l supp ly and  
d istribu tion
Local a re a  
netw o rk(s )
P ropu ls ion
S e rv e r room s D a m a g e  control
R em ote  contro l and  
m onitoring
S tee rin g
D is trib u ted  IC T C argo  m a n a g em en t
D is tres s , U rg en cy  
and S a fe ty
S itu a tio n a l a w a re n e s s
D ata  s to ra g e  and  
re trieva l
H ote l s e rv ices  (F re sh  
w a te r, s e w a g e  e tc .)
3. S hip ’s functional 
areas
4. S hip ’s functions  
directed, perform ed  
and m onitored by:
S u p ers tru c tu re Master
U p p er deck Deck crew
Hull Engineering crew
Logistics crew
Part 3: ICT security strategy and management plan
The ICT asset assessment and risk evaluation from the previous section can be used 
to inform the ship security plan or can act as a standalone entity. There are two basic 
requirements for an ICT plan: security management to prevent disclosure, alteration 
and destruction (DAD: the consequences of a breach in CIA); and operational 
security to support float move fight. Relevant barriers drawn from across the literature 
and data include:
1. The lack of sustainable business models
2. Performance and productivity focus can on one hand lead to high risk 
strategies and subsequent adverse events. On the other hand over-regulation 
can have unintended consequences
3. Lack of managerial understanding and oversight of security
4. Failure of policies and procedures
5. Complex legal issues when trading crosses international borders.
6. Technical and business success relies on external partners.
7. How can an organization know if it is secure enough to detect and prevent 
security events that require business-continuity, crisis management, and 
disaster-recovery actions?
8. No effective bench marks to say if enough is being done.
9. Even achieving a certain level of security does not guarantee sustainability.
10. Delineating responsibilities when decisions are automated.
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Security controls are normally put in place following the assessment stage are used 
to reduce any residual ICT security risk. Examples of security controls recommended 
by the Computer Emergency Response Team Co-ordination Center (CERT CC) are 
provided in Table 6.7. On-board, ICT security controls must be commensurate with 
the level of threat and the state of vulnerability at any given moment, for example 
during pilotage in restricted waters, the loss of situational awareness data could have 
a serious impact.
Table 6.7: Security controls that could be used in a ship ICT security plan and the barriers to watch 
for
Security controls version 4.0 (Carnegie Melon Institute, 2013) Barriers
1. Inventory of authorised and unauthorised devices Missing items Items not reported
2. Inventory of authorised and unauthorised software
Missing items 
Items not reported
3. Secure configurations for hardware and software on mobile 
devices, laptops, workstations, and servers
Complexity
4. Continuous vulnerability assessment and remediation
Time consuming 
Reasons not understood
5. Malware defences
Not updated
False sense of security
6. Application software security
Not updated
False sense of security
7. Wireless device control
Missing items 
Items not reported
8. Data recovery capability
Backups not taken 
Not stored correctly
9. Security skills assessment and appropriate training to fill gaps
Skills gap 
Lack of awareness
10. Secure configurations for network devices such as firewalls, 
routers, and switches
Complexity 
Technical skills
11. Limitation and control of network ports, protocols, and sen/ices Technical skills
12. Controlled use of administrative privileges
Technical skills
13. Boundary defence Boundaries not established Boundaries too fluid
Responsibilities for boundaries not understood or in 
dispute
14. Maintenance, monitoring, and analysis of audit logs Technical skills
15. Controlled access based on the need to know
Physical
Virtual
16. Account monitoring and control
Local
Networked
17. Data loss prevention Security awareness
18. Incident response and management Not available Not understood
19. Secure network engineering Technical
20. Penetration tests and red team exercises
Too expensive 
Not understood
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Part 4: How to update the profile - method and sources of information
Whilst it is important to learn from experience and changing circumstances, it is also 
important to be able to look forward in attempt to predicate and circumvent potential 
problems. Horizon Scanning is one method for monitoring future risk that has 
potential synergies with the findings of this research. The Horizon Scanning Centre 
(HSC) advocates use of the Backcasting method of Horizon Scanning to support the 
needs of divergent organisations that exist in complex milieus (Horizon Scanning 
Centre, 2013). Backcasting reviews a range of information from a variety of sources 
in an attempt to identify drivers and trends. The aim is to deliver solutions for 
problems that can appear to be intractable now or may not even be recognised as 
problems. For example, Table 6.8 provides an axial comparison using a 2x2 matrix 
that maps ICT security drivers and trends as either barriers or enablers and whether 
they are in or out of your control. Notwithstanding the choice of update method, from 
an organisational perspective, it is known that security updates and information for 
the ship security assessment and ship security plan will come from conventional 
sources such as the International Maritime Organisation, international and national 
communities and commercial security providers. Figure 6.7 provides the final version 
of the updateable maritime ICT security profile showing potential sources of barrier 
information and reporting.
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Table 6.8: The use of Backcasting in a maritime environment (Horizon Scanning Centre, 2013)
Bar
In our control
iers
Ena Dlers
guidd*
Provides lessons from experience* and changing circumstances
Ship security plan
Initiates and providesInitiates and provides
Physical risk assessment
Physical security risk assessment feeds Into
ICT plar
Provides lessons from experience and changing circumstances
ICT security strategy 
and plan.
Can produce a stand 
alone ICT security 
assessment
Initiates and provides
ICT risk assessment
ICT security risk assessment infon
Review of current 
physical threats
Assessment of ship's 
physical 
vulnerabilities
Assessment of ship's 
ICT vulnerabilities
Review of current 
threats to ICT
Ship security 
assessment
Ship's ICT asset 
assessment
Updateable database of indicators presented in non technical language that can be used to monitor security issues by all mariners.
International and national commercial and military organisations
Head Quarters, owners and others
Figure 6.7: The updateable maritime ICT security profile with sources of barrier information and reporting
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Whilst ICT security updates could also come from conventional sources, It is 
proposed that updates for the profile could come from international Maritime Trade 
Organisations. The UK maintains several MTOs including the Gulf and other 
locations. (Current operational deployments can be found in Royal Navy (2013).) A 
recent change to the structure came with the introduction of the Maritime Trade 
Information Centre (MTIC) which was established in 2013 to fill ‘information 
management gaps’ in the RN’s security support to the Merchant Navy.
Part 5: Input from non ICT security experts
The ISPS Code and OCTAVE are designed for use where there are continuous 
reviews of security by experts from the physical and ICT security disciplines 
respectively. The research reported here suggests that if the secure ICT maritime 
profile is to be effective, then non-security experts will need to be involved in the 
process. It is proposed that the barriers themselves can be put to work, or more 
accurately, use the mariner’s understanding of barriers to allow them to take part in 
the security assessment and monitoring processes. The rationale behind this thinking 
lies in the dual approach of using security experts based ashore to establish the safe 
physical and ICT working conditions and then engaging users at sea to monitor 
security. Those at sea would not be concerned with technical security issues perse, 
but identifying potential barriers that are relevant to ICT security which they can 
describe and are willing and able to report. In this way, the database can act as a two 
way translational tool that offers a realistic approach to the long standing issues 
identified in this research. The ultimate aim would be to have a web based 
updateable database of barriers presented in non-technical language that can be
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used by mariners to monitor security issues. This topic is carried forward to Chapter
7.
6.4 Conclusion
If a barrier to ICT security exists or is created then it can lead to a threat, and that 
threat can be realised if an associated vulnerability can be exploited. Some of the 
barriers are straightforward and easy to identify and understand but others are 
complex and potentially have impacts at the strategic, operational or tactical levels of 
shipping functions that can have unforeseen outcomes. This chapter has drawn 
together the different threads in the preceding chapters to design and build an 
updateable maritime ICT security profile that that will help mariners moderate the 
effects of barriers to ICT security. It is proposed that the principles of Horizon 
Scanning could be used as a technique to keep the profile up to date. Chapter 7 will 
set out the final conclusions of this research.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions
This chapter begins with a summary of the thesis. Then, an appraisal of the research 
questions is provided. Next, the contribution to the literature and suggestions 
regarding how others can use this work are outlined. At the end of this chapter, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the research methodology and recommendations for 
further research are provided.
7.1 Summary of this thesis
The research roadmap, first provided in Figure 1.3, is reproduced as Figure 7.1 with 
the addition of the chapters of this thesis mapped to the relevant sections. Chapter 1 
established the context for this research by describing a worldwide mobile workforce 
that is coming to terms with the changing demands of ICT in a physical environment 
that is often hostile. The key innovations in maritime ICT, the dangers involved with 
being at sea and the need to call for help, were looked at. This led to the aim of the 
research presented in this thesis: to advance understanding of security issues 
associated with the use of ICT systems in a maritime environment. Specifically, the 
research sought to reveal barriers to secure ICT and use them to inform the 
development of a secure ICT maritime profile that will be capable of being updated on 
an on-going basis.
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Aim: To advance 
understanding of security
ith the -v  
iina V  
maritime environment
issues associated wit
use of ICT systems in a Maritime ICT: Management and day to day
operations S
□  The need for this maritime sector 
research
□  W hat is a barrier? □  Maritime  
barriers
v' Barriers to ICT security: Key terms to help identify barriers from the empirical data
Chapter 1
□  New dangers posed 
by reliance on ICT
□  Complex systems and 
policies which are not 
co-ordinated
□  Lack of ICT security 
awareness
□  ISPS Code lacks 
ICT security 
section
□  The need for holistic 
risk based security□  Maritime 
military 
issues
□  Merchant 
issues
Chapter 2
□  What the literature says about wireless security, ICT security and barriers (Mostly non- maritime specific)
❖  Scoping exercise 
RN interviews and analysis
□  Develop research 
methodology
Chapter 3
❖  Merchant Navy 
data and analysis
Chapters 4  and 5
Key:
□  literature 
❖ Research data 
> Secondary literature 
J  Findings and 
conclusions
Draw together all sources >  Maritime incidents and 
disasters for an understanding 
of what could happen
J  Barriers e.g. tensions between ICT 
users and security experts
^  Maritime ICT security 
profile
v' Conclusions and 
recommendations
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1: Research roadmap from Figure 1.3 with chapters mapped to the relevant sections
In the absence of literature that is specific to the maritime sector, Chapter 2 looked at 
the security characteristics of land based ICT which has the greatest relevance to the
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maritime sector. This included wireless and cyber security. The literature was also 
used to define the nature of barriers and to identify the terminology associated with 
barriers to secure ICT. The resultant broad list of barriers as set out in Table 2.3 
helped to identify barriers from the empirical data. Also, the results of this literature 
review enabled the four research questions to be formulated.
The research methodology, reported in Chapter 3, provided a satisfactory means to 
build on the literature reported in Chapters 1 and 2 which led to the development of 
an in depth view of ‘real world’ barriers to secure ICT that is presented in later 
chapters. This depth was achieved in the main by one to one semi-structured 
interviews with Royal Navy and Merchant Navy personnel.
The results of interviews with Royal Navy personnel were summarised and analysed 
in Chapter 4. The findings include a list of barriers and descriptions of security 
characteristics that could be used as examples of threats, outcomes and critical 
assets for use in the updateable secure ICT maritime profile. For a long time the data 
resisted deep understanding. The breakthrough came when the author returned to 
first principles and considered again the question of what is a barrier? This 
reappraisal led to the realisation that any given barrier can have multiple properties 
and dimensions. This in turn led to the identification of the correlation between 
objective barriers and security threats, and subjective barriers and vulnerabilities. An 
objective barrier is taken to be one that can apply in equal measure to all, and a 
subjective barrier is taken to be one that is perceived by an individual. In this sense 
an objective barrier is not unlike a security threat potentially faced by all whilst a 
subjective barrier is not unlike one that is perceived by an individual. Now, rather than 
the data being flat in the sense that it was not revealing anything new to the author,
the data came alive with information. In total, nine barriers were identified. (See 
Section 4.4.)
Chapter 5 reports the data collected from opportunity-based discussions with 
Merchant Navy officers. The parallel activity of reviewing the structure of the ISPS 
Code Ship Security Assessment successfully identified appropriate security 
components for use in an updateable maritime ICT security profile. Secondary 
literature was used to identify activities, such as terrorism and pirates, and incidents, 
such as groundings and collisions, to reveal the potential threat actors and impacts 
should an incident caused by failure of ICT security occur at sea.
Chapter 6 returned to the discussion regarding barriers and described how they acted 
as a stimulus for developing the maritime ICT security profile. The profile itself was 
developed in five parts by drawing together the different threads from the preceding 
chapters. The design and build of the profile is based on known security principles to 
help mariners moderate the effects of ICT security complexities. This profile is 
intended as a standalone entity although there is also scope for its integration into the 
ISPS Code for use as part of a sector wide holistic security assessment tool.
7.2 Appraisal of the research questions
The research questions were formulated in Section 2.7 and are restated here:
1. How are mariners responding to the increasing use of ICT and how 
and to what extent is their security behaviour adapting to the changes in 
technology?
2. What has been the impact of ICT on maritime organisations’ security 
culture?
3. How have maritime authorities and organisations responded to the 
potential threats and vulnerabilities of maritime ICT?
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4. Can the barriers be used as the basis for a secure ICT profile that can 
be used successfully in a maritime environment?
Each of these questions will now be discussed in turn.
1. How are mariners responding to the increasing use of ICT and how and to 
what extent is their security behaviour adapting to the changes in technology?
The research suggests that mariners are coming to terms with the increasing use of 
ICT but it also indicates are that they may not be adapting their security behaviour to 
the changing conditions and circumstances. Data to support these conclusions was 
presented in Chapters 1, 2, 4 and 5. For example, Chapter 1 provides a description of 
how maritime ICT has evolved from the late 1800s to 2013 showing that mariners 
were in the vanguard of adoption of radio and other technology and continue to make 
best use of technology. ICT security in a maritime environment is essential because 
of the growing dependence that mariners have on ICT. This includes emergency and 
commercial communications, situational awareness, seamanship, engineering and 
logistics. As such, working and living at sea calls for a level of self-sufficiency which is 
robust and able to recover from failure in exceptional circumstances if disasters are to 
be avoided.
2. What has been the impact of ICT on maritime organisations’ security culture?
An attack targeting ICT could, at best, reduce the ability of mariners to be self- 
sufficient, or at worst lead to disaster at sea. The people using maritime ICT are 
under constant pressure, and in the face of incidents they can tend towards self- 
preservation rather than the needs of the many. There are complex national, 
international, organisational and legal issues which have to be dealt with as vessels 
cross jurisdictions. Insufficient training and awareness can lead to incidents that have
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greater impact than they would elsewhere because the physical environment is 
unforgiving.
3. How have maritime authorities and organisations responded to the potential 
threats and vulnerabilities of maritime ICT?
With the exception of the ENISA (2011) report, little evidence could be found to 
suggest that any co-ordinated response to the potential threats and vulnerabilities of 
maritime ICT is in hand. Evidence from multiple sources suggests that it is difficult 
and costly for authorities and organisations to prepare for responses to threats 
without strong evidence to support the need such actions. Even maritime 
organisations that have a strong security culture built into their day to day working are 
struggling with the rapid changes brought about by new developments in ICT.
4. Can barriers to ICT security be used as the basis for a secure ICT profile that 
can be used successfully in a maritime environment?
The data and literature used in this thesis comes from multiple sources and most are 
well known to the maritime and security communities and well respected by them. For 
example, the ISPS Code, Octave and CRAMM form the basis for the maritime ICT 
security profile. This model uses a combination of the general ICT and social barriers 
drawn up from the findings of Chapters 1 and 2 and the 9 specific barriers from the 
data. The profile will be helpful in the real world in terms of informing attempts to 
counter actual and potential dangers.
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7.3 Contribution to the literature
This research has considered secure ICT at sea with a particular focus on barriers. It 
has pointed to gaps in secure maritime ICT literature and to a scarcity of research into 
the potential impacts and consequences of incidents related to lack of ICT security 
that may occur at sea. In so doing, it has contributed to new knowledge in a number 
of important ways with the principal contribution being a model for a maritime ICT 
security profile. Protecting ICT assets is essential and this research has identified 
nine of the barriers to maritime ICT security, an understanding of which has been 
used in the maritime ICT security profile.
The findings of this research suggest that the maritime sector should acknowledge 
the existence of barriers to secure ICT to a much greater extent and adopt pro-active 
countermeasures that will help all mariners understand and deal with security issues.
If security incidents are to be avoided, or at least contained, then adopting a profile 
approach will help security experts design and implement secure ICT more 
effectively. Additionally, the profile will help raise overall awareness across the 
maritime sector.
7.4 Intended audience and how others should use this work
The intended research audience includes those wishing to start their careers in the 
maritime sector or more experienced researchers reflecting on barriers and the nature 
of barriers. The audience for the practical results include all lawful mariners who wish 
to gain a better understanding of ICT security and how it might affect their 
organisation. Finally, for those working in the maritime sector where military and 
merchant co-operation required, this research will help situate their appreciation.
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This work can be used in several ways by those working in the maritime sector and 
researchers working across domains. First, they could use the maritime profile to 
assess ICT assets and vulnerabilities within their own organisations and use the 
results to build an ICT security management plan. Second, the information gathered 
for ICT could be used to help with a ship’s physical security plan. This could be part of 
a two way trade of information between ICT and physical security personnel to help 
reduce duplication of effort. Third, researchers could use the information contained in 
this thesis to reflect on barriers and perspectives on how barriers behave in different 
conditions and circumstances. Fourth, it can be used by those wishing to reflect on 
maritime ICT and maritime trade. Fifth, it can be used by those reflecting on practical 
ICT security in a land environment. Finally, there is sufficient information to generate 
maritime ICT security scenarios. Consider, for example, a situation where maritime 
ICT systems enact the priorities of float move fight. Routine operations can be broken 
down into distinct periods during which the location dependant aspects of barriers will 
come to the fore. Automated damage control terminals making pre-emptive 
reconfiguration of damage control equipment; machinery is running and selected in 
optimum states and conditions; intelligent work terminals storing and processing 
information; whilst communications nodes scan the electro-magnetic spectrum and 
select the most efficient channel to ‘clear traffic’. The routine operations will also 
require integrated sensor data and information that can be generated in any part of 
the world. A list of the components of this situation is provided in Table 7.1 together 
with location dependant barriers.
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Table 7.1: Components of a hypothetical return voyage. Secure ICT systems configured to meet prevailing 
conditions and circumstances.
ICT systems that 
support the priorities 
of float move fight
Location Barriers
Period 1 Alongside (Home) 
Mooring buoy 
At anchor
Barriers associated with connection to land lines. For example:
1. Threats from hackers and intruders
2. Threats from viruses, worms and Trojans
3. Absence of privacy of personal data
4. People who connect insecure machines to the Internet do not bear the 
full consequences of their actions
5. The ease with which computer users are deceived by fake websites
6. Many people say they value privacy yet act otherwise when online
Period 2 Exit (Day)
Restricted in Ability to 
Manoeuvre 
Constrained by draft 
Passage
Open waters, out of sight 
of land
S ea areas of operations 
Coastal passage and 
‘choke points’
Distress, urgency and 
safety
Transition from confidentiality integrity availability to secure ICT that 
supports float move fight:
1. Operational imperatives overriding security requirements
2. Tensions experienced between security experts and ICT users
3. Security limitations impeding business progress
4. Limited security training leading to repeated security incidents
5. Inadequate planning for recovery from disruption
6. Loss of ICT skills due to automation
7. Budget cuts lower moral and can reduce funding for security
8. Manpower cuts and information overload are cause problems of over 
work for little reward
9. Cancellation or delayed projects can require continued use of obsolete 
systems with inherent security shortfalls
Period 3 Alongside (Away) Transition from secure ICT that supports float move fight to confidentiality 
integrity availability in an overseas environment
1. Unknown service providers
2. Crew behaviour
Period 4 Exit (Night) Greater dependence on ICT for situational awareness
1. Jamming
2. Spoofing
7.5 Evaluation of the methodology and suggestions for further investigation
The research methodology was designed to allow an exploration of barriers in a 
maritime context with the aim of advancing understanding of security issues 
associated with the use of ICT systems in that context. The purpose of the 
methodology was to take the list of barriers identified from the literature as a starting 
point to develop an in depth view of ‘real world’ barriers to secure ICT in the maritime 
environment. To achieve this depth, one to one semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with Royal Navy and Merchant Navy personnel. The challenge of this 
approach was to find willing and able interviewees’. It had been planned to conduct 
certain interviews on-board ships. Although it would have helped to understand the
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working environment, this did not happen because it was not possible to secure 
formal approval. The interview data was analysed using a grounded approach to 
allow characteristics to emerge from the data. A major output from this analysis was 
the realisation that the characteristics of barriers can very usefully be characterised 
as objective and subjective. For the Merchant Navy, a combination of observation of 
lectures and post lecture informal discussions were used. With hindsight, this 
component of the research would have benefited from a pre-course discussion with 
the course leader. Secondary data regarding Royal Navy and Merchant Navy security 
issues was also collected and data provided information that can be used for the 
generation of scenarios.
It is suggested that this research has raised two topics worthy of further investigation. 
First, a range of organisations from the maritime sector could be approached to take 
part in testing the utility of the security profile in the ‘real world’ and in so doing 
determine if the findings of this research are generalizable across military and 
commercial organisations. As part of this investigation, it is suggested that the subject 
population be extended to include people with limited maritime ICT security 
experience so that a broader picture can be established. (Those, for example, who 
use ICT but may not consider themselves to be subject experts.) Secondly, this 
research has described specific aspects of Royal Navy and Merchant Navy ICT 
security, and has revealed barriers, their characteristics and their attributes. However, 
these descriptions do not explain why a barrier is what it is; why does a barrier 
behave the way it does in certain circumstances but not others? This type of 
investigation would require a revised methodology and a new data collection effort.
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The aim of the investigation would be to develop a theory of barriers to ICT security in 
the maritime sector.
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Appendix A 
Guidelines used in this research
Research question:
What are the barriers to achieving information and technology security in a maritime
environment?
Interview topics:
Information Assurance, people and technology.
The purpose of the research and anticipated audiences:
To advance the understanding of information and technology security at sea. This work will 
include physical security aspects and is being conducted for the benefit of all lawful mariners.
Informed permission will be sought for each person interviewed or observed. All participants will be 
briefed separately prior to the commencement of any formal or informal interview or observation.
Interviews will be conducted on the principle of confidentiality. Permission will be sought to take notes 
and make audio recordings of each interview. The notes will be summarised in a database for use as 
agreed below.
Use of the data will be negotiated with participants on specific criteria and within specific timelines. 
The data will be used for statistical purposes and will contribute to more detailed analysis such as 
Cognitive Mapping or Grounded Theory. Your data may be used in papers and journal articles. The 
thesis itself is due for completion in September 2011.
No data will be used that a participant asks to be kept in confidence.
Participants will be asked at the end of the interview for permission to use their data and if anything 
needs to be excluded.
Participants will have an opportunity to see their data and how comments and observations about 
them are reported in the context of the case study. Participants may edit and add in, if necessary, 
criteria for accuracy, relevance and fairness (The appropriate section of the database will be 
forwarded for consideration and approval).
Direct quotation and attributed judgements in articles, journals and reports require the explicit 
permission of the participant.
Permission will be sought for access to documents, files and correspondence. These items will not be 
copied without explicit permission.
Non-attributable data and information used in summarising findings across projects or in raising 
general issues about the findings does not require specific clearance.
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Appendix B
Royal Navy data and mapping 
SY1 27th Feb 2009
Author’s note: This interview was conducted as part of the scoping exercise described in Chapter 3. As 
such, the question numbering used here correspond to the numbering used for the main interviews and 
not the numbering used during this pilot interview.
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of maritime environment and ICT 
security
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
The new technology will support not only 
the critical safety at sea, but will support the 
business drivers, certainly in the Merchant 
Service, which will be reducing operating 
costs whilst maximising profit. In a  military 
context greater faith in the ships fighting 
capability will be preserved. Modem  
technology is considerably more reliable 
and easier to maintain because it is a swop 
out swop in.
1. Network and information 
security is a  challenge.
2. ICT has critical role to play.
3. Reducing operating costs can 
lead to reduction in money spent 
on ICT security.
4. Role of ICT continues to 
develop.
5. Reliability of ICT may point to 
other problems with security.
1. Network
2. Identify critical systems
3. Operating costs
4. Changing roles of IT
5. Reliability
B
Q1
Communications technology has allowed a 
greater coming together of disparate 
systems used to maintain the vessel, its 
propulsion systems, its navigation systems 
and greater information sharing between 
organisations.
1. Integration of on-board control 
systems.
2. Enables organisations to 
share information if they want to.
6. Network
7. Control systems
8. Information sharing
C
Q3
W e have moved on quite considerably from 
the days of the Titanic disaster where it was 
very basic wireless technology and line of 
sight communications to being able to have 
world-wide communications real-time and 
instantaneous. So overall the new 
technology is supporting the business in all 
aspects.
1. Communications enable 
world-wide operations.
2. Able to communicate anytime, 
anywhere.
3. Supports all aspects of 
business.
9. World-wide
10. Mobile
11. Communications
12. R ealtim e
13. Instantaneous
14. Support to operations
D
Q7
Being a cynic? W here we have grown up 
over the last twenty years with 
technological solutions we haven't 
necessarily thought enough about the 
impact if that solution was not there.
1. Greater dependence on 
technical solutions.
2. Lack of fall-back options.
15. Support to operations
16. Dependence on technology
17. Systems failure
18. Impact
E
Q7
Navigation skills are not necessarily taught 
any longer and there is the reliance on GPS  
satellite technologies which because they 
are nothing more than a computer could be 
attacked and taken out of service in which 
case we could finish up with a lot of ships 
scattered throughout the world and nobody 
knows how to get them home again.
1. Situational awareness 
depends on technical solutions.
2. Lack of fall-back options.
3. Loss of command and control
19. Situational awareness
20. Dependence on technology
21. Failure
22. Impact
23. Command and control
F
Q7
Even within an engineering context 
engineers have been brought up to rely on 
IT to diagnose problems and indeed to 
rectify problems. Without that IT a lot of 
engineering solutions will not be apparent.
1. Technology used for 
mechanical and electrical fault 
diagnosis.
2. Loss of engineering skills.
24. Engineering needs IT
25. Dependence on technology
26. Loss of engineering skills
27. Systems failure
28. Impact
G
Q7
Communications, lose the IT that provides 
the internet type communications do we still 
retain the skills for radio frequency 
communications or line of sight 
communications? The loss of traditional 
communications skills as a result of 
technology is a  potential business disabler.
1. In the event of a systems 
failure, the lack of fall-back 
because of the loss of traditional 
radio communication skills will 
present problems.
29. Systems failure
30. Impact
Continued ....
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SY1
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of maritime environment and ICT 
security
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
H
Q7
Whilst I appreciate the reason for the 
reduction of training within the traditional 
skills because they were manpower 
intensive which IT tends to be; the 
opposite for business continuity we still 
need to retain those skills
1. Need to reduce personnel 
costs.
2. Loss of traditional skills
3. Need to retain skills as fall-back
31. Operating costs
32. Loss of skills
33. Skills for contingency
I
Q7
It has been said that children leaving 
school will have lost the ability to write, 
certainly lost the ability to use pens and 
paper because of their reliance on IT.
1. Loss of traditional skills 34. Loss of skills
35. Skills for contingency
J
Q7
Impact could be catastrophic to the 
business which in a military context could 
lead to a loss of life in a business context 
could result in a  company having to file for 
bankruptcy.
1. Loss of IT could be catastrophic 
in military and commercial context.
36. Catastrophic
K
Q8
Broadly speaking our maritime cousins 
face exactly the same problems as a 
terrestrial based system
1. Afloat and ashore face similar 
problems
37. Context based
L
Q8
For example, if there were a malicious 
software attack that originated in the Far 
East, then a UK based fixed system would 
be attacked possibly 3 or 4 hours after a 
fixed place in the Far East. However, a UK 
ship in the Far East will be attacked at that 
time. They face the same threats and 
vulnerabilities and therefore the risk is the 
same perhaps just in different time scales.
1. Threat from malicious software 
similar but time scales may differ
38. Threat time scale
M
Q8
The concept of the platform being in a salt 
water environment; electricity and water 
do not mix very well. The corrosive effect 
of salt water and the atmosphere on 
metallic objects is far greater and 
corrosion on a key component on an IT 
system will be more catastrophic. Special 
consideration has to be made for the 
corrosive effect of salt water.
1. Salt water corrosion
2. Electrical equipment 
surrounded by water
39. Corrosion
40. Physical protection
41. Electrical protection
N
Q8
Working conditions were there isn't as 
much free space around the equipment 
down to and including a key board is an 
issue.
1. Working environment not ideal
2. Limited IT available
42. People’s working 
conditions
43. Limited IT assets
0
Q8
The availability and compatibility of spares 
is an issue.
1. Are the correct spares 
available?
44. Maintenance
P
Q8
Satellites issues associated with 
atmospherics and change of position.
1. Electro-magnetic environment
2. Satellite tracking
45. Interference
Q
Q8
There isn't much time to get software 
patches which may or may not be critical. 
How do you get soft patches if you are at 
sea and have been attacked by a virus 
and are on a distributed network and as 
part of the network defence you have 
been disconnected from the network?
1. Zero day attack
2. How to get software fix if 
network not available
46. Speed of attack
47. Software patches
00
The way you would get the fix is as an e- 
mail attachment: that could have 
interesting outcomes.
1. Lack of fall-back 48. Contingency
S
Q8
Network Enable Capability has the 
potential to put an additional burden on 
staff because the electronic environment 
in which we and others are working is 
greater and the adversary will be able to 
hide where he is coming from and as 
everything joins together for information 
sharing the impact on the business from a 
loss of that capability could be greater.
1. Work load increasing due to the 
actions of the ill-disposed.
2. Increasing capability of the ill- 
disposed.
3. If business carried out in a 
networked and information sharing 
environment then loss of capability 
at sea could have a greater impact 
than similar occurrence on land.
49. People’s working 
conditions
50. Cyber warfare
51. Impact
Continued ....
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Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of maritime environment and ICT 
security
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
T
Q8
The threats will be the same: there are 
only about a dozen basic types of 
malicious software however there are 
several thousand variations on a theme. 
As we join together perhaps we need to 
take stock of who the threat actor is: keep 
your enemies close but keep your friends 
closer’.
1. Threats are the same in all 
environments.
2. Must understand who or what 
poses the threats and then 
understand how those threats may 
be carried out.
52. Threat assessment
53. Threat actors
54. Vulnerability assessment
U
Q8
Yesterday’s terrorist is today’s freedom 
fighter and tomorrow’s politician. Know 
your enemy. The threat will be the same it 
may have a different complexion.
1. Keep up to date with current 
threat actors.
2. Monitor how threats change 
and evolve
55. Threat actors
V
Q11
I see a greater need for security risk 
management. W e security professionals 
could adopt the head in the sand 
approach T h e  answers no, now what is 
the question?’ The effect that has on 
business is potentially catastrophic. W e  
need to be firmly embedded in business; 
we need to have a good understanding of 
business and the business needs to 
understand where we are coming from.
1. Security must keep pace with 
the operational requirements of 
the business.
2. Business must keep pace with 
current security requirements.
56. Security v business
57. Business v security
W
Q11
It is business information that needs 
protecting. Information is the most 
valuable to the organisation after its work 
force and the business needs to 
understand that and from the outset of any 
programme work with the security 
professional rather than allowing security 
to be bolted on at the end when it 
becomes costly and those costs may well 
be disproportionate.
1. Information should be regarded 
as an important asset and 
protected as such.
2. Security should be built in, not 
added as an expensive after 
thought.
58. Awareness
59. Security by design
60. Cost of security
61. Time lost
X
Q12
I have no direct experience of it. W hat I do 
have experience of is where systems are 
coming together what is to one system is 
a small risk and will be accepted in that 
business area having a major impact on 
another and therefore presents a  greater 
risk to other business areas. If those areas 
are within an entire single organisation, I 
accept that the cumulative effect could be 
catastrophic.
1. W hen systems exchange 
information in situations in which 
they were not designed to do so, 
then the risk of unforeseen 
consequences can be 
catastrophic.
62. Security by design
63. Impact of inter-connections
Y
Q12
I am not sure whether businesses fully 
understand the individual risks they are 
carrying may have an impact on 
somebody else. At senior level, I am not 
sure they understand the cumulative 
effect. You only need to look at recent 
events in the financial world to show 
exactly what I mean by that. That I think is 
an awareness issue and the cultural issue: 
we have never had a problem so why 
should I worry about it now and why 
should I worry about what I am doing in 
terms of somebody else’s business. So it’s 
the parochial nature of business units.
1. Senior management not fully 
aware of the cumulative effect of 
risk.
2. Awareness and cultural issues 
of shared working environment.
64. Managements 
understanding of risk
65. People’s behaviour
66. Shared working 
environment
Continued ....
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Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of maritime environment and ICT 
security
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
Z
Q12
These views have been much the same 
since I got into this business. Although 20  
years ago information held on the PC ITSy 
then was lock away the hard disc. Now  
with systems storing information in data 
warehouses local servers or whatever, we 
have seen a slight shift. People are less 
reluctant to store things locally then they 
were although when it was locked away 
with disc they were more likely to lock the 
key board. Now they will get up and walk 
away because the system will do it after 
30 minutes and there is no information 
there it is all on the server it does not 
matter the machine is still accessible. 
There are some positives and some 
negatives. W e are getting there slowly 
towards the stage where people are 
realising that we all have a part to play in 
security and protecting information. But 
we need to wait another half a  generation 
before it becomes effective so the 
‘Facebook’ generation of IT literate juniors 
take up the senior management positions.
1. W hen systems where 
standalone and not mobile in the 
way they are today, then it was 
possible to lock away a PC or 
even remove a hard drive and 
store it in a safe.
2. Now, servers can be off-site, 
devices are mobile and have 
wireless connectivity which 
changes the nature of IT security.
3. Awareness of this change is 
slow to take hold.
4. Even when awareness in place, 
people’s behaviour still tends 
towards the ‘take the easy way’ 
approach.
5. Understanding will come, but is 
some years off.
67. Physical security
68. Distributed information
69. Security awareness
70. People’s security behaviour
AA
Q13
It has been suggested that perhaps we do 
that [use non MODUK methodologies] and 
there was a suggestion within government 
that the financial world understands risk 
management quite well and we should 
perhaps be learning from them: I need say 
no more.
1. Although risk management is 
said to be well understood, this is 
not always the case.
71. Understanding risk 
management
BB
Q13
However what I will say is that there are 
some very good standards out there. I 
think clearly of the ISO 27000 family which 
certainly within government as a whole all 
government departments have asserted 
their conformance with ISO 27001 some 
going slightly further than the ISO  
standard some remaining with the ISO  
controls as part of their strategic 
Information Assurance policies. It is an 
international standard so it should work 
equally well within the maritime 
environment of the UK, Singapore, United 
States, Canada or New Zealand.
1. Applying international standards 
should help joint operations and 
shared information environments.
72. International security 
standards
73. Joint operations
74. Shared information
CC
Q 14
The security controls within the MODUK  
would fully meet and exceed the ISO  
27000 controls and this has been so for 
many years. It has been said that the ISO  
standard is catching up.
1. MODUK could have a role to 
play in devising international 
standards.
75. International security 
standards
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SY1: Summary of initial analysis
SY1 Category
Organisation
Critical assets
Sources of threats
Outcomes
People
Environment
Technology
Attributes
Loss of engineering skills 
Skills for contingency 
People’s working conditions 
Security awareness 
Security v business 
People’s behaviour
Operating costs 
Information sharing 
Support to operations 
Command and control 
Operating costs 
Business v security 
Security by design 
Cost of security 
Time lost
Managements understanding of risk 
Understanding risk management 
Complying with international security standards 
Managing joint operations
World-wide 
Real time 
Instantaneous 
Electro-magnetic
Changing roles of IT 
Reliability 
Control systems 
Mobile
Communications 
Limited IT assets 
Impact of inter-connections 
Shared working environment 
Distributed information
Identify critical systems 
Situational awareness 
Engineering needs IT 
Maintenance 
Contingency capability 
Physical security
Dependence on technology
Systems failure
Context based
Threat time scale
Corrosion
Physical
Electrical protection 
Interference 
Speed of attack 
Lack of software patches 
Cyber warfare 
Threat actors
Impact
Catastrophic
Unable to conduct joint operations 
Unable to provide for float move fight
SY2 24th June 2009
Data
block
and
question
Interview ee's opinions  
of m aritim e environm ent and ICT 
security
R esearcher’s interpretation o f 
interview ee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
Crews must be prepared for autonomous 
working. There is a need for ships to be 
able to work without links to UK or other 
commands.
1. In the event of IT failure 76. Autonomous working
B
Q2
Technology will under pin all maritime 
activity and be the main deliverer of 
operational capability.
1. Dependence on IT 77. Dependence on IT
OJ
°
o
For example, AIS (Automated 
Identification System) has security 
implications. AIS is similar to IFF 
(Identification Friend or Foe) for aircraft. 
Naval vessels would switch off AIS if 
going into an operational mode and switch 
on for safety. The ill-disposed can benefit 
from knowing position.
1. AIS intended to help situational 
awareness but can be used by the 
ill-disposed to locate and track 
potential targets
78. Situational awareness
79. Location threat
80. Tracking threat
D
Q3
Yes, essential. IT security an enabler 
without which we could not rely on 
information to do our business.
1. Dependence on CIA 81. Confidentiality
82. Integrity
83. Availability
Q4
Omitted because SY2 still somewhat 
uncomfortable and so did not want to 
worsen the situation
E
Q5
In HMG the policies of the Chief 
Information officer and the Command 
Information Officers are moving towards 
exploiting information not just protecting it.
1. The need to make best use of 
information as an asset
84. Information asset
F
Q5
A MODUK security diagram should 
include information exploitation leading 
from IT Security (ITSy) and Information 
Assurance should be shown as 
overarching the physical and technical 
aspects of security.
1. The hierarchy of IT security 
functions includes technical and 
physical aspects
85. Hierarchy responsibilities
86. Technical security
87. Physical security
G
Q5
The perception is compartmentalised but 
in my opinion it should be holistic. For 
example, when asked, Users will say: ‘The 
Principle Security Advisor does that’, 
when in fact security in the round should 
be engrained in the culture. Security 
training is a  cross boundaries issue.
1. Security should be viewed as a 
‘whole ship’ activity not 
compartmented and then forgotten 
about by the majority
88. Holistic security approach
H
Q6
There has been a tightening of security 
control. Some of the measures are off the 
back of the Burton and Hanigan reports in 
2007/2008. The reaction to security 
breaches in 2007/2008 may have been 
inappropriate. For example, the census of 
removable media takes a lot of time and 
effort and I question the value when 
perhaps accounting and tracking are more 
important.
1. Security controls have been 
tightened because of the loss of 
personnel data and continued 
security breaches by the 
Department
2. Reaction may have been 
inappropriate
89. Reaction to incidents
90. Threat from insider
I
Q7
Loss of intelligence feed in the middle of a 
sensitive operation could lead to 
operational compromise. W e use Impact 
Table to assess potential damage. You 
can imagine the loss of the Nuclear Firing 
Chain! A full range of activities would be 
affected. W e need confidentiality, integrity 
and availability to conduct our business 
effectively. A Protective Marking is related 
to national security breach. The Impact 
Table expands this into the loss of 
capability. For example the likely impact of 
the loss of a pay system. This underpins 
risk management of information.
1. Loss of information at critical 
situation
2. Impact tables used to assess 
potential damage
3. Dependence on IT
4. Protective marking for 
confidentiality
91. Situational awareness
92. Impact on operations
93. Impact on confidentiality
Continued ....
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SY2
Data
block
and
question
Interview ee's opinions  
of m aritim e environm ent and ICT  
security
Researcher’s interpretation of 
in terview ee’s opinions
Research code
O
c_
00
There are no new threats but changing 
‘threat actors’ and the associated security 
vulnerabilities need a more ‘holistic 
approach’ and a better understanding of 
security by ail players.
1. No new threats
2. Changing threat actors
3. Security vulnerabilities change
4. Needs holistic security 
approach to cope with problems
94. Threats are threats
95. Threat actors change
96. Security vulnerability 
changes
97. Holistic security
K
Q9
MOD CERT [Computer Emergency 
Response Team] issues warnings on a 
daily basis. W e continue to be vulnerable 
to existing and upcoming threats. Threats 
are dependent on potential enemies who 
want to exploit the vulnerabilities. W e  
need to take a more holistic view. Through 
life consideration of computer systems is 
for everyone. From design, delivery, 
operation and Users; all have a part to 
play.
1. How to keep the community 
appraised of current situation
2. Whole community required
98. Alert warning and response
99. W hole community 
response
L
Q10
The RN and MODUK have the right 
security processes and practices in place 
but the MODUK security manual is 
considered to be large and unwieldy by 
the community that use it.
1. The right processes and 
practices supported by a 
document which is large and 
unwieldy
100. Security process
101. Security practice
102. Security documentation
M
Q11
This depends upon perception. W hen you 
accept risk your decision is informed and 
effective then the answer is no. As long as 
the risk is accepted then again the answer 
is no. I suspect risk taking is ill judged. W e  
probably take risk we do not know about. 
In Navy Command we have a lot of 
systems that we do not know about form 
either a systems or security perspective. 
Someone buys a system which presents a 
risk, especially if the system interfaces 
with other systems. Commanders buy but 
do not fully understand the consequences.
1. Risk based decision has to be 
informed to be effective
2. Risk environment not known
3. Consequences of taking 
security risk are not understood
103. Informed risk
104. Blind risk
105. Risk consequences
N
Q12
W e do not know the cumulative risk. W e  
should be trying to match procurement to 
system security accreditation.
1. Procurement of IT should 
include security accreditation as 
part of the process
106. Procurement
107. Accreditation
0
Q12
If I had my way we would have the service 
providers better understanding their roles 
and responsibilities. Trying to accept IT 
responsibility not PSyA. Systems must be 
fit for purpose and present acceptable 
risks. N6 etc. better understand their 
responsibilities.
1. Sen/ice providers do not 
understand their responsibilities
2. RN Divisions do not understand 
their responsibilities
108. Security responsibilities; 
organisation
109. Security responsibilities; 
human behaviour
P
Q12
Scenario - 1 need a computer in that tent 
in 12 hours but cannot accredit. But, to 
deliver in future with knowledgebase and 
understanding then security culture needs 
to be engrained within the delivery 
organisation. There has been a top down 
directive to IPTs. Should apply to N6 ISS 
deliverers but not resourced.
1. Predict the requirement and 
then have a solution ready to go
110. Future IT requirements
0
Q12
The Maturity Model is focused on Protect 
[This is a new Protective Marking]. If that 
is the requirement then good. If the 
security process is to cover more, then the 
model has to be expanded. But generally 
it does what it needs to and well thought 
out. It is questionnaire focused direct at 
MODUK level. At TLB level it is open to 
interpretation.
1. IAMM is fit for purpose 111. Security models
Q13 to 
Q17 
inclusive
Omitted because of time constraint
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SY2: Summary of initial analysis
SY2 1 Category
People
Organisation
Technology
Environment
Critical assets
Sources of threats
Outcomes
Attributes
Security practice
Security responsibilities; human behaviour 
Future IT requirements
Dependence on IT 
Hierarchy responsibilities 
Holistic security approach 
Reaction to incidents 
Alert warning and response 
Whole community response 
Security process 
Security documentation 
Informed risk 
Blind risk
Risk consequences
Procurement
Accreditation
Security responsibilities; organisation 
Autonomous working
Situational awareness 
Security models
Information asset 
Technical security 
Physical security
Location threat
Tracking threat
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Threat from insider
Threats are threats
Threat actors change
Security vulnerability changes
Holistic security
Loss of personnel data 
Impact on operations 
Impact on confidentiality
SY3 8th July 2009
Author’s note: SY3’s wife was ill and arrived at the interview in somewhat of a distracted state. He was 
offered the opportunity to re-schedule the interview but he declined stating that he would rather work to 
keep his mind off the problem. This interview started with Q 1, but was allowed to stray off track. Even 
so, good data was generated during the shortened interview.
Data
block
and
question
Interview ee's opinions  
o f IC T security in a m aritim e  
environm ent
Researcher’s interpretation of 
in terview ee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
The difficulty in any environment is Users 
not following accreditation rules. If they 
read and adhere to Security Operating 
(SyOps) instructions then I would be out of 
work.
1. Not following the security rules 112. Accreditation
113. Peoples security behaviour
B
Users circumvent the rules. For example, 
and the rules state that only MODUK  
authorised [crypto enabled] data pens can 
be used with MODUK systems and that 
these data pens must not be used on any 
other system [say, a  private laptop]. So, if 
a member of staff is under pressure to 
finish work and this can only be done at 
home, and then they will break this rule
1. Circumvent rules
2. Threat from unauthorised 
memory and other devices
3. Pressure of work leads staff to 
take short cuts
114. Peoples security behaviour
115. Threat from unauthorised 
devices
C
Rules are also overridden in urgent 
operational circumstances, for example’ 
the transfer of information between 
international partners.
1. Security acknowledges the 
need for operational expedience.
116. Operational expedience
D
In a military environment (I am not sure 
about civilian procedures) our procedure 
[procurement] is not aligned with IT 
security. A commanding officer can 
demand an urgent operational 
requirement via an Integrated Project 
Team  (IPT) and the IPT can deliver and 
so circumvent accreditation issues. When 
the IT Security Officer (ITSO) is the also 
the Deputy Weapons Electrical Officer 
(DW EO) needs to make his mark, then if 
the CO wants something then the DW EO  
won’t say no. If the DW EO is doing his job 
supporting MODUK not CO then the 
procedure is aligned to accreditation.
1. Procurement and security 
requirements are not aligned
2. Accreditation issues
3. Conflict of loyalty to 
Commanding Officer or security
117. Procurement
118. Accreditation
119. Pressure to break the rules
E
Communications security processes are 
generally considered to be good, but even 
here Users often break the rules.
1. Security process is good but 
people break the rules
120. Peoples security behaviour
F I do not think training is the problem. 1. Security training is not a problem
121. Security training
G
The ability to get anti-virus and patches to 
units is a  problem. MODUK policy does 
not allow certain types of file extensions to 
be used over the network. This means 
that patches have to be mailed to ships 
and so can be out of date before being 
applied.
1. Security rules prevent certain 
file extensions being used. For 
example .zip files are not allowed. 
Patches are burned onto CDs and 
posted to ships.
122. Security own goal
123. Patches out of date
124. Ships’ are vulnerable
Continued ....
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Data
block
and
question
Interview ee's opinions  
of m aritim e environm ent and ICT 
security
Researcher’s interpretation o f 
in terview ee’s opinions
Research code
H
There is a ‘disconnect’ between what the 
military security organisation needs and 
the commercial service provider delivers. 
It has been known for [ICT] service 
providers to destroy cyber evidence 
because their priority is to restore the 
service not maintain forensic evidence. 
For example, if a  User discovers a virus 
and inform Atlas [the consortium that 
provide equipment and technical support] 
then they [Atlas] will clean up the system 
and close the incident. This destroys 
evidence, and solves nothing -  the 
oriqinator of the virus is still at large.
1. Commercial service providers 
put commercial considerations 
before MODUK security process.
2. Cyber evidence
3. Different forensic priorities
125. Commercial service 
providers
126. Cyber evidence
127. Forensic priorities
I
W e send Fleet Situational Awareness 
Notices ahead of MODUK Computer 
Emergency Response Team and the Joint 
Security Co-ordination Centre -  we try to 
be proactive.
1. Attempt to stay ahead by 
issuing early warning
128. Early warning
J
This organisation [WARP] deals with 
Information Systems. Another RN 
organisation deals with compliance 
checking, and then there are RN physical 
security teams.
1. Complex security organisation 
within Royal Navy
129. Complex organisational 
structure
K
Information is one of the most important 
assets after the individual. W e spend a lot 
of time and resources protecting our 
information.
1. Information as asset
2. Time and resources used
130. Information as asset
131. Time
132. Security resources
SY3: Summary of initial analysis
SY3 | Category Attributes
Peoples security behaviour 
Operational expedience 
Pressure to break the rules 
Security training
Accreditation
Procurement
Commercial service providers 
Complex organisational structure
Time
Security resources
Information as asset
Environment
Critical assets
Technology
Organisation
People
Sources of threats
Threat from unauthorised devices
Security own goal
Patches out of date
Ships’ are vulnerable
Cyber evidence
Forensic priorities
Early warning
IT not available due to exploitation of out of date security
Outcomes software
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INT1 23rd June 2009
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of ICT security in a maritime 
environment
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
At sea the operational imperative takes 
precedence. For example I recently 
headed a team working in six separate 
domains. Each domain represented one 
country with different technical standards 
and operating procedures. Ashore we 
follow the rules, but work afloat requires 
an ability to conduct risk management. If 
the IT is insufficient, for example different 
networks, unconnected standalones and 
the need to use private IT then that can 
lead to ‘bending of the rules’. In such 
cases we remain accountable for our 
actions and therefore a  level of self-risk 
assessment is called for. There is also a  
need to protect juniors from actions which 
could put them at risk of disciplinary 
action.
1. Afloat, operations take 
precedence over security
2. International information 
exchange
3. Multiple international technical 
standards
4. Ashore, security takes 
precedence over operations
5. Afloat risk balance between 
operations and security
6. Plethora of IT
7. The need to use private 
equipment -  rule bending
8. Subordinates need protecting 
from punitive consequences of 
rule bending
133. Operations v security
134. Security v operations
135. Risk management
136. Private IT
137. Rule bending
138. Punitive measures
B
Q2
The Automated Identification System ‘Blue 
Picture’ is an important element. It helps 
build the intelligence picture and allows 
naval units to prosecute contacts that are 
not squawking an official code.
1. Own IT working against us
2. Vessel not transmitting AIS  
would be worth investigating
139. Covert tracking
140. Identifying potential hostiles
C
Q3
Critical. I support the activities of the CIO. 
He is responsible for ensuring Information 
Assurance, security compliance and best 
practice.
1. Information is business and 
operationally critical
141. Critical information
D
Q3
I recently completed an Information 
Security course which is now mandated 
for all MODUK personnel. It was intuitive. 
However, I feel that those with less 
experience may not get as much form the 
content.
1. Security training mandated 
following incidents involving the 
loss of personal data
2. One size training does not 
necessarily fit all
142. Mandated security training
143. Broad v targeted training
Q 4 Wanted to move on so because sufficient time spent on Q1 to Q3.
E
Q5
Yes, but protecting our information could 
be better. Having worked with the 
Americans they seem to have a better 
understanding of IA. In the RN there can 
be a disconnect between Users 
awareness and experts requirements. 
Memory sticks for example have been 
used widely which is against security 
policy. However, if User needs to transfer 
data between systems then ‘data sticks’ 
are used. That was until a recent 
crackdown following the personal data 
losses. It is also important for Users to be 
able to trust the archiving mechanisms. 
Work is underway to improve the RN 
[electronic] archive.
1. Could do better
2. Security experts have 
expectations that users cannot 
always reach
3. Rule breaking
4. Electronic archiving does not 
have a good reputation in the RN. 
Users have been known to burn 
documents etc. to CD and keep in 
filing cabinet. This breaches the 
Freedom of Information Act.
144. Could do better
145. Security v users
146. Rule breaking
147. Faith in IT
148. Networked archives
F
Q6
Yes, HMG are trying to rework known and 
trusted methodology when a simple fix 
would probably have done.
1. IAMM is an over reaction 149. Managem ent response to 
incidents
G
Q7
This happens today on a regular basis 
and can be caused by anything from a 
crypto change over to technicians going 
off for a cup of tea. In these situations life 
stops. This is because operations and life 
on-board ship are organised around IT.
1. Planed outages
2. Accidental outages
3. Information critical for 
operations
150. Planed outages
151. Accidental outages
152. Information critical for 
operations
Continued ....
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INT1
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of maritime environment and ICT 
security
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
O
i
00 
-1-
Yes, [international] Operation Atalanta is 
run in an unclassified environment. 
However, UK information and intelligence 
from the HQ at Northwood will have much 
higher protective markings. Therefore we 
(UK) have to be careful in vetting what we 
release. There are certain rules governing 
sensitive information which can be broken 
in extremis and at a Commanding 
Officers’ discretion. However, this ‘Action 
on’ has to be justified to the Director 
GCHQ.
1. The plethora of IT and 
information needed for 
international operations can lead 
to mistakes
2. Information exchange rules can 
be broken it special circumstances 
but such actions have to be 
justified to higher authority
153. Complexity leads to 
mistakes
154. Managing risk
Q9 INT1 did not want to talk about this subject
1
Q 10
Yes. Plans are in place to try and improve 
the situation.
1. Lax security practice can cause 
incidents
155. Security practice
J
Q 10
Again, this comes down to the operational 
imperative. W e are trained not to break 
the rules. But obeying the rules and doing 
the job right takes time. Therefore there 
has to be value judgement. Constant look 
out for bad practice. Difficult to interpret 
and so protect others information. 
Mitigation includes training, management 
and leadership.
1. Following security rules can 
lead to operational difficulties
2. Balance between security risk 
and operational imperative
3. Need to protect other 
nationalities information
4. Difficulties with bad practice 
obviated by training, management 
and leadership
156. Security v operations
157. Security risk v operational 
imperative
158. Duty of care
159. Obviate with training
160. Management practice
161. Leadership
K
Q11
W e must sign up to accept that things will 
go wrong. W e can disguise information to 
mitigate risk. To protect the information we 
must understand the overall picture. 
Improving information culture.
1. Need contingency plans
2. Risk mitigation
3. Must understand the operating 
environment
4. Information culture
162. Contingency
163. Risk mitigation
164. Environment
165. Information culture
Q12 INT1 did not want to talk about this subject
L
Q 13
If Americans detect irregularities they cut 
links between systems. This can be 
counterproductive. W e could be more 
surgical with new technology.
1. Immediate action -  cut links
2. Lose chance for intelligence 
gathering
166. Contingency
167. Intelligence gathering
M
Q 14
The growing expectations for IT are not 
always being met. In general, in the 
Services we deal, live and breathe 
security.
1. IT not always living up to 
expectations
2. Security culture
168. Meeting expectations
169. Security culture
N
Q 14
W e have the Official Secrets Act as the 
ultimate sanction.
1. Official punitive measures 170. Official punitive measures
Q15, 
Q 16 and 
Q 17
Omitted due to time constraint
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INT1: Summary of initial analysis
IN T I | Category
People’ security behaviour
Organisation’s security culture
Environment
Technology
Critical assets
Sources of threats
Outcomes
Attributes
Private IT 
Punitive measures 
Mandated security training 
Broad v targeted training 
Could do better 
Security practice 
Management practice 
Leadership
Operations v security 
Security v operations 
Security v users 
Risk management 
Security culture
Management response to incidents
Managing risk
Security v operations
Security risk v operational imperative
Duty of care
Obviate with training
Risk mitigation
Official punitive measures
Faith in IT 
Networked archives 
Contingency 
Meeting expectations
Critical information 
Information critical for operations
Rule bending 
Rule breaking
Covert tracking 
Identifying potential hostiles 
Planed outages 
Accidental outages 
Complexity leads to mistakes
INT2 23rd July
Author’s note: The interviewee was pressed for time which resulted in a rushed interview and less 
depth (30 minutes). The result was an informal discussion where the following points were made:
Data
b lock
and
question
Interview ee's opinions  
of ICT security in a m aritim e  
environm ent
Researcher’s interpretation of 
in terview ee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
Yes it does: issues with bandwidth; office 
space; routines and access to IT. For 
example, juniors have to queue to get on 
the system.
1. Space in the electromagnetic 
environment at a premium
2. Limited working space on-board
3. Limited IT available for crew
171. Electro-magnetic 
environment
172. Working conditions
173. Limited availability of IT for 
all
B
Q2
In fight environment well provisioned. W e  
also use IT for ‘Medicare’. All with 
bandwidth issues.
1. Also use IT to collect 
information from external sources
174. Shared information
C
Q3
Serious potential that we cannot get 
information we need to sea. Need to be 
disciplined to do it. There is not an 
information overload -  but people pushing 
rubbish which is a disabler.
1. System failure prevents flow of 
information needed to conduct 
operations.
2. Not an information overload, 
just people pushing rubbish which 
clogs the system
175. Impact of systems failure
176. Information overload
177. Overload v push of rubbish
At this stage it appeared that the INT2 
was becoming deeply uncomfortable. He 
was offered the opportunity to end the 
interview but he wanted to continue. 
Rather than make the situation worse, the 
researcher set the questions to one side. 
The remainder of the time was spent in 
informal conversation during which INT2 
raised the following points:
D
I find I am returning to more traditional 
ways of working due to a combination of 
factors.
1. Cannot make system work so 
returning to e-mails with 
attachments.
178. Security by design
E
W e are IT inhibited, many people that we 
work with in this building, they cannot 
access MODUK systems so cannot use 
links etc.
1. Connectivity to all parts of the 
organisation not in place so ‘web 
working’ not always possible
179. Security hampers
operational requirements
F
The C to F [Defence Information 
Infrastructure] migration was a step back 
in capability. I spend 30 minutes per day 
managing e-mail rather than issues.
1. Migration to new system was 
not well managed and was seen 
by some as a  backward step.
180. Security by design
INT2: Summary of initial analysis
INT2 | Category Attributes
Working conditions 
Limited availability of IT for all
Security by design
Electro-magnetic environment
Security hampers operational requirements
Shared information
Information overload 
Overload v push of rubbish
Impact of systems failure
Critical assets
People’s security behaviour
Environment
Sources of threats
Outcomes
Organisation’s security culture
Technology
171
ENG1 6th July 2009
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of ICT security in a maritime 
environment
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
Yes it does. You have the element of 
bandwidth which makes it more difficult. 
Other environments are similar: mobile 
environments. W e have a paucity of 
communications connectivity.
1. Restrictions due to bandwidth
2. Similar restrictions apply in land 
environment
3. Limited communications options
181. Bandwidth
182. Mobility
183. Single point of failure
B
Q2
W e spend more time sitting on e-mail. 
Unfortunately systems are still stove 
piped. Organisation boundaries within 
single platform [chain of command] 
require communications using e-mail with 
little automation [no web working]. This 
means our on-board information exchange 
is poor. W e still have to make sure our 
paper BRs are up to date and correct.
1. Intelligence, management, 
warfare etc. all on their own 
system
2. Self-imposed network 
restrictions
3. Duplication of effort (Paper and 
electronic books)
4. In case on-board systems fails
184. Stove pipe v shared
185. Command and control
186. Internal information 
exchange
187. Duplication of effort
188. Contingency documents
C
Q3
Enormously. From a communications 
point of view [IT] is very important, but lots 
of underlying support activity is not done 
well.
1. Important for operations
2. Support activity
189. Operational security
D
Q3
Operations stuff is weighed off [well done] 
but the support side absolutely terrible. 
For example, making reports and returns.
1. Reports and returns 190. Management
E
Q3
How the information is held, including 
spread sheets; there is no compatibility 
and different formats. It is the same 
information but people busy reformatting. 
The information should be available -  
most tools are geared up to top level 
management. As such, the resultant 
information is no use to Users.
1. Time wasted reformatting to 
satisfy different parts of the same 
organisation
191. Needs one source of truth
F
Q4
Haphazard, haphazard and haphazard; I 
refer back to my previous answer!
1. Haphazard
2. Haphazard
3. Haphazard
192. Information management
193. Information exploitation
G
Q5
Information is an important asset, but it 
depends on which level of the 
organisation you talk about. At higher 
levels it is very important; lower down not 
cognisant of what information means. 
People are not trained
1. Information is an asset
2. Awareness of information as an 
asset varies across the 
organisation
194. Information as asset
195. Awareness
H
Q6
There has been a bit of a shift. IA, in my 
view, completely focused on not getting it 
-  the need to know. Showing signs of 
making sure getting it -  the need to share. 
Poor on making sure information accurate 
and correct. Big factor of not managing it 
well.
1. Returned to an earlier 
paradigm, need to know, because 
of data losses
2. Starting to settle back into need 
to share
3. Issues with information 
management
196. Need to know v need to 
share
197. Information management
I
Q7
As it stands from a support point of view 
and the way they operate or organised -  if 
IT stops then everything stops. Ships don’t 
sail, helicopters don’t fly. IA processes 
should have allowed continuity -  having 
the right fall-backs -  but we have lost the 
knack. IA is ignored, not trained, not 
exercised.
1. IT critical for all operations
2. Lack of fall-back capability
3. Lack of contingency plans
4. Lack of IA awareness and 
understanding
5. Lack of training
6. RN does not practice for 
working without IT
198. Dependence on IT
199. Fall-back
200. Contingency
201. Awareness and 
understanding
202. Training
203. Exercise
g
c
_
00
MT WAN etc. will give more access points 
and lead to more complexity. Difficult to 
co-ordinate encryption key handling. IP 
crypto may help. In a  maritime 
environment [IP crypto] by 2012 perhaps 
further.
1. Greater complexity of 
connections and poor working 
practice will worsen the situation
2. Traditional cryptographic 
methods too expensive and 
complex for international network 
working
204. Technical complexity
205. Multiple unguarded access 
points
206. Key distribution
K
Q8
Complete integration into Dll. You cannot 
use it for what you need it for. New  
vulnerabilities to Centre. Single point of 
failure.
1. Ubiquitous network
2. Impact of non-availability
3. New vulnerabilities not 
accounted for
4. Single point of failure
207. Ubiquitous network
208. Impact of non-availability
209. New vulnerabilities not 
accounted for
210. Single point of failure
Continued ....
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ENG1
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of maritime environment and ICT 
security
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
Q9 Omitted because of time constraint
L
Q10
Yes, training is a huge issue. W e are 
trying to improve.
1. Issues with security training
2. Plans in place to improve
211. Security training
M
Q10
The other problem is without knowledge of 
security there is little control. For example, 
to improve welfare connectivity a local 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) was used 
to set up a ‘hot spot’ on board a ship. This 
shows a lack of understanding at the 
command level’
1. Lack of awareness of security 
issues and likely outcomes of 
incidents
212. Lack of security awareness
N
Q11
So difficult and linked to previous answer. 
Without training and understanding you 
have to lock down which stops business. 
Risk -  with a  lack of understanding you 
cannot take risks.
1. Link between security 
awareness and risk management
213. Lack of security awareness
214. Risk management
Q12, 
Q 13 and 
Q14
Omitted because of time constraint
0
Q15
They must be a bit different. It depends; I 
would expect physical security would be 
better and in electronic environment as 
well. An attack would be fairly expensive 
so you would need to be a capable 
adversary. More likely to look for a 
cheaper option.
1. At sea, likely that physical and 
virtual environments safer
2. Too expensive to attack
3. Would require capable 
adversary
4. Adversary would look for 
cheaper option
215. Safer at sea
216. Capable adversary
P
Q16
There seems to be an appetite to move 
towards commercial services and virtual 
private networks. This forces costs down 
but will change the threat. Sharing 
communications networks with 
commercial increases the threat.
1. Contracting out network and 
other sen/ices
2. Reduces costs
3. Changes threat
4. Network shared with 
commercial organisations
217. Contracting out
218. Costs
219. Changes threat
220. Changes vulnerability
Q
Q16
Could lead to denial of sen/ice if this 
becomes primary means. W e would 
defend the traffic but not the service 
provider. W e are not training or exercising 
this scenario [denied civil 
communications].
1. Network provider lies outside 
the ‘umbrella’ of military protection
2. Traffic stream may be 
encrypted but what if service 
provide under attack?
3. Lack of understanding of this 
problem
221. Threat to service provider
222. Co-operation between 
military and service 
providers
R
Q17
Yes, probably can use commercial 
methodologies although there are 
nuances and slight differences. Availability 
of bandwidth connectivity which limits how 
well you can assure your information. W e  
have a resynchronisation and trust 
requirements -  is this the entity you want 
to talk to?
1. Lessons from land environment 
could be applied afloat
2. Bandwidth restrictions apply to 
security
3. Establishing cyber trust
223. Lessons from ashore
224. Bandwidth
225. Cyber trust
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ENG1: Summary of initial analysis
ENG1 Category
Environment
Critical assets
Outcomes
People’s security behaviour
Technology
Sources of threats
Organisation’s security culture
Attributes
Internal information exchange 
Duplication of effort 
Operational security 
Management 
Needs one source of truth 
Awareness and understanding 
Security awareness 
Training
Command and control
Lessons from ashore
Security training
Lack of security awareness
Risk management
Contingency documents
Costs
Co-operation between military and service providers
Need to know v need to share
Information management
Contingency
Exercise
Information exploitation
Bandwidth 
Safer at sea
Single point of failure
Bandwidth
Cyber trust
Stove pipe v shared
Technical complexity
Multiple unguarded access points
Cryptographic key distribution
New vulnerabilities not accounted for
Mobility
Needs one source of truth 
Information as asset
Contracting out 
Safer at sea 
Capable adversary 
Ubiquitous network 
Threat to service provider 
Dependence on IT 
Fall-back
Impact of non-availability
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ENG2 24th June 2009
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of ICT security in a maritime 
environment
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
It is different but getting closer in that 
technology available ashore is now more 
accessible on ships.
1. Technology convergence 226. Technology convergence
B
Q2
For example, in 1984 in the Falklands I 
could make an HF radio telephone call to 
talk to my wife. In 2004 In HMS Invincible, 
I could ring direct, browse the internet and 
watch satellite TV  in my cabin.
1. IP voice and data services now 
permit communications which are 
similar to those available in the 
land environment
227. IP technology
C
Q3
Commercial gain can be obtained from 
knowing where your competitor’s ships 
are. I understand that certain commercial 
companies are turning off their AIS. This is 
allowed in high threat areas.
1. Location tracking used by the 
ill-disposed to gain advantage
2. Rules can be held in abeyance 
in high threat areas
228. AIS
229. Security v operations
D
Q3
Access to the Internet helps in disaster 
relief. For example, unclassified satellite 
pictures of earthquakes are used to help 
understand a situation. AIS will identify 
what ship is where and give an 
INMARSAT number if fitted.
1. Access to Internet technology 
helps military vessels to take part 
in relief operations involving 
government and commercial 
organisations
230. Location tracking
231. Disaster support
E
Q3
In 2005 an RN helicopter ditched in the 
Gulf. W e were not close but we were able 
to use AIS and INMARSAT to coordinate 
the rescue using AIS data.
1. An example of commercial 
location tracking used to help 
military operation
232. Location tracking
F
Q3
Telemedicine is now more robust and we 
make regular reports to the Met office. 
This may be automatic.
1. Medical emergencies
2. W eather reports
233. Medical
234. Situational awareness
Q 4 Omitted because of time overrun on Q3
G
Q5
Information as an asset is essential, from 
running an organisation through to battle 
winning advantage.
1. Information essential across all 
parts of an organisations to enable 
its activities
235. Information essential
H
Q5
W e are trying to get our arms around it. 
Information management is hugely 
difficult, time consuming and expensive. 
W e are moving into IM but not necessarily 
achieving information exploitation.
1. Scope of the problem not fully 
understood
2. Time consuming and expensive
3. Getting better at information 
management but not how to put 
information to good use
236. Scope of problem
237. Takes time
238. Takes money
239. Information management
240. Information exploitation
I
Q6
The information assurance problem area  
was relatively small. The Burton and 
Hannigan reports cover everything, and 
we trying to do all recommendations at 
once. This will take a  lot of time and effort 
to make successful.
1. Sledge hammer to crack a 
walnut
2. Time consuming
3. Lot of effort required
241. Over-reaction
242. Takes time
243. Takes effort
J
Q7
Very serious impact. At worst huge impact 
on UK and world economy. You can think 
of a big merchant ship losing 
communications may not be so serious -  
losing control of machinery mid Atlantic? 
An EM [electromagnetic] pulse could lead 
to economic meltdown. It is possible to 
jam GPS [Global Position System] 
satellites and these satellites are due to 
fall out of the sky in 10 years.
1. Very serious impact across the 
world
2. Outcome location dependant
3. GPS jamming
244. Very serious impact
245. Outcome location 
dependant
246. Jamming
247. Situational awareness
Q8 Covered in by response to Q7
K
Q9
W e use firewalls shore side. Seen from a 
Merchant Navy perspective even with 
firewalls what happens when the Chief 
Engineer downloads a virus which stops 
the ship.
1. Technical solutions shore side 
can be transparent to users. 
However, when afloat the same 
transparency may not be possible
248. Insider threat
175
Data
block
and
question
Interview ee's opinions  
o f IC T security in a m aritim e  
environm ent
R esearcher’s interpretation o f 
in terview ee’s opinions
R esearch code
L
Q10
A major cause. People told not to put 
dongle into machines but it still happens. 
There have been examples where ship's 
staff have upload virus using their own 
memory devices. There is a  lack of 
understanding and training which leads to 
this sort of thing.
1. Users use un-authorised IT in 
official equipment.
2. Accidental or deliberate 
uploading of malicious software
3. Lack of security awareness
249. Insider threat
250. Malicious software
251. Lack of security awareness
M
Q11
At sea you do what you need to do. 
Although we have non-operational 
systems at sea they can be critical. Shore 
side can afford to be less resilient. 
Potentially accepting cumulative risk is 
increasing our vulnerability.
1. May have to bend the rules
2. Even IT which may not be 
considered as critical has a role to 
play
3. Cumulative risk is a  bad idea
252. Bend rules
253. All equipment critical
254. Cumulative risk
N
Q12
Potentially risk on risk increasing 
vulnerability.
1. Cumulative risk increasing 
vulnerability
255. Cumulative risk
Q 13 and 
Q14
Omitted because of time constraint
0
Q15
W e are always playing catch up with 
technology; it is difficult to play catch up 
because of the rate of change. Simon 
Singh talks about this in his book [The 
Code Book].
1. IT tends towards rapid 
obsolesce
2. Tend to react rather than being 
pro-active
256. Rapid obsolescence
257. Reactive
258. Proactive
Q 16 and 
Q17
Omitted because of time constraint
ENG2: Summary of initial analysis
ENG2 | Category Attributes
People’s security behaviour Insider’s security behaviour
Lack of security awareness
Bend rules
Organisation’s security culture Cumulative risk
Reactive v proactive
Security v operations
Scope of problem
Takes time
Takes money
Information management
Information exploitation
Over reaction to security incidents
Environment Situational awarenessDisaster support
Technology Rapid obsolescence
Technology convergence
IP technology
Critical assets All equipment critical
Medical
Information essential
Sources of threats Insider threat
Malicious software
Location tracking 
AIS
Location tracking 
Jamming
Outcomes Very serious impact
Outcome location dependant
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Interviewee's opinions 
of ICT security in a maritime 
environment
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
Yes it does. The challenges are the 
independent nature of a  maritime unit and 
connectivity. For example, submarines 
and the intermittent nature of that 
connectivity. In terms of information 
assurance I am not sure if it is different 
working in an office or in a ship. 
Information assurance applies across the 
board. Connectivity and bandwidth restrict 
use.
1. Ship’s crews have been used to 
a high level of autonomy once 
away from shore.
2. New technology reduces this 
autonomy to a certain extent
3. Submarines still display some 
of the characteristics of pre­
broadband due to their operating 
environment
4. Even so, limited IT and 
bandwidth still cause issues
259. Change in operating rules
260. Reduced autonomy
261. Environmental conditions
262. Limited IT available
263. Bandwidth constraints
B
Q2
Using it more now than when I was last at 
sea. I think contacting land or civilian 
environment will not have changed as 
much as you would expect. More 
sophisticated than in the past but not as 
significantly as in other areas due to 
constraints -  bandwidth and connectivity. 
There is a  greater use of data 
transmission compared to several years 
ago.
1. More use on-board because of 
improved capability
2. Ship to shore connectivity still 
an issue
3. More use being made of IP data 
connections
264. Expectations of IT
265. Connectivity issues
266. New ways of working
C
Q3
To a large extent it is critical to maritime 
activity in both non-military and military 
contexts. Not least by the nature of the 
technology available to the RN. Ultimately, 
using technology will become smarter and 
potentially reduce the number of units to 
achieve the same effect. This could apply 
to wider maritime, for example deep sea 
fishing.
1. IT critical
2. Automation needs fewer units 
to achieve the same aim
267. IT Critical
268. Automation
D
Q4
RN information management is inefficient 
with too much none-targeted information. 
The information management organisation 
on-board is undergoing re-organisation 
ahead of Information Assurance Maturity 
Model, which is HM G’s response to the 
data loses in 2007/2008.
1. Inefficient
2. Non targeted information 
means push everything and hope 
something sticks
269. Information management
270. Information exploitation
E
Q5
Viewed from hierarchy perspective then 
going that way; taking organisation as a 
whole then not so much.
1. Senior management starting to
2. Overall, not so much
271. Information management
272. Changing people’s security 
practices
F
Q6
Well, the establishment of the MODUK  
Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the re- 
brigading of the Director General 
Information (DGInfo) suggest hierarchy 
are trying to take information seriously.
For the RN, the designation of DCinC as 
CIO suggests the same. Also SIO  is now 
the senior risk owner.
1. Reorganisation of 
responsibilities following security 
incidents
273. Organisation’s response to 
incidents
G
Q6
For on-board governance, the First 
Lieutenant (XO) is now the SIO. He was 
the Unit Security officer (USO) under the 
old security regime. This change is 
happening ahead of IAMM changes.
1. Reorganisation of 
responsibilities following security 
incidents
274. Organisation’s response to 
incidents
H
Q7
There is potential to downgrade our 
capability significantly risk over reliance 
[on new technology]. W e have legacy fall­
back to signal traffic that we won’t have in 
future. Some ways we work now were not 
allowed in the past [joint operations]. This 
is situation dependant for example, if you 
are acting as a private ship, as part of a 
task force or on joint operations such as 
anti-piracy. Increasingly, the impact will 
become more severe as more 
dependence and will depend on folding in 
command systems and data link pictures.
1. Over reliance on IT increase 
vulnerability.
2. No fall-back
3. Dependency depends upon 
prevailing conditions and 
circumstances
4. Impact and outcome will be 
more severe
275. Over reliance
276. No fall-back
277. No contingency plans
278. Impact and outcome 
situation dependant
Continued ....
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I
Q8
Only by virtue of the growth in the use. 
The IA age there is more ability to do 
network attack. It’s worth enemy investing 
in attack capability. As we advance we try 
to address were we can. Possibly 
architecture having a clear blue print for 
the connections. Not having full handle so 
need to map the architecture and 
subsequently configure.
1. Network vulnerability will 
increase
2. Ill-disposed may invest more in 
their own capability
3. Do not understand the extent of 
the virtual problem
279. Network vulnerability will 
increase
280. Ill-disposed may invest 
more in their own capability
281. Do not understand the 
extent of the virtual 
problem
J
Q9
The MODUK does not have a map of IT 
architecture being deployed and this 
makes management and defence of the 
networks inefficient.
1. Scale of problem not 
understood
282. Scale of problem not 
understood
K
Q9
I am not sighted on MODUK disaster 
recovery. In the RN we use ‘belt and 
braces’ to make resilience. So we do not 
plan for recovery. A [civilian] business 
model would not invest in that way but 
would have more disaster recovery 
planning’. W e float move fight the 
information system.
1. RN plan to avoid the need for 
disaster recovery by using 
massive resilience.
283. Disaster recovery
284. Resilience
L
Q9
In submarines everything is about 
resilience. The trade-off is between safe 
and exploit.
1. Resilience 285. Resilience
M
Q9
Stove pipe could lose the war. Timeliness 
of information is critical - it is more 
important to get the information and 
accept the risk. There has to be 
compromise.
1. Security risk v operational risk
2. Compromise between the two
286. Security risk v operational 
risk
287. Compromise
N
Q10
Not entirely sure it is. Carelessness is 
simpler [easier] than security. The loss of 
information is due to carelessness and the 
lack of appreciation just how easy it is to 
lose information. For example, compare a 
‘memory stick’ to an office full of files.
1. It is easier to take short cuts 
than it is to spend time applying 
security principles
2. A memory device can hold a 
library full of information. In the old 
days you would have had to break 
into an office and open a filing 
cabinet to have access to a small 
fraction of the information.
288. Education may be ok
289. People’s security behaviour
290. Virtual data composite
291. Scale of the problem
0
Q11
W e will be seeing responsibility pushed 
down to lower levels. CO and XO will 
carry more responsibility. That’s the way 
the IA is being focused. Directing risk 
management policy and enacting at lower 
levels leading to more work for individuals. 
The situation could be mitigated by the 
single Defence infrastructure; reduce 
having to move things about.
1. Increased security responsibility 
leads to more work for all
292. Security workload
Q12 Omitted because ENG3 not sited on the topic
P
Q13 and 
Q14
There are software tools such as 
sanctuary software (tie down). Utilise 
technology to implement policy -  take the 
burden off individuals.
1. Make better use of security 
software to reduce work load
293. Security workload
Q
Q15
Increasing reliance on commercial 
services such as Airwaves; the possibility 
of 'Jamming'; single points of failure; and 
the limited number of satellites; in a land 
environment you have alternative paths.
1. Reliance on outsourcing
2. Single point of failure
3. No alternative connectivity
294. Outsourcing
295. Single point of failure
296. Alternative routing
R
Q15
A ship has a certain security that land 
environments don’t have.
1. Physically secure box at sea 297. Physical security
S
Q16
The spread of network capability means 
threat not new -  threats increase. Enemy 
looks for vulnerabilities particularly in 
terms of unclassified systems.
1. Threats not new
2. Ill-disposed probe for 
vulnerabilities which do change
298. Threats are threats
299. Vulnerabilities change
Q17 Omitted because of time constraints
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ENG3: Summary of initial analysis
CategoryENG3
Sources of threats
Organisation’s security culture
Outcomes
Technology
People’s security behaviour
Environment
Critical assets
Attributes
Reduced autonomy 
Expectations of IT 
New ways of working
Do not understand the extent of the virtual problem 
Changing people’s security practices 
People’s security behaviour 
Security workload 
Security education
Outsourcing
Scale of the problem not understood 
Information management 
Information exploitation 
Organisation’s response to incidents 
Change in operating rules 
Disaster recovery 
Security risk v operational risk
Environmental conditions 
Bandwidth constraints
Single point of failure 
No alternative routing 
Threats are threats 
Vulnerabilities change 
Physical security 
Limited IT available 
Connectivity issues
IT Critical
Automation
Resilience
Network vulnerability will increase
Ill-disposed may invest more in their own capability
Over reliance
No fall-back
No contingency plans
Impact and outcome situation dependant
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A
Q1
There are a  lot of different challenges not 
seen alongside. W e have long 
deployments and limited communications. 
Obtaining information to keep the 
business informed can be difficult at times. 
It is a unique environment. The working 
patterns are irregular. For example, you 
can be working full on and then alongside 
with little time off. Exercises present 
problems of endurance. W e have long 
days at sea. As a Weapons Electrical 
Officer I could be up at 0800 and not finish 
until 2300. It’s not friendly -  noise and so 
on.
1. Peoples working conditions 
away from home for extended 
periods
2. Limited connectivity
3. Irregular working patterns
4. Exercise to extremes to test 
and maintain operational 
capability
5. Noisy environment
300. Working conditions
301. Limits with IT connectivity
302. Irregular working patterns
303. Extreme operational 
exercises
304. Noisy conditions
B
Q2
The bulk of routine business is conducted 
on IT. W e no longer use physical 
communications. For example, in this job I 
have had one written letter and this 
represents what has happened at sea. 
Since late 90s we have used attachments 
or even just text in e-mails. Information is 
only on line.
1. Depend on IT for routine 
business
305. Dependence on IT
C
Q2
Many reference documents are easier to 
get to. The electronic versions are more 
up to date. The physical distribution 
services are now gone. So, many 
publications are not available. The whole 
(RN) world is centred on information 
systems.
1. Electronic reference material 
only
2. Not always available
3. Physical distribution stopped 
which means local paper copies 
have to be produced and kept up 
to date.
306. Electronic reference 
material
307. Updates
308. Paper backup
D
Q3
As above; critical. W e made our way 
across into information working several 
years ago and cannot go back. Ten years 
ago we had difficulties with feed interrupts. 
W e still have feed interrupts but the 
software now takes account of shortfalls.
1. Critical
2. Transition to electronic ways of 
working irreversible
3. Software can compensate for 
interruptions to service
309. New working practice
E
Q4
Information is fundamental to doing 
business. [Also] Inconsistent, it is 
frequently difficult to find a unique single 
source of truth. There are multiple 
information sources which are not 
consistent. W e (C4ISTAR and HQ) have 
many Campaign Plans for example. They 
are not co-ordinated and often at odds. 
[Finally] Incoherent, coupled with the 
inconsistency means we do not see good 
practice which leads to an inconsistent 
approach. This leads to hard work for 
people.
1. Fundamental
2. Inconsistent 
3 . Incoherent
310. Information management
311. Single source of truth
312. Security practice
F
Q5
Not enough value placed on good 
information and this is not understood. For 
example, looking at encyclopaedic data, 
systems need this information for 
business processes and as data to 
process. Missing or low quality data leads 
to poor output. Not sure if others (RN) 
understand this concept. W e create 
mountains of data which is useless. Again 
the Campaign Plan is an example.
1. Awareness of security practice
2. Quality and availability of data
313. Security awareness
314. Integrity
315. Availability
G
Q6
There has been fallout from Burton and 
Hannigan. There are now tighter 
procedures for handling and carrying data. 
Security measures are enforced to stop 
data leaving secure areas.
1. Management reaction to 
security incidents
2. Changing secure working 
practice
316. Reaction to incidents
317. Changing people’s security 
behaviour
Continued ....
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H
Q7
It can be devastating really. In 2000 -2002 
we set up CSS. Within a short time ships 
became dependent. If you have a server 
crash or lose connectivity then it takes 
time to get back into old ways of working. 
This can lead to User frustration and lost 
key information for making decisions and 
blind to background material.
1. Rapidly became dependent on 
IT
2. Causes frustration when not 
available
3. No real alternative
4. Can lead to loss of information
318. Dependence on IT
319. Users expectations
320. Single point of failure
321. Loss of integrity
I
Q8
Without data, the business process would 
not go on. It would take longer to do 
things. Reverting to formal messaging 
would be a nightmare. W e are building in 
firewalls and constraints, limiting file type 
transfers and harmful packages. But in 
coalition there must be a  balance between 
security and openness.
1. Interruption to data flow would 
cause operational problems
2. Balance needed between need 
to know and need to share
322. Interruption
323. Need to know v need to 
share
J
Q9
Predominately risk based approach to 
systems and day to day information they 
contain. It can be erratic and can slow 
down the speed of progress when trying to 
get new systems etc. However, there are 
good reasons for doing it. For example, 
the RN Command Support System (CSS) 
followed accreditation procedure but not 
when operational. Playing lip service to 
security measures runs the risk of 
completely corrupting the operation.
1. Risk management v risk 
avoidance
2. Former needed latter can lead 
to delays
3. Accreditation process followed 
for procurement of CSS. Now that 
it is operational, security is 
processes are not being enforced.
324. Risk management v risk 
avoidance
325. Accreditation rules
326. Operational security
K
Q10
The CSS [Command Support System] 
requirement was defined as a closed 
system in the late 1980s then as it 
became operational more and more 
connections were needed. In the original 
design, nobody considered that file 
transfer would be needed. But now we 
have User error transferring file from new 
server system. CSS Security Operating 
Procedures (SyOps) would have 
prevented this in the old days but new 
design for flexibility not locked down.
1. Impact of connecting disparate 
systems not understood
2. The need for flexibility can be 
used as an excuse to override 
security processes
327. Accreditation
328. Operations v security
L
Q10
Security training poor from both an 
information systems and information 
technology view point. I recently 
completed an information assurance 
course. Otherwise I have no formal 
training. I have never been an IT Security 
Officer (ITSO) although I have had ITSOs 
working for me. With only a few hours 
training I have to read books to catch up. I 
have had jobs where I should have known 
more but never received training. W e  
seem to rely on expensive gurus now!
1. Security training for systems 
and information is poor
2. IT security officer can be a  
second or third job
3. Outsourcing
329. Training
330. People
331. Outsourcing
M
Q11
It will largely track policy and plans for 
fixed architecture. This presents problems 
in the working environment. One of the 
problems is the accreditation for combat 
systems. W e have to apply information 
systems accreditation to combat and 
legacy systems interactions.
1. Accreditation process 332. Accreditation
Continued ....
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Q11, 
Q12, 
Q13 and 
Q14
Omitted because of time constraint
N
Q15
It’s not really different, in fact not so many 
points of penetration. W e have good 
protection and radio encryption.
1. Points of penetration (physical 
boundary around the hull).
2. Radio encryption
333. Physical security
334. Radio encryption
Q16 Omitted because of time constraint
0
Q17
The speed of change is so great. The big 
problem is that we are the poor cousins in 
terms of bandwidth and most information 
systems take little consideration of 
bandwidth [e.g. synchronous v IP].
1. Rapid time scales
2. Poor bandwidth
3. Applications can be network 
heavy
335. Time scales
336. Bandwidth
337. Network heavy
P
Q17
At home you can expect broadband and 
more. On-board ship there is a single 
input path, which is expensive, technically 
limited and so we are constrained.
1. Ship radio connectivity 
expensive and technically limited
338. Radio links expensive
Q
Q17
W e must concentrate on bandwidth 
efficiency to make (maritime) solutions 
useable.
1. Need to improve modulation 
and compression techniques
339. Modulation and 
compression
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ENG4: Summary of initial analysis
ENG4 1 Category
People’s security behaviour
Organisation’s security culture
Environment
Technology
Critical assets
Sources of threats
Outcomes
Attributes
Working conditions
Irregular working patterns
Extreme operational exercises
Noisy conditions
New working practice
Security practice
Security awareness
Changing people’s security behaviour
Users expectations
Security training
Dependence on IT 
Information management 
Reaction to incidents 
Need to know v need to share 
Risk management v risk avoidance 
Accreditation rules 
Operational security 
Outsourcing
Time scales 
Bandwidth
Limits with IT connectivity 
Dependence on IT 
Single point of failure 
Applications that are network heavy 
Radio links expensive 
Modulation and compression
Electronic reference material 
Updates 
Paper backup 
Single source of truth
CIA v DAD
Service interruption 
Loss of CIA leading to DAD
CIS1 26th August 2009
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of ICT security in a maritime 
environment
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
A
Q1
Undoubtedly yes. The environment in 
terms of its hostility both the enemy and 
also the elements. Predominately, in my 
area of business, it is the limited 
bandwidth which presents a  constraint 
which is not frequently remembered with 
ease by those within the wider 
communications C4 [Command, Control, 
Communications and Computers] 
community.
1. Hostile enemy
2. Hostile elements
3. Bandwidth constraint
4. Those working in land 
environment not always 
aware of limitations with ship 
to shore communications
340. Environment - enemy
341. Environment -  elements
342. Bandwidth
343. IT limitations
B
Q2
Personally? I think the breed of ‘Luddites’ 
have gone and I think, in the main, there 
is a  universal recognition that information 
technology is your life blood. The linkage 
is to decision superiority, which is 
ultimately what senior officers at sea are 
there to do; not to be managers but to 
make decisions.
1. Lifeblood
2. Information for management
3. Information for decisions
344. Lifeblood
345. Information for 
management
346. Information for decisions
°o
Decisions are completely dependent on 
good information and therefore the 
realisation is that one needs to assimilate 
as much relevant information as possible 
and that therein lies the challenge of 
information management, to ensure that 
Commanding Officers brains are not be 
befuddled with a  lot of material that is not 
relevant. So, I suppose the short answer 
is that I would be totally reliant upon IT.
1. Quality of information
2. Information management
3. Totally reliant on IT
347. Quality of information
348. Information management
349. Totally reliant on IT
D
Additional
question
1
How do you think this will evolve?
I think it will clearly grow the ability for 
external micro management and will drive 
the need for ships at sea to provide more 
information ashore to spread local 
situational awareness and to contribute to 
the wider picture. But the evolution that 
must take place is that proliferation of 
information will drive the requirement for 
smarter information management and for 
the need for local specialists to provide 
that service of information management 
information packing; not necessarily 
producing information or using information 
but just ensuring that it is presented in the 
best way possible to enable it to be 
rapidly assimilated.
1. Spread of IT will enable micro­
management from ashore
2. Ship’s will provide information 
to improve situational awareness
3. Smarter information 
management
4. The need for local specialists to 
advise on information continuity 
and format
350. Command and control
351. Local responsibility v micro 
management
352. Information management
353. Information experts
E
Additional
question
1
Obviously, one of the evolutions is the 
significant change that we are trying to 
introduce in the naval intelligence 
capability where we believe we do need 
enduring specialists who can provide that 
service to the Command. The Command 
obviously needs to be hungrier for the 
products that sometimes they are 
unaware of. I think we recognise that 
intelligence is just a subset of information. 
It is special information that comes, often, 
from sensitive sources and comes with 
analysis. It still needs effective 
management.
1. Specialist information 
exploitation
2. New intelligence capability
354. Specialist information 
exploitation
Continued ....
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F
Additional
question
2
Do you foresee any barriers to achieving 
this evolution?
Yes, I think the technological barriers are 
falling. I think we are still significantly 
hampered at sea by bandwidth and the 
cost of it at the moment -  we live in austere 
times. Linked to that are the technologies 
that are in play frequently assume 
continual presence and high bandwidth 
which is not necessarily the case for 
warships and submarines that dive or ships 
that need to maintain EMCON silence.
1. Technological barriers are 
playing less of a role
2. Bandwidth
3. Service costs
4. Operating conditions and 
circumstances dictate how and 
when IT can be used
355. Technological barriers
356. Bandwidth
357. Outsourcing
358. Security v operations
G
Additional
question
2
The major barriers, I know, are cultural and 
it is maintaining the risk balance between 
the benefits of sharing and the risks of 
inappropriate sharing or operational 
compromising of operational security.
1. Cultural
2. Maintaining balance between 
need to share and need to know
359. Cultural barriers
360. Need to share v need to 
know
H
Q3
As ever it is fundamental. Historically, the 
sparsity or the limitations of 
communications technology have 
encouraged, or fostered, a  degree of 
independence which has been cherished 
by mariners. Some would say that, 
unfortunately, technology has begun to 
erode that. But never the less I think that 
the senior management within the Navy, at 
the moment, still fosters that independence 
of Command thought; I think so as to 
ensure that there is not an over reliance on 
communications which have that ability to 
micro manaqe from shore.
1. Autonomy v micro-management
2. Loss of autonomy due to better 
connectivity
3. Must not let IT erode command 
and control
361. Autonomy v micro­
management
I
Q3
Though technically feasible and tempting, it 
is not 100% assured and therefore for 
resilience purposes it makes a lot of sense. 
It is predominately our main 
communications pipe which is the external 
stimulus that would otherwise make our life 
at sea very insular.
1. Continuous links to shore would 
be very expensive and not always 
possible
2. IT used as an impetus for 
improving ways of working
362. Ways of working
J
Q4
I could be flippant and say chaotic! It is 
certainly sub-optimal. It is incoherent and 
aspirational. There is a huge desire to do 
better. I think that there is a realisation that 
we could do a whole lot better. So, the 
aspiration is there and people would like to 
do better.
1. Chaotic -  not as good as it 
could be
2. Incoherent
3. Aspirational
363. Ways of working
K
Q5
Yes, but, it does not often behave as if it 
truly recognises its importance. I would say 
that, particularly in this headquarters 
organisation and I think that you could 
extend it to the wider Navy in most 
instances, we are information management 
organisations. W hen you ask us what we 
do, people will talk about generating force 
elements at readiness.
1. Importance of information 
recognised
364. Information management
365. Information for operations 
support
Continued ....
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L
Q5
W e don’t, we take information in and we 
generate information out which others act 
on. That is what actually results in those 
hard outputs. The vast majority of this 
headquarters outputs and inputs are 
information. So yes; we have got the 
previous First Sea Lord to state, in some 
of the documentation associated with our 
new information governance and 
structures, that information is the life 
blood of the Royal Navy. W e cannot do 
anything without good information on 
which to base our decisions and actions.
1. Information management
2. Information governance
3. Information for decisions and 
actions
366. Information management
367. Information governance
368. Information for decisions 
and actions
M
Q5
I hope the answer to ‘how does the 
organisation protect information’ is, in a 
structured way recognising the differences 
between physical security and ‘cyber1 
security; but clearly the latter is evolving.
1. Cyber security is evolving 369. Cyber security
N
Q5
In governance terms we are challenged 
by the fact that our key elements of 
information and knowledge, that we wish 
to protect, are increasingly held in 
electronic form and the current ‘flavour1 of 
our protection regime is very much 
centred on recent, very public, breaches 
of personnel data. Therefore, the 
pendulum has swung back towards the 
‘need to know1 and a focus on protecting 
information and not sharing, rather than 
deriving the benefits of sharing. There are 
a range of publications, such as JSP 440, 
and others which we use for guidance on 
a daily basis.
1. Information and knowledge 
base held in electronic form
2. Need to know taking 
precedence over need to share as 
a response to security incidents
370. Need to protect electronic 
environment
371. Management reaction to 
security incidents
0
Additional
question
3
How effective are these publications?
They are not as effective as they could be 
because they largely don’t address the 
cultural aspect which is where we need to 
work. 1 suppose in terms of approach we 
are trying to use a risk management 
approach which should mean that those 
involved in aspects such as accreditation 
are not actually empowered to say no. All 
they can do is arm the decider with the 
information as to the risk.
1. Security rules and guidelines do 
not address the cultural aspects
2. Accreditors need authority to 
act
372. Security culture
373. Accreditation
P
Additional
question
3
1 think that one of the key issues at the 
moment, in a  risk based approach, is 
trying to identify who the risk owner is and 
increasingly as our networks proliferate 
and become entwined, those who might 
have thought they were empowered to 
take an information risk may be 
jeopardising an entire network and 
therefore they are not. The key challenge 
is to work out who is empowered to 
accept risk.
1. Need to identify the owner of 
the security risk in situations 
where networks become 
interconnected
374. Risker owner
Continued ... .
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Q
Additional
question
3
A  strand of that answer ‘how do we do it’ 
is also, not as well as we could or should 
and that is based, primarily, on our 
inability to know what it is we have got to 
protect. The issue, again on the personnel 
data front, is compiling an information 
asset register, and this information asset 
terminology ostensively applies to all 
information assets; but we still really 
cannot get a crisp definition of what an 
information asset is.
1. Do not understand the sale of 
the problem
2. W hat is an information asset?
375. Scale of the problem
376. Information as asset
R
Additional
question
3
By inference, if it isn’t an information asset 
then it is an information liability you should 
probably get rid of. The thinking is, 
predominately, that an information asset 
is a key element of information that 
underpins any process within Defence 
and therefore it is the process owner who 
is in a position to decide what constitutes 
an information asset and how it is to be 
controlled. That thought process is 
leading onto the next question.
1. If information is not an asset 
then it is a  liability
2. Information owner
377. Information as asset
378. Information owner
J
Q6
Information Assurance has changed 
rapidly in the last few months as a result 
of responding to the public data losses 
and the Information Commissioner 
effectively putting the MODUK on 
quarterly report. The change has primarily 
been to a  reactive stance closing off 
weaknesses that have been identified by 
Sir Edmund Burton and the Data Handling 
Review. W e have yet to move to the more 
proactive stance.
1. HMG undertaking close scrutiny 
of MODUK because of data 
losses
2. Move from reactive to proactive 
security stance
379. Management response to 
incidents
380. Reactive v proactive 
security
K
Q6
Key amongst the changes is a  new 
lexicon, including new titles, provided to 
us by the Cabinet Office and a new  
governance structure that we have had to 
stand up within the Naval Service. This 
has switched the focus of senior level 
information risk ownership and 
management from ACNS who was the 
titular Chief Information Officer, it was 
largely titular, down to this headquarters 
and to anointing DCINC as the Command 
Information Officer and Senior Information 
Risk Owner. Primarily because, as Chief 
of Staff for the headquarters, he is best 
placed to pull the levers that would get 
things done.
1. New job titles
2. New security responsibilities
381. Management response to 
incidents
L
Q6
There have been a lot of changes and a 
number of them have been less than 
coherent. Perhaps some of them are 
somewhat reactive with Cabinet Office 
directives being passed on from the 
Centre to TLBs without necessarily any 
sort of value being added in terms of the 
applicability or implement-ability of some 
of these directives.
1. Change has not been for the 
better
2. Cannot apply all the new 
security requirements in all 
situations
382. Change not thought 
through
Continued ....
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Is this a barrier to achieving future 
success if we are struggling with this at 
this stage, when we get Network Enabled 
Capability is it going to get worse?
M
Additional
question
4
No I do not think so. It has got to get 
better it is so important. The focus for that 
improvement, which we have now been 
given, is the Information Assurance 
Maturity Model which is giving us a bench 
mark against which to compare ourselves 
and hopefully a  hit list on the road to 
improvement.
1. Changes must not be allowed 
to become barriers
2. Working towards improvement 
with IAMM as benchmarking toll
383. Security behaviour
N
Additional
question
4
So we have assessed ourselves against 
that pretty subjectively at the first pass 
and identified that we are at a low level, 
not at the bottom but low, and so an 
ambitious target has been set to get from 
level one to level three by 2012. That will 
be critically dependant, as ever, on 
resource; but key amongst that will be the 
cultural change programme which is 
where many of the failings against that 
maturity model are.
1. RN starting from low level but 
intend to improve rapidly
2. Cultural change programme
3. Improving security is resource 
dependant
384. Security behaviour
385. Cultural change
386. Resources
It has been suggested by other 
interviewees’ that the IAMM is an 
overreaction?
0
Additional
question
5
I think to a certain extent we needed 
those public losses, in a  way, as a 
wakeup call and a catalyst for the change 
which otherwise might have been so slow 
in coming that it would not have achieved 
the rapid results that hopefully we will now 
get and have always needed.
1. Incidents have forced change to 
take place
387. Security behaviour
388. Cultural change
P
Additional
question
5
Key amongst this is role out of Dll (F) as a 
ubiquitous infrastructure in Defence and 
our relative unpreparedness for that and 
the ability to exploit the benefits it should 
bring. In most instances, particularly in the 
circles I move in, we have been overly 
focused, necessarily so, on the technical 
aspects and have not been able to devote 
energy that we probably should have 
done to exploiting the benefits.
1. Ubiquitous infrastructure
2. Get the technology out there, 
then worry about how to use it 
was the wrong approach
389. Exploit the befits
Q
Additional
question
5
Our l-hub team down below, who were 
configured to take forward information 
exploitation initiatives across the TLB, 
have become almost exclusively involved 
in account management not just for the 
Dll role out but just with managing the day 
to day chum that results from normal 
appointing and organisational change 
which is endemic.
1. Information management team  
not being used to their full 
potential
390. Security behaviour
Continued . .. .
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R
Q7
Well, in part we in the Naval Service 
prepare for and train to cope with the loss 
of external connectivity. But within Units 
we are just so totally reliant on it for 
situational awareness and management 
of the platform
1. Practice loss of connectivity
2. Internal dependence absolute 
and loss of IT not practiced
391. Connectivity
392. Contingency
S
Q7
Examples being the conficker virus and 
the realisation that, though ostensively it 
was an operational support capability that 
was denied us, the boundary between 
operations and operations support is 
increasingly fuzzy and the realisation of 
Health and Safety implications. RFAs 
have their safety manuals resident on 
those systems. So, if they could not 
access them then, in theory, they could 
not go to sea. W e are dead in the water 
without the system.
1. Operations v operations 
support
2. Total dependence on the IT 
system
393. Boundaries of responsibility
394. Dependence on IT
T
Q8
Yes, increasingly our drive towards a 
ubiquitous network does make us a more 
attractive target and the potential for more 
significant impact if an adversary is 
successful. However, the counter 
argument is that it allows us to introduce 
more effective protection and awareness 
of our networks health and the attacks to 
it.
1. Ubiquitous network increases 
vulnerability
2. Increased vulnerability 
improves effort towards new 
understanding of the problems
395. Ubiquitous networks
396. Can have positive effect
U
Q9
That is certainly a  growth area. W e have 
within the Naval Service a W ARP, the 
Warning and Reporting Point which is 
within the bailiwick of PSyA; though 
increasingly the people there don’t have 
the level of skill to understand the 
messages they are passing on and very 
often they are shouting from the roof top 
not necessarily knowing who they are 
expecting to acknowledge it. That is why 
my team will become more involved.
1. The need for incident response 
capability
2. New skills needed
397. The need for incident 
response capability
398. New cyber security skills 
needed
Is there scope for a  Computer Emergency 
Response Team  on-board?
Is it worth having a  small team on-board?
V
Additional
question
6
In effect you do. The W eapon Engineering 
team hopefully have that expertise and 
are configured for battle damage repair. I 
think you are right that the cyber battle is 
continuous and spontaneous and 
therefore yes that battle damage repair 
team will have to acquire more of the skill 
sets which in part they have already got 
through the system engineering skills and 
their system management skills. It will 
need augmentation from shore. The first 
line of defence is system knowledge and 
maintaining the system at the correct 
patching state.
1. New cyber security skills need
2. Shore side support needed
3. Need to have intimate 
understanding of how IT works as 
a whole
399. New cyber security skills 
needed
400. Shore side support needed
401. Systems thinking
Continued ....
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W
Q10
It is primarily cultural. You should be 
aware that Permanent Undersecretary of 
State has directed that everybody in 
Defence, along with ail other Government 
Departments, is to receive some 
information security awareness training. 
The major focus is personnel data but not 
exclusively so.
1. Need to change security culture 
from top to bottom
2. Need security training and 
awareness from top to bottom
402. Security culture
403. Security training
404. Security awareness
X
Additional
question
7
Are you aware of any other issues that 
lead to security incidents?
There is the ill-disposed external attack; 
but I think by far the majority of security 
incidents are own goals. Now we rather 
more overtly talk about the fact that we 
not only do computer network defence but 
we have a latent computer network attack 
capability within Defence working on the 
premise that if we understand how we 
might attack other peoples systems we 
better understand how they might attack 
ours.
1. External attacks
2. Mostly internal problem
3. Network defence
4. Network attack
405. Attack population - external
406. Attack population -  internal
407. Network defence
408. Network attack
Y
Q11
I think it will, in the near term, continue to 
be seen as an N6 [CIS Division] function 
and that the focus will be on technology 
and accreditation. My fond hope is that 
increasingly it will become an N3 N5 
function. I see your question relates to IT 
risk, but I would say it is information risk 
where there is a better understanding of 
process and process ownership and 
therefore who is empowered to manage 
risk, decide ‘what are your key assets to 
be protected’ and developing a proper risk 
management approach rather than an ad 
hoc one.
1. Short term focus will continue to 
be technology and accreditation
2. Longer term, personal 
awareness and intelligence will 
become imbedded in the security 
mix
3. Information risk involves 
process and process ownership 
so that the right people can make 
the right decisions based on 
accurate information
409. Accreditation
410. Imbedded security 
awareness
411. Information risk 
management
Z
Q12
Yes that is true. To a certain extent our 
weakness or exposure to the conficker 
virus was in part that sort of decision. 
Those systems that we had hoped would 
be replaced by new, where still in 
existence and the cost of testing and 
applying patches was a factor in the delay 
in their implementation thereby leaving us 
exposed to a weakness.
1. The risk involved with running 
on obsolete systems causing 
problems
412. Obsolete technology
413. Cumulative risk
AA
Q12
I think the challenge, in the context of 
cumulative risk, is ensuring that in our 
approach to the governance of 
information risk that the right person is 
identified to track and assess that 
cumulative risk. There may be a number 
of people that are aware of elements of 
risk but in the new information risk 
management approach, and it is one of 
my new roles, potentially, as the Senior 
Information Risk Owners Information Risk 
Manager to try and expose to him what 
that cumulative risk might be and that it is 
identified in the first place.
1. New role in tracking cumulative 
risk.
414. Cumulative risk
Continued ....
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BB
Q13
I think that that is a  splendid example. In 
my previous existence in the DCSA  
[Defence Communications Sen/ices 
Agency], when I was challenged by 
General Rapper to get under the skin of 
industry, the cry from a number of people 
was ‘well it’s all very well talking to 
industry they can cut corners because 
people don’t die if they get it wrong’.
1. Industry cut corners to make 
profit
415. Security behaviour
CC
Q13
But banks would probably beg to differ. In 
the business health sense they would die 
if they screwed up big time and therefore 
they are incentivised almost to the same 
extent as we are for safety critical 
software. So, yes I believe we should be 
looking closely at that.
1. Lessons from other sectors are 
important
416. Lessons cross sectors
DD
Q14
Applying the risk management approach 
is the best methodology. To say that, in 
theory, nothing is off limits and that 
appropriately advised and once the risks 
had been properly assessed then there is 
the scope to adopt.
1. Risk management depends 
upon proper assessment and 
guidelines
417. Risk management
EE
Q15
By inference we might think that we are 
potentially at less threat because of the 
tenuous nature of our connectivity and our 
lack of continual presence makes us less 
attractive to external attack. I think the 
internal vulnerabilities are just as acute 
and the impact is potentially more acutely 
felt through the lack of expertise on-board 
and the lack of the ability to rapidly ship in 
that expertise. Once again, the bandwidth 
constraints to remotely apply patches and 
reach back to the hub. Physical security is 
much improved - you have a tin box 
around you to protect and deter.
1. Non-permanent connectivity 
reduces vulnerability
2. Internal vulnerabilities include 
lack of IT expertise
3. Bandwidth
4. On-board physical security well 
covered
418. Connectivity
419. Lack of IT security 
expertise
420. Bandwidth
421. Physical security
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CIS1: Summary of initial analysis
CIS1 ~| Category Attributes
Cultural barriers 
Ways of working 
New cyber security skills needed
People’s security behaviour
Organisation’s security culture Command and control
Information management
Need to know v need to share
Autonomy v micro-management
Information governance
Management reaction to security incidents
Security culture
Risker owner
Environment Environment - enemy 
Environment - elements 
Need to protect electronic environment 
Boundaries of responsibility
Technology
Critical assets
Sources of threats
Outcomes
Bandwidth 
IT limitations 
Total reliance on ICT 
Technological barriers 
Network defence
Information for decisions 
Information experts 
Information for operations support
Cyber
Change not thought through 
No contingency 
Ubiquitous networks 
Attack population - external 
Attack population -  internal 
Network attack 
Obsolete technology 
Cumulative risk
Connectivity
CIS2 21st July 2009
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Q1 and 
Q2
Omitted because CIS2 has no sea going 
experience
A
Q3
Same as an HQ environment. The 
purpose is different -  to run a ship, but the 
way should be very similar. When 
personnel move ashore the principles 
should be the same. There is a massive 
role for information from sensors to 
intelligence to administration to keep the 
ship running. Information overload very 
important to avoid in the afloat 
environment. It happens in HQs as well. 
It’s a nuisance in HQ, but afloat could be 
danqerous.
1. Transferable skills
2. W hat could be a nuisance 
ashore could be a serious problem 
afloat
422. Transferable skills
423. Barrier depends upon 
prevailing conditions and 
circumstances
B
Q3
W e need to reduce overloading. There is 
no technology in place. Much is cultural 
and behavioural like guide lines and 
protocols. My experience is that no one 
adheres to them. For example, I receive 
information copies of e-mail which takes 
time to wade through. It’s about push 
versus pull. The technology is emerging to 
enable pull. Although the technology will 
not be used properly until the critical mass 
working that way. Such as posting 
information etc. The afloat solutions 
coming soon.
1. Information overload
2. Culture and behaviour
3. Push v pull
424. Information overload
425. Change security culture
426. Change security behaviour
427. Push v pull
C
Q4
Inconsistent: People have inconsistent 
levels of experience. Team  Site use is 
inconsistent, people still use attachment 
versus instead of links. W e are not as bad 
as other Divisions.
Improving, slowly, our use of information. 
This is a general problem -  do not 
appreciate collaborative working versus 
dissemination or publish to wider 
audience.
One more -  records management is a 
problem area for everyone. This partly due 
to poor tooling and partly poor culture.
1. Inconsistent experience
2. Inconsistent behaviour
3. Improving slowly
4. Records management poor due 
to technology and culture
428. Lack of experience
429. Change behaviour
430. Records management
D
Q5
Very much so, led by ACOS. Absolutely 
as you would expect for C4ISTAR.
1. Information is an important 
asset
431. Information as asset
D
Q6
If we go back one year then massive. 
Personal data encryption rules using 
approved products; removal of hard discs 
and memory sticks off site; and cultural 
changes have led to a much better 
understanding of the need to protect 
Information Assurance assets. For my 
Section this has led to more procurement 
action.
1. Changing security culture 432. Changing security culture
433. Changing security 
behaviour
Continued ....
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Certain interviewees have suggested that 
HMG have overreacted. Would you like to 
comment?
E
Additional
question
Yes, I think initially there was a knee jerk. 
But common sense coming through. 
Deadlines for optical media have been 
extended. The difference between 
personal and protective marking has more 
sensible discrimination. Whether we can 
meet new timelines is debateable. Risk 
balance cases are being accepted if 
shown to be working towards full 
compliance. Burton and Hanigan reports 
take the utopian position. It is up to the 
Department (MODUK) to take sensible 
path. Especially after the impact of the 
losses. Everyone more sensitive -  For 
example, if I take my laptop (off base) I 
carry it with me rather than leave in the 
car.
1. Sensitivity to security issues is 
changing
434. Security behaviour
Will the sensitivity stand the test of time?
F
Additional
question
It is a risk unless constantly reinforced. 
Must be embedded in operations and 
daily business then it will be ok. W e are 
not at that point. W e need constant 
reinforcement. Information Assurance 
must reset target or fade. Should be on 
same footing as diversity etc. Treat like 
that or it will fade again.
1. Could lose momentum if not 
constantly reinforced with security 
awareness campaign
435. Security culture
436. Security behaviour
G
Q7
First thing is the reputational impact on 
MODUK and certainly on the (Royal) 
Navy. Reputation is more than real 
impact. In extreme circumstances it could 
have an impact on operations, but this is 
rare. If you know then you can do 
something. There is a  morale issue -  if 
one of my team lost something now I 
would be very angry. It would do 
C4ISTAR damage. W e set best use 
practice and set an example to others.
1. Impact on reputation when 
things go wrong
2. Impact on operations
3. Impact on morale
437. Impact: reputation
438. Impact: operations
439. Impact: morale
H
Q7
A virus could lead to the loss of capability. 
Conficker, for example, led to the 
disconnection, of certain Units, from the 
RLI leading to a temporary loss of 
capability. This example with NAVYSTAR  
became inconvenient. W e have fall-back 
at the moment. That’s the worry about 
putting all across Dll.
1. Impact: loss of capability
2. Loss of contingency once all on 
one network
440. Loss of capability
441. Single point of failure
442. Contingency
I
Q7
There is an interesting parallel with banks 
etc. W hat happens when the Internet is 
not available? I run my affairs on the 
Internet. W hat happens if it all falls over? 
Do they have fall-back?
1. Fall-back procedures 443. Fall-back
444. Contingency
Continued ....
194
CIS2
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of maritime environment and ICT 
security
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
H
Q8
I have never heard of a virus on military 
messaging. W e have more vulnerability to 
hacking into IP systems. The more reliance 
on technology then the experienced 
hackers will look to exploit in terms of 
malware and executable code.
1. X25 systems are inherently 
safe because of their 
architecture
2. Vulnerability lies with IP 
networks
445. Legacy systems
446. IP vulnerabilities
I
Q9
The other issues -  more sophisticated and 
on-board support requires extra skills and 
on-board support. Extra skills required by 
MSP for example the NAVYNET  
maintainer skills will need uplifting.
Perhaps not extra more like different skills. 
On the other hand system skills and 
redundancy minimise single point of failure. 
The one positive thing is you have a self- 
contained environment (at sea). You can 
disconnect and still run. Core node loss 
shore side means lost data.
1. Change to on-board skills 
required
2. New skills required
3. Secure box at sea
447. Change to skill set
448. Physical security
J
Q10
It has been, no doubt, with people carrying 
laptops in cars and airports -  not carrying 
dongle and laptop separately. In my 
opinion it is probably the major cause of 
security incidents. The other cause is 
people under pressure to deliver output.
For example sending data over the Internet 
and going astray. Senior officer needs to 
get this information and the Internet is the 
only way to do so. Achieving output is more 
important than security.
1. Laptops outside of the 
physical security perimeter
2. Pressure of work leads to 
shortcuts
3. Operations takes precedence 
over security
449. Security boundaries
450. Changing people’s security 
behaviour
451. Operations v security
K
Q11
Only issue is the Commanding Officer is 
more empowered to take risk than in an 
HQ. Operation imperative lead to more risk 
than sat in HQ.
1. Operations override security 452. Operations override 
security
Q12, Q13  
and Q 14
Omitted because of time constraint
L
Q15
I suppose that you don’t have permanent 
network connection which could reduce the 
vulnerability.
1. Not always connected so not 
always vulnerable
453. Malicious activity
M
Q16
Network Enabled Capability probability 
brings that additional vulnerability.
1. Network working implies 
potential for vulnerability
454. Malicious activity
N
Q17
Generally, the more IP connectivity you 
have that potential to exploit maliciously.
1. More connectivity implies 
more attack routes
455. Malicious activity
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C IS2 | Category Attributes
People’s security behaviour
Organisation’s security culture
Critical assets
Environment
Technology
Sources of threats
Outcomes
Transferable skills 
Lack of experience 
Change needed 
Change to skill set 
Security boundaries
Change needed 
Operations v security 
Operations override security
Barrier depends upon prevailing conditions and 
circumstances
Records management
Information
Contingency
Information overload 
Single point of failure 
Fall-back 
IP vulnerably 
Physical security 
Malicious activity
Impact: reputation 
Impact: operations 
Impact: morale 
Loss of capability
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A
Q1
Of course it does. There are specific 
instances. W e are more secure in some 
senses. There are constraints due to 
bandwidth. This tends to lead to technical 
issues such as virus updates, patch 
information and ensuring access to latest 
advice and policy.
1. Secure from physical sense
2. Less prone to threats when not 
connected
3. Bandwidth constraints
4. Downloading software can be a 
problem
456. Physical security
457. IT threats
458. Bandwidth
B
Q1
Physical no major changes more about 
information management and information 
issues.
1. Physical issues remain as they 
have been
2. Emphasis on information 
management and security
459. Physical security
460. Information management
461. Information security
C
Q2
Increasingly, from an RN perspective, 
people are seeking to have new integrated 
support solutions with reach back. No 
longer want to wait to get into harbour. 
365/24 coverage is expected but not 
always available -  which brings tensions. 
Information management not fully thought 
through at sea. W e do not procure for the 
C4 architecture to which we deliver which 
constrains our ability to deliver NEC.
1. Easier to seek virtual 
professional help from ashore
2. Expectations of IT not being 
met by procurement
462. Reduction in skills
463. Increased dependence
464. IT expectations
D
Q3
Comes back to expectation of constantly 
being in touch. W e expect e-mail as a  
minimum to keep in contact with our 
support agencies and we get lost in 
information management issues.
1. Information management issues 465. Information management
E
Q3
For example, as a Charge Engineer at sea 
I would send signals (OPDEF) between 
support authority and command chain. But 
now, a Gun Maintainer may already have 
made contact and the Charge Engineer is 
out of the decision chain and actions 
taken on equipment responsible for but 
not know -  we have not thought through 
information management. The 
Commanding Officer used to authorise 
signals, this is no longer the case. W e  
recognise the problem. C O ’s Orders need 
to include orders that no actions taken 
until CO and Command informed.
1. Chain of command can be 
circumvented
466. Command and control
ii 
00 
°
It is a cultural shift from hierarchy for 
information to flat structures and authority 
to act.
1. Hierarchy v flat management 
structures
467. Hierarchy v flat
management structures
G
Q4
1. Trying hard but need to embed ways of 
working within culture
2. Revise our views on information -  
present in topical format not hierarchy. W e  
are getting there. It may be the 
technology. With MOS we will be able to 
cut, dice and store more efficiently. You 
must conform now and wait for MOS.
3. Not intuitive -  we need to be driven by 
metadata viewed in human format but in 
one system and one source of truth.
1. Trying hard but not yet there
2. Trying to change information 
culture
3. Trying to change behaviour
468. Changing culture
469. Changing people’s 
behaviour
Continued ....
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H
Q5
It does; we make the platitudes. However 
we do not we do not the resources into 
information management. W e do not 
understand the ways of working. Lack the 
training at the basic level such as Team  
Sites, attachments verses links and 
references in documents. If you are 
serious SIO needs to be imbedded in 
business and ability to change needs to 
be driving from upon high. CIO  
(organisation) beginning to realise this. 
Without policies at 2 Star and higher then 
there will be no change. However, still' 
resource limited.
1. Lack of understanding of 
information management
2. Lack of security awareness
3. Trying to change ways of 
working
4. Senior management needs to 
understand security issues
470. Information management
471. Security awareness
472. Ways of working
473. Senior management
I
Q6
Two pressures in IA: Embarrassment of 
losses led to a review on handling 
procedures concentrating on the Data 
Protection Act. General review almost 
draconian taking us back to need to know, 
don’t share and compartmentalised. 
Contrasting with operations and NEC  
pushing from the other end based on need 
to share. Two ends pulling in opposite 
directions. W e are working on how to 
achieve both. Effective assured delivery is 
what we want. Timely information is 
needed if you are entitled to see it.
1. Outcome -  embarrassment
2. Over reaction
3. Retuning to need to know
4. Conflicts with need to share
474. Embarrassment
475. Over reaction
476. Need to know v need to 
share
J
Q7
From a general perspective -  over 
reliance on IT to conduct some 
compulsory tasks with no fall-back -  lack 
of disaster recovery.
1. Over reliance
2. No fall-back
3. No contingency plans
477. Over reliance
478. No fall-back
479. No contingency plans
K
Q8
W e [RN] are going to a bigger network - 
Dll driving all eggs in one basket and 
afloat risk to high grade messaging. 
Traditional threat from current state, to 
new networks and the threat to support 
operations during transition of systems.
1. Ubiquitous network
2. Loss of command and control
3. Vulnerability during transition to 
network working
480. Single point of failure
481. Command and control
482. Transition vulnerabilities
i 01 
-
10
Poor understanding due to over 
complication and contradictory. For 
example, Removable media must be 
encrypted but technology not available.
1. Too complicated and often 
contradictory
2. Technology not available to 
meet security requirements
483. IT too complicated
484. IT  not meeting security 
requirements
M
Q10
Constant education and reminders but 
faced with a  difficult problem. Pressure 
from command line and line management 
to achieve and output leads to ‘sneaker 
net’ use. W e have to understand the risk 
to overcome limitations.
1. Security education and 
awareness pushed. Even so, 
shortcuts taken
2. Risk involved not understood
485. Education
486. Awareness
487. Risk management
N
Q11
W e need to be cognisant with business 
rules being applied by the organisation but 
hope that there would be a level of 
delegations: understand; greater 
autonomy to a certain level; and seen to 
get waivers. One would hope the 
technology would minimise the need to 
move data from system to system.
1. Need consistent security rules 
across the organisation
2. But, need delegated authority in 
certain circumstances
3. Network technology will help 
keep data in once place, one 
source of truth and ‘pull’ what you 
need
488. Consistent security rules
489. Delegation where 
appropriate
490. Better technology to pull 
when needed
Continued ....
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CIS3
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of ICT security in a maritime 
environment
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
Q12 Omitted because CIS3 unsighted on the issue
0
Q13
At the moment we design systems then 
apply security. There needs to be a step 
change in information systems design. 
With metadata it should be possible to 
apply security tags to information.
1. Security by design 491. Security by design
P
Q14
System high approach but then have 
cultural approach -  need to share versus 
system approach unless you have taken a 
conscious decision to use.
1. All data in one (virtual) place. 
Then give access to those that 
need to see the relevant parts
492. Security by design
Q
Q15
Can apply to maritime and deployed 
issues such as bandwidth.
1. Threats and vulnerabilities 
similar afloat and ashore
493. Threats
494. Vulnerabilities
R
Q16
More and more to wider threats as we 
grow the size of the network. The 
techniques are out there -  we need to 
ensure technology for layered defence.
1. Will grow as time progresses 
and network expands
2. Need for layered defence
495. Will grow as time 
progresses and network 
expands
496. Need for layered defence
Q17 Omitted because of time constraint
CIS3: Summary of initial analysis
CIS3 | Category Attributes
Reduction in skills 
Changing behaviour 
Security awareness 
Ways of working 
Education 
Awareness
Command and control
Hierarchy v flat management structures
Changing culture
Over reaction
Need to know v need to share 
Risk management 
Consistent security rules 
Delegation where appropriate
Organisation’s security culture
People’s security behaviour
Technology
Environment
Critical assets
Sources of threats
IT too complicated
IT not meeting security requirements
Single point of failure
Transition vulnerabilities
Better technology to pull when needed
Security by design
Need for layered defence
Information
Physical security 
IT threats 
Bandwidth
Increased dependency on IT 
Over reliance 
No fall-back 
No contingency plans
Will grow as time progresses and network expands
Outcomes
Raised expectations not met
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C0N1 25th June 2009
Data
block
and
question
Interview ee's opinions  
of ICT security in a m aritim e  
environm ent
Researcher’s interpretation of 
in terview ee’s opinions
R esearch code
A
Q1
It’s a relatively small community. Focus 
almost holey work focused with no 
recreation or other outlets. The physical 
environment can be challenging, the 
weather, sea states and cold.
1. Close knit community
2. W ork centric
3. W eather can be counter 
productive
497. People’s working 
conditions
498. People’s behaviour
499. Natural obstacles
B
Q2
There are the long working hours with 
disrupted sleep patterns. The confined 
space and closed community can lead to 
tension. Personal issues can exist and 
you have to be flexible.
1. Working conditions
2. Psychological problems
3. Inter-personal problems
500. People’s behaviour
501. Reaction to difficult 
conditions
C
Q3
All the roles that IT plays in any business 
setting.
1. Roles of IT the same afloat and 
ashore
502. Roles of IT
D
Q3
IT used to be disjointed. It was not long 
ago that when you sailed you 
disconnected from the organisation and 
infrastructure. In a period of 20 to 25 years 
that has radically changed. The rate of 
change has increased and network 
enabled ships leads to longer detached 
working. This all feeds the stress already 
caused by the environment. I think it must 
be horrendous to be at sea and being fed 
by the e-mail machine -  information 
requests, enquires and demands.
1. Move from isolated working to 
virtual real-time connections
2. Leads to increased stress from 
incessant push of information and 
requests for information
503. Changed working patterns
504. Stress
505. Information overload
E
Q 4
The life blood for any organisation. 
Information, that’s how all organisations 
work. Even a simple example of a corner 
shop. They need to know their customer 
requirements, shopping habits and 
suppliers.
1. Life blood. 506. Information critical
F
Q5
It thinks it does. But it does not truly 
understand the value of the information it 
has or treat handling and processing with 
the kind of value it ought to.
1. Value of information not 
understood
2. Handling of information could 
be better
507. Value of information
508. Handling of information
G
Q6
This has had impact both good and bad. 
Whilst the loss is bad and clearly lax 
policy and procedure allowed loss. 
Reaction to the loss is having a 
disproportionate effect which is hampering 
the use of information to best effect. It 
may be solving the problem we have but 
massively overcompensating which has 
caused more problems which may in time 
prove to be more adverse than the loss of 
personal data in the first place.
1. Lax security policy and process
2. Disproportionate response
3. Caused more problems
4. Long term impact not known
509. Policy and process
510. Management response to 
incidents
511. Long term impact
H
Q7
To our organisation you would 
immediately stop current dynamic 
command and control capability. This 
would impact on any form of decision 
making. You would isolate forward 
deployed decision makers from their 
sources. W ider scale activity direction 
would be lost and loss of interaction. They 
would use different words in a  commercial 
organisation but same effect.
1. Loss of command and control
2. Decision making lacks 
information
3. Isolate widely dispersed units
4. Strategic decisions 
compromised
512. Command and control
513. Tactical operations
514. Strategic operations
Continued ....
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C0N1
Data
block
and
question
Interview ee's opinions  
of m aritim e environm ent and ICT  
security
Researcher’s interpretation o f 
in terview ee’s opinions
Research code
I
Q8
Probably not truly new; much more of 
what we have now. Maybe the threats are 
there; where they pop up will change. 
Scale and scope will be the daunting 
factor. I question how much theory should 
make it to the practical environment. 
There is an issue of balance.
1. Threats are threats
2. Vulnerabilities change
3. Scale of the problem will 
increase with network working
4. Not keen on theory -  prefers 
practical solutions
5. Balance between theory and 
practice
515. Threats are threats
516. Vulnerabilities change
517. Network working
518. Theory v practice
J
Q9
One has to try to avoid single points of 
failure within the infrastructure. You have 
to make IT security that is either 
transparent to the User Community or 
extremely simple for User Community to 
interact.
1. Single point of failure
2. Security built or has to be User 
friendly
519. Single point of failure
520. Security v User
521. User v security
K
Q10
Education of people is probably one of the 
biggest causes of failure; this is not a new 
challenge or issue.
1. Still not getting security 
education right
522. People’s security behaviour
L
Q10
Don’t make it to complicated or boring. 
The current approach to IT security is not 
intuitive -  not yet simple enough to make 
training etc. simple.
1. Security and so associate 
training too complex which 
equates to boring for Users
523. People’s security behaviour
524. Security v User
M
Q11
W e must evolve a method of risk 
management not the current method of 
risk aversion -  the root cause of 
overreaction to loss of data. W e must 
manage, understand and deal with. If not, 
there will be no evolution. If driven by 
profit motive, organisations will 
understand and try to do risk 
management. Could become completely 
paralysed in a military sense constrained.
1. Risk management rather than 
risk avoidance
2. Senior management need to 
avoid risk
3. Risk avoidance equates to no 
progress
4. Will fall behind in technology 
terms and so be unable to fight 
cyber war
525. Risk management
526. Risk avoidance
527. Avoidance v progress
528. Capability outdated
Q12, 
Q13 and 
Q 14
Omitted because of time constraint
N
Q15
Might be so, ITSy risk should be part of 
the overall delivering mission. There 
probably are. Because of physical 
displacement of platform to land. 
Therefore, point of linkage becomes point 
of failure, and because maritime platform 
alternatives and diversity are limited -  not 
as many options.
1. Risk management should be 
built into operations
2. Single point of failure
3. Limited alternative routing
529. Risk management
530. Single point of failure
531. Contingency
O
Q16
Will change in time. The very complexity 
of technology itself may limit the ability to 
interfere.
1. Evolving with time
2. Complexity could work in our 
favour. If we cannot find it they 
cannot find it
532. Evolving cyber threat
533. Unexpected benefit
P
Q16
The wrong doer has to become more 
technically competent. Listening to digital 
signals needs a sophisticated level of 
technology to intercept. On the other hand 
they could take a  physical route to disrupt, 
blow-up cut wires etc. More sophisticated 
infrastructure may be able to re-route as a 
result, but they still may find a single point 
of failure.
1. Cyber criminals require 
technical capability
2. Electronic eavesdropping
3. May chose a physical attack in 
preference to complicated 
technical attack
4. Technical reconnoitre
534. Ill-disposed technical 
capability
535. Eavesdropping
536. Physical threats and 
vulnerabilities
537. Ill-disposed conducting 
reconnaissance
Q
Q17
People talk about mobile phone tracking 
at sea. You do not want to make it obvious 
when away from land, but when in sight of 
land or in harbour it’s very difficult to hide 
a ship. The German commerce raiders 
used deceptive communications and 
disguises.
1. Location tracking
2. Visual tracking
3. Radio for deception
538. Location tracking
539. Visual tracking
540. Radio for deception
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C0N1: Summary of initial analysis
C 0N 1 I Category Attributes
People’s security behaviour
Organisation’s security culture
Technology
Environment
Critical assets
People’s working conditions 
People’s behaviour 
People’s security behaviour 
Reaction to difficult conditions 
Changed working patterns 
Stress
Theory v practice 
Ill-disposed technical capability
Policy and process
Management response to incidents
Command and control
Tactical operations
Strategic operations
Command and control
Security v User
User v security
Risk management
Risk avoidance
Avoidance v progress
Contingency
Natural obstacles
Roles of IT
Handling of information 
Network working 
Single point of failure 
Capability outdated 
Evolving cyber threat 
Unexpected benefit
Information critical 
Value of information
Sources of threats Information overload 
Threats are threats 
Vulnerabilities change 
Eavesdropping
Physical threats and vulnerabilities 
Ill-disposed conducting reconnaissance 
Location tracking 
Visual tracking 
Radio for deception
Outcomes Long term impact
C0N2 2nd September 2009
Author’s note: This interview was conducted as an informal discussion of security principles because 
the interviewee has no sea going experience.
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of ICT security in a maritime 
environment
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
A The challenges faced in delivering 
situational awareness.
1. Delivering situational 
awareness
541. Situational awareness
B The difficulty defending your own and 
others information.
1. Defending information 542. Information as asset
C Difficulties maintaining communication links.
1. Maintaining communications 
links
543. Communications links
D It is difficult to bring security principles to bear at extreme distances.
1. Distributed security 544. World-wide
545. Distributed security
E
W hat do 1 need to do, what do 1 need to 
prosecute, how do 1 prosecute it and how 
can 1 do that keeping a high quality of IA 
to do it? So what technical solutions are 
available for me to do that?
1. Plan
2. Develop
3. Implement
4. Look to technical solutions that 
are tried and tested
546. Management
547. Existing solutions
F
A common [MODUK] understanding of 
terminology remains a challenge. Indeed, 
the use of [MODUK] terminology is 
different from that used in government.
1. The need for a common 
taxonomy
548. Common taxonomy
G
There is a lack of understanding of how 
information can be used correctly and that 
training is required to overcome this. The 
lack of understanding of the technology 
makes it difficult to understand security 
risks. W hen you lose the understanding of 
the integral linkages between security, 
management information, knowledge 
management and exploit information 
starts to break down.
1. Information as asset not 
understood
2. Training required to overcome 
lack of understanding
3. Lack of understanding of the 
technology and linkages makes it 
difficult to plan for security
4. Information management starts 
to break down
549. Information a asset
550. Information training
551. Understanding technology 
and linkages
552. Breakdown in management 
systems
H
MODUK losses of information are starting 
to drop off.
1. Rates of incidents falling in 
2009
553. Report and monitor
1 There is no money to go back to an 
entirely risk free world -  and life isn't risk 
free.
1. No money to return to fortress 
security
2. Fortress security a bit of a myth 
anyway
554. Cost of security
555. No incentive to return to 
fortress security
556. Security pipe dream
J Data aggregation and financial risk 
reaching ‘critical’ levels and a growing 
realisation that risk should not be allowed 
to stack up.
1. E.g. How many restricted 
documents in one place add up to 
secret?
2. Compound risk not a good thing
557. Data aggregation
558. Risk management
559. Compound risk
K A good maritime threat and vulnerability 
analysis has not been conducted. As a 
result, decisions are being made without 
the full facts.
1. Needs threat and vulnerability 
assessment
2. Decisions on security being 
made without the full facts
560. Threat assessment
561. Vulnerability assessment
562. Risk blind
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C0N2 Summary of initial analysis
C0N2 | Category
People’s security behaviour
Organisation’s security culture
Technology
Environment
Sources of threats
Critical assets
Outcomes
Attributes
Situational awareness 
Information training 
Report and monitor
Management of security issues
Common taxonomy
Breakdown in management systems
Report and monitor
Cost of security
No incentive to return to fortress security
Security pipe dream
Risk management
Compound risk
Risk blindness
World-wide
Communications links 
Distributed security 
Use of existing solutions 
Understanding technology and linkages
Information as asset 
Data aggregation
Threat assessment 
Vulnerability assessment
None
C0N3 2nd September 2009
Author’s note: This interview was conducted as an informal discussion of security principles because 
the interviewee has no sea going experience.
Data
block
and
question
Interviewee's opinions 
of ICT security in a maritime 
environment
Researcher’s interpretation of 
interviewee’s opinions
Research code
A
It is better to have security technology that 
supports people rather than technology 
with all the bells and whistles.
1. Security for the people. 563. Security by design
B
Bad security practice is a cause of 
incidents but also the need to get the job 
done leads to taking short cuts. If security 
practice is embedded in normal business 
then business practice should improve 
and management of risks become 
standard practice.
1. Peoples actions can cause 
security incidents.
2. Operational imperatives can 
override security practice.
3. Security should be part of 
normal business activity
4. Security risk management as 
standard practice.
564. People’s behaviour
565. Security awareness
566. Operational imperatives
567. Security imperatives
568. Security by design
569. Security risk management
C
The new linkage between career 
progression and disciplinary action [The 
no blame culture is being replaced with 
facing the consequence of actions]. This is 
leading to improved behaviour.
1. Make people accountable for 
their actions.
2. Improved behaviour by threats 
of punitive response.
3. Replacing no blame culture.
570. Accountability
571. People’s behaviour
D
Risk can be sensibly managed as long as 
mitigation processes are in place.
1. Risk management required
2. Contingency plans to mitigate 
against failure.
572. Risk management
573. Contingency
E
Raising consciousness (awareness), it 
identifies the frailties in explicit ways and 
helps to identify the investment strategy 
needed in order to improve. It would help 
if MODUK would adopt normal risk 
management processes in this area. 
However, MODUK is doing the right 
things; it just needs to get better. The 
security methodology and processes are 
good enough.
1. Awareness of the problems 
helps with vulnerability analysis 
and the best way to spend to 
improve security.
2. MODUK security could be 
better.
574. Security awareness
575. Vulnerability assessment
576. Operating costs
577. Security risk management
F
There is a  need to apply the threat 
assessments and mitigation in the 
business context. There is also a need to 
embed security design into capability 
design so that it enables rather than 
dampens and weakens practice.
1. Security and operations must 
correspond.
2. Build security into the system 
from day one.
578. Threat assessment
579. Security by design
G
There is nothing worse than a bolted on 
security measure. The best way to 
achieve safety is by design from the first 
stage.
1. Bad security design can lead to 
lowering of morale.
2. Cost implications if security 
applied as an after-thought.
580. Security by design
581. People’s behaviour
582. Security practices
H
An opportunity arose to chat about wider 
issues. He believes that ICT procurement 
across HMG should be based on design. 
Also talked about MODUK enterprise wide 
initiatives, one of which is the three part 
MODUK Information Strategy (MODIS).
1. ICT bought by HMG should 
have security by design.
2. MODUK initiatives must include 
security.
583. Security by design
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C0N3: Summary of initial analysis
C0N3 Category
Environment
Outcomes
Source of threats
Organisation’s security culture
Technology
Critical assets
People’s security behaviour
Attributes
People’s behaviour cannot be guaranteed in difficult 
circumstances
Lack of security accountability 
Lack of security awareness
Security risk management 
Operational imperatives override security 
Inadequate security practices in place
None
Lack of security by design 
Threats to ICT 
Vulnerabilities of ICT
None
None
None
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